Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09NOUAKCHOTT798
2009-12-14 07:44:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Nouakchott
Cable title:  

MAURITANIA: 2009 COUNTRY REPORTS ON TERRORISM

Tags:  PTER ASEC MR 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXYZ0000
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHNK #0798/01 3480744
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 140744Z DEC 09
FM AMEMBASSY NOUAKCHOTT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8955
INFO RUEILB/NCTC WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
UNCLAS NOUAKCHOTT 000798 

SIPDIS

S/CT: RHONDA SHORE AND NCTC

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PTER ASEC MR
SUBJECT: MAURITANIA: 2009 COUNTRY REPORTS ON TERRORISM

REF: A. STATE 109980

B. SECSTATE 122733

UNCLAS NOUAKCHOTT 000798

SIPDIS

S/CT: RHONDA SHORE AND NCTC

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PTER ASEC MR
SUBJECT: MAURITANIA: 2009 COUNTRY REPORTS ON TERRORISM

REF: A. STATE 109980

B. SECSTATE 122733


1. (U) Al-Qa'ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) represented
the primary terrorist threat to Mauritania. After two
attacks in late December 2007 and two others in 2008,
including the February attack against the Israeli embassy and
the September Tourine attack that cost the lives of 11
soldiers and their civilian guide, AQIM significantly
increased its level of activity and severity of attacks. In
2009:

- On November 29, three Spanish aid workers traveling in a
caravan from Nouadhibou to Nouakchott were kidnapped by
gunmen in an attack claimed by AQIM.

- On June 23, American citizen Christopher Leggett was
murdered by two gunmen upon arriving at his workplace in
Nouakchott. AQIM claimed responsibility for the murder,
stating Leggett was targeted for Christian proselytizing
activities.

- On August 8, a suicide bomber affiliated with AQIM
detonated his explosive belt next to the French Embassy
compound in Nouakchott. There were no fatalities other than
the attacker. This marks the first suicide bomber attack in
the history of the country.


2. (U) The lawless eastern and northern regions of
Mauritania were a haven for smugglers and terrorists. The
porous borders with Algeria, Mali, and Western Sahara posed
ongoing challenges for the ill-equipped and poorly funded
Mauritanian security services. In the case of the Leggett
murder and the suicide bomber attack, terrorists entered
Mauritania from outside the country with the sole intention
of carrying out operations. Through the year, there were
specific threats against U.S. interests and citizens in
Mauritania.


3. (U) The August 6, 2008 coup d'etat against
democratically elected President Sidi Ould Cheikh Abdallahi
resulted in the suspension of all U.S. government
non-humanitarian assistance, including most military
cooperation and counterterrorism training to the junta-led
government. Constitutional order was restored eleven months
after the coup following Abdallahi's resignation and the
naming of a transitional government of national unity that
led the country to presidential elections on July 18, won by
Mohamed Ould Abdel Aziz and recognized by the international
community. The U.S. government re-initiated its military
cooperation with the newly formed Mauritanian government in
September. Programs focusing on counterterrorism include the

Counterterrorism Fellowship Program and Special Forces
Training of Military CT units under the Joint Combined
Exercise Training Program. Prior to the coup, the U.S.
provided counterterrorism training to two Mauritanian units
and now plans to continue strengthening military capacity.


4. (U) In response to the increased terrorist threat in
Mauritania, the government strengthened roadblocks and road
security. In November, authorities announced the creation of
a new Road Security Agency in charge of monitoring terrorist
activity and all forms of trafficking in Mauritanian roads.
The government has consistently exhibited a willingness to
cooperate with the U.S. to prevent and deter future acts of
terrorism. Mauritanian authorities have been highly
responsive to U.S. requests for security support, both for
routine operations as well as special events, despite
security forces' somewhat limited means. American security
officials enjoy open access to their Mauritanian
counterparts. Also, although the new government does not yet
have a formal strategy to counter extremism, it has
demonstrated a willingness to assist the U.S. in implementing
counter-extremism programs.


5. (U) The Mauritanian government has displayed a
willingness to both investigate and apprehend individuals
involved in acts of terrorism against U.S. citizens or
interests, as shown by the arrest of the entire terrorist
cell responsible for planning and executing the Leggett
murder. Two members of the cell were apprehended on July 17
and the remaining members were taken into custody mere days
later. The government has stated its intention to try these
individuals.


6. (U) As of December 31, the Mauritanian government held
in custody approximately 66 terrorist suspects.
Approximately thirteen of them have already been prosecuted
and sentenced. In July, the Nouakchott court condemned Abdel
Jelil Ould Biye and Teyeb Ould Saleck, two terrorists who
participated in the 2005 Lemgheity attack, to eight and seven
years respectively. In November, the government of Senegal
extradited to Mauritania three Mauritanians allegedly
implicated in the August 8 suicide bomber attack against the
French Embassy.


7. (U) In order to improve regional coordination in the
fight against terrorism, Mauritania participated in an August
12 meeting in Tamanrasset (Algeria) with chiefs of staff from
Algeria, Mali, and Niger to draft a counterterrorism strategy
for the Sahara. According to the agreement, Mauritania will
deploy 4,000 soldiers to secure its borders with Mali and
Algeria. Mauritania has a strong bilateral military and
counterterrorism cooperation with France.


8. (U) Point of contact: Nitza Sola-Rotger, Political
Officer, sola-rotgern@state.gov, 222.525.2660 extension 4404



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