Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09NOUAKCHOTT657
2009-10-12 15:12:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Nouakchott
Cable title:
A PESSIMISTIC ALGERIAN OUTLOOK ON MAURITANIA
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C O N F I D E N T I A L NOUAKCHOTT 000657
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/12/2014
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER MR AG
SUBJECT: A PESSIMISTIC ALGERIAN OUTLOOK ON MAURITANIA
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Dennis Hankins for reasons 1.4 (b and
d)
C O N F I D E N T I A L NOUAKCHOTT 000657
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/12/2014
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER MR AG
SUBJECT: A PESSIMISTIC ALGERIAN OUTLOOK ON MAURITANIA
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Dennis Hankins for reasons 1.4 (b and
d)
1. (C) Departing Algerian Ambassador Rachid Chakib Kaid
(protect throughout) provided Charge a pessimistic outlook on
Mauritania's political prospects in the coming year. Kaid,
who has served in Mauritania for five years, said he had
witnessed the roller-coaster of recurring coups. He had
hoped to see stability and development set in under President
Abdallahi, but the August 2008 coup had proved that hope to
be short-lived. Kaid has told his replacement to expect
continued instability as he does not have an optimistic view
of President Aziz' future.
2. (C) The Algerian Ambassador saw Aziz in an extremely
difficult place. The country has very little money and the
prospects for significant development and investment funds
are years off at best. Aziz' populist and traditional
political campaign made things worse because he raised mass
expectations with promises he can't keep and made political
promises to more traditional leaders than he can take care
of. Aziz' successful transition from "coup leader" to
"constitutional leader" has, unfortunately, set the precedent
for some future military or security element to push him
aside if they are displeased with his performance. Charge
responded that we agree Aziz' is in a difficult economic
position -- a position that would have faced any of the
presidential contenders in the July elections -- but we are
cautioning opposition politicians not to relish the idea of a
new coup against Aziz. As conditions in Guinea have shown,
Mauritania could do far worse than Aziz. Kaid said he hoped
Aziz would be able to get the economy going and create
political stability -- two conditions he saw a vital for
Algerian security interests. He just wasn't confident.
3. (C) Kaid was more positive when discussing Mauritania's
commitment to combating terrorism. When he first arrived in
Nouakchott, Mauritanians dismissed any possibility of
domestic radicalization and saw the risk posed by Al Qaeda as
somewhat remote. The 2005 Lemghetty attack began to change
attitudes and, after the multiple terrorist attacks of 2007 -
2009, the Mauritanians now appear truly committed to taking
on AQIM and cognizant of their own internal radicalization
problem. Kaid saw Mauritanian engagement in Algiers'
four-way counter-terrorism coordination activities as
positive, but he viewed close Mauritanian-Malian cooperation
as unlikely since, "Aziz still resents that the Malians
openly condemned the coup and the Malians are sure he
provided material support to the Tuareg in retaliation."
4. (C) Kaid lamented that broad Maghrebian cooperation
remains hampered. While technical issues can be addressed
within the Arab Maghreb Union, "we can have no real
cooperation until we can have regular Head-of-State summits"
which remains impossible because of Western Sahara. He added
that the Libyans had failed to capitalize on their
simultaneous leadership of the African Union, CENSAD, AMU,
General Assembly, and seat on the Security Council but added,
"any country would be challenged doing any of these jobs well
-- doing them all together is impossible."
HANKINS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/12/2014
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER MR AG
SUBJECT: A PESSIMISTIC ALGERIAN OUTLOOK ON MAURITANIA
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Dennis Hankins for reasons 1.4 (b and
d)
1. (C) Departing Algerian Ambassador Rachid Chakib Kaid
(protect throughout) provided Charge a pessimistic outlook on
Mauritania's political prospects in the coming year. Kaid,
who has served in Mauritania for five years, said he had
witnessed the roller-coaster of recurring coups. He had
hoped to see stability and development set in under President
Abdallahi, but the August 2008 coup had proved that hope to
be short-lived. Kaid has told his replacement to expect
continued instability as he does not have an optimistic view
of President Aziz' future.
2. (C) The Algerian Ambassador saw Aziz in an extremely
difficult place. The country has very little money and the
prospects for significant development and investment funds
are years off at best. Aziz' populist and traditional
political campaign made things worse because he raised mass
expectations with promises he can't keep and made political
promises to more traditional leaders than he can take care
of. Aziz' successful transition from "coup leader" to
"constitutional leader" has, unfortunately, set the precedent
for some future military or security element to push him
aside if they are displeased with his performance. Charge
responded that we agree Aziz' is in a difficult economic
position -- a position that would have faced any of the
presidential contenders in the July elections -- but we are
cautioning opposition politicians not to relish the idea of a
new coup against Aziz. As conditions in Guinea have shown,
Mauritania could do far worse than Aziz. Kaid said he hoped
Aziz would be able to get the economy going and create
political stability -- two conditions he saw a vital for
Algerian security interests. He just wasn't confident.
3. (C) Kaid was more positive when discussing Mauritania's
commitment to combating terrorism. When he first arrived in
Nouakchott, Mauritanians dismissed any possibility of
domestic radicalization and saw the risk posed by Al Qaeda as
somewhat remote. The 2005 Lemghetty attack began to change
attitudes and, after the multiple terrorist attacks of 2007 -
2009, the Mauritanians now appear truly committed to taking
on AQIM and cognizant of their own internal radicalization
problem. Kaid saw Mauritanian engagement in Algiers'
four-way counter-terrorism coordination activities as
positive, but he viewed close Mauritanian-Malian cooperation
as unlikely since, "Aziz still resents that the Malians
openly condemned the coup and the Malians are sure he
provided material support to the Tuareg in retaliation."
4. (C) Kaid lamented that broad Maghrebian cooperation
remains hampered. While technical issues can be addressed
within the Arab Maghreb Union, "we can have no real
cooperation until we can have regular Head-of-State summits"
which remains impossible because of Western Sahara. He added
that the Libyans had failed to capitalize on their
simultaneous leadership of the African Union, CENSAD, AMU,
General Assembly, and seat on the Security Council but added,
"any country would be challenged doing any of these jobs well
-- doing them all together is impossible."
HANKINS