FORMER PRESIDENT ABDALLAHI - "I UNDERESTIMATED THE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NOUAKCHOTT 000623

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/27/2014
TAGS: PREL PGOV KDEM PINR MR
SUBJECT: FORMER PRESIDENT ABDALLAHI - "I UNDERESTIMATED THE
RESISTANCE TO CHANGE IN MAURITANIA"

Classified By: CDA Dennis Hankins for reasons 1.4 (b and d)


1. (C) A Man Content With Himself: Charge met with former
President Abdallahi on September 24 at his simple home in the
village of Lemden (three hours southeast of Nouakchott).
This was the first meeting with Abdallahi since he resigned
his office on June 24 as his part of the Dakar Accords.
Abdallahi was in very good health and spirits. He lives with
his daughter and middle son and no longer has any staff.
Gone are the Mauritanian security agents who
guarded/monitored him prior to his resignation. Abdallahi
has only rare visitors now and most of them are people asking
for a handout "because they think all ex-presidents are
rich." Abdallahi gives them a meal and a warm conversation,
but then must send them on their way. The former president
is happy in Lemden having spent only half a day at his house
in Nouakchott -- where his wife normally stays. Abdallahi
told the Charge he is content with his life and proud both of
his record as president and of his resistance to the coup
which, at minimum, forced the military to allow him to regain
his presidential powers (although momentarily) and allow for
a constitutional change of government. Abdallahi has no
future political ambitions although he sees his daughter and
eldest son perhaps pursuing a political career in the future.
His only personal lament is that his children will likely be
cut off from employment opportunities in Mauritania for the
immediate future.


2. (C) Similar Views To U.S. on Election: Unlike most of
the Mauritanian opposition leaders, the former president
accepted the July 18 elections albeit with disappointment.
"We had reasonably credible elections and now the opposition
has to adjust to a new reality." When Charge reminded
Abdallahi of a conversation they had nearly a year ago in
which the former president opined that the era of traditional
tribal and elite politics were over, Abdallahi said he had,
"underestimated the resistance to change in Mauritania."
Despite Aziz' control of the mechanisms of power right up to
the elections, Abdallahi resigned himself to the fact that
the majority of Mauritanians chose the traditional and "safe"
option of supporting whoever is in power rather than voting
for what was better for democracy. Having sent his elder
children to campaign on behalf of FNDD candidate Messaoud
ould Boulkheir, Abdallahi also said he had, "underestimated
the importance of money in Mauritanian politics." He noted
despondently that, "invariably conversations with local or
tribal leaders came down to one question -- 'What will your
candidate give me?' -- and nothing more."


3. (C) Less Harsh On Aziz: Abdallahi was consistently
respectful of Aziz referring to him only as "the President"
or "President Aziz" and never as "the General." Where he had
been fiercely critical of Aziz in the past, he now showed
some understanding of the huge challenges the new president
faces in view of floods, limited financial resources, severe
electrical shortages in the capital, and a weak economic
situation, He said, "I am not encouraged by what I see, but
I will have to allow the President some time before I dismiss
him entirely." Where he was most critical of Aziz was in the
new President's populist penchant for making promises he
can't keep. Abdallahi noted his advisors always cautioned
him not to say the truth about harsh economic realities, but
he had always insisted on being straight forward. Having
faced food riots himself as president, Abdallahi predicted
mass public discontent soon as it becomes evident that Aziz'
promises prove empty.


4. (C) More Harsh On The Opposition: Abdallahi chided the
opposition for not being able to get past the election loss.
He laughed off the "chemically altered ballot" theory put
forward by Ahmed Ould Daddah as reflective of a man "who has
done a great disservice to Mauritanian democracy." Abdallahi
said, "Ould Daddah was never able to accept my election
victory and did everything he could to destabilize my
government. He encouraged and supported the coup and only
turned against the military when he saw they wouldn't
organize elections to his liking." He praised the FNDD for
having built one of the few real political coalitions in
Mauritanian history, but he worried that coalition -- without
a common objective -- will wither away. "There are a few

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very good people in the FNDD," but others he saw as allies of
convenience. The former president hoped the FNDD would
retain some of its unity to build an effective parliamentary
opposition. He agreed with Charge that the opposition should
find a way to hold the Aziz government to a high standard but
not try to block action. Indicative of his increasing
distance from politics Abdallahi noted he had not spoken to
Ould Boulkheir since the elections (Comment: Personal
relations between the two were never warm. End Comment).


5. (C) Mixed on the International Community: Abdallahi
shared some of the displeasure of the opposition with the
international community during the Dakar Accords saying, "you
were fixated on a date (for the election) but never gave us a
rational reason why even a delay of two weeks was not
possible." He also said, "The oversight promised during the
transition period never materialized." Despite his
reservations, he did not seem to believe the end result would
have been any different as long as Aziz was allowed to run.
Abdallahi warmly praised the U.S. through both the Bush and
Obama Administrations saying, "You were the only country that
really seemed committed to supporting our democratic
experiment after I was elected and the only country to
maintain a clear and principled stance after the coup."
Despite his disappointment with the election results,
Abdallahi said, "Mauritanians will always remember what you
did for us. They know now they can trust the U.S. to do the
right thing." As always, Abdallahi remained confused about
the French. He was convinced that President Sarkozy had
truly supported Mauritanian democracy, but he saw over his
time in office that other French influences took over. He
asked rhetorically, "Do you think the French turned on me
because I decided to work closely with the United States?"


6. (C) Time Will Tell: Abdallahi said he did not share the
hopes of many opposition leaders that another coup will soon
displace Aziz, "One can never wish bad for ones own country,"
but he was not optimistic Aziz would be able to establish
political harmony or get the economy moving. He saw that the
eventual long-term results of the Dakar Accords would mean,
"Either the international community helped us Mauritanians
find a consensual exit to a political crisis, or the
international community legitimized a coup." He lamented
that the "Mauritanian model" no longer refers to the
post-2007 hopes of a democratic example for the Arab world,
but instead refers to how a coup leader can find legitimacy.
Already he had heard of coup leaders in Honduras and Conakry
demanding to be legitimized just as Aziz had.
HANKINS