Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09NOUAKCHOTT578
2009-09-14 09:19:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Nouakchott
Cable title:  

RESUMPTION OF PEACE CORPS OPERATIONS IN MAURITANIA

Tags:  PREL ASEC AMGT MR 
pdf how-to read a cable
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DE RUEHNK #0578/01 2570919
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 140919Z SEP 09
FM AMEMBASSY NOUAKCHOTT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8760
INFO RUEHBP/AMEMBASSY BAMAKO 0318
RUEHNM/AMEMBASSY NIAMEY 3300
C O N F I D E N T I A L NOUAKCHOTT 000578 

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT PLEASE PASS PEACE CORPS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/14/2014
TAGS: PREL ASEC AMGT MR
SUBJECT: RESUMPTION OF PEACE CORPS OPERATIONS IN MAURITANIA

REF: NOUAKCHOTT 575

Classified By: CDA Dennis Hankins for reasons 1.4 (b and d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L NOUAKCHOTT 000578

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT PLEASE PASS PEACE CORPS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/14/2014
TAGS: PREL ASEC AMGT MR
SUBJECT: RESUMPTION OF PEACE CORPS OPERATIONS IN MAURITANIA

REF: NOUAKCHOTT 575

Classified By: CDA Dennis Hankins for reasons 1.4 (b and d)


1. (C) Summary: Mission recommends the return of Peace
Corps volunteers in areas of lesser terrorist risk defined as
locations west of the Mission-designated "frontier zone."
Peace Corps volunteers in Nouakchott, if any, would have to
be placed in housing that meets USG standards for direct
hires. End Summary


2. (C) A new Security Strategy Based on AQIM Intent:
Reftel outlined the Mission,s "Layered Security Strategy"
stemming from the September 2-3 interagency conference held
in Nouakchott to discuss counter-terrorism and
counter-extremism engagement with the newly elected
Government of the Islamic Republic of Mauritania (GIRM). The
strategy draws from an understanding of AQIM tactics in
Mauritania that target outlying towns and cities that are
vulnerable to cross-desert hit-and-run attacks (defined as
the "frontier zone" running from Zouerate in the north to
Nema in the southeast) and Nouakchott (as the political
capital and home to a quarter or more of all Mauritanians)
for higher-profile attacks that may include VBIEDs, PBIEDs,
and assassination attempts. The areas west of the frontier
zone and outside of Nouakchott are deemed less at risk since
it is more difficult to escape after a hit-and-run attack
(because the attackers need to by-pass multiple security
check points),because they offer fewer high-value political
targets, and, because of their smaller populations, it is
difficult to conduct pre-attack surveillance. The Mission
response is: (a) to bolster early-warning through our
on-going and effective security cooperation as well as
provision as requested of airborne ISR and training and
equipping of the Mauritanian border patrol and long-range
reconnaissance units; (b) providing ongoing training and
equipment to the Mauritanian elite military counter-terrorism
units based in the "frontier zone;" and, (c) building
military command-and-control as well as police and justice
sector capacity in Nouakchott.


3. (C) Evaluating PCV Safety: On August 8, Peace Corps
headquarters in conjunction with the Department decided to
suspend its Mauritanian operations and either re-assign or
repatriate all of its volunteers in country. In its August
12 press release, Peace Corps noted, "Although it is the
Agency,s position that the Volunteers are relatively safe in
their communities and villages, it is potentially dangerous
for them to safely travel in the country." The combined
Peace Corp / Diplomatic Security assessment team also noted
the good security for the PCVs during their August 8 out
brief with the Ambassador. They noted a remarkably high
level of awareness and concern about the PCVs from community
leaders. They also noted the security effectiveness of check
points (often multiple) at roads leading into towns. The
August 12 statement also noted, "The Peace Corps will
continue to assess the situation and determine when the
security conditions on the ground permit the safe return of
Volunteers."


4. (C) A Safe Region to Operate: Threat reporting
continues to show a desire and capability for AQIM to conduct
terrorist operations in Mauritania. Consistent with Para. 1,
the threat reporting focuses on the "frontier zone" and
Nouakchott. It is unlikely the AQIM threat will diminish in
the foreseeable future. The nature of the threat reporting,
however, indicates that there are appreciably safer parts of
the country where renewed Peace Corps operations would be
possible. Post proposes that Peace Corps operations be
renewed in the provinces of Dakhlet Nouadhibou, Inchiri,
Brakna, Assaba, Gorgol, and Guidimaka. Peace Corps
operations would not take place in the provinces of Zemmour,
Adrar, Tagant, Hodh-el-Gharbi, and Hodh-el-Chargi (note:
there were no previous operations in Zemmour and
Hodh-el-Chargi provinces).


5. (C) Status of Nouakchott PCVs: There have never been a
large number of PCVs assigned to the capital of Nouakchott.
Those who have worked here have been "third years" who
demonstrated responsibility during their previous three
years. The volunteers have made useful contributions to
central Mauritanian training facilities based in Nouakchott.
Post would like to continue with these important postings but
only if we could provide a level of security on a par with
USG employees based here. That would include housing with
secure doors, an alarm, and guard service. Ideally,
Nouakchott PCVs would have vehicles so they would not need
public transit or taxis.


6. (C) Ambassador,s Consultations: Ambassador Boulware
will be in Washington October 3 to 16 and would welcome the
opportunity to discuss renewed Peace Corps operations during
his consultations.
HANKINS