Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09NOUAKCHOTT510
2009-08-11 15:21:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Nouakchott
Cable title:  

MAURITANIA: LEADER OF OPPOSITION OULD DADDAH SEES

Tags:  PREL PGOV PTER MR 
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NOUAKCHOTT 000510 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/10/2014
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER MR
SUBJECT: MAURITANIA: LEADER OF OPPOSITION OULD DADDAH SEES
CONTINUED DOWNWARD SPIRAL

Classified By: DCM Dennis Hankins for reasons 1.4 (b and d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NOUAKCHOTT 000510

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/10/2014
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER MR
SUBJECT: MAURITANIA: LEADER OF OPPOSITION OULD DADDAH SEES
CONTINUED DOWNWARD SPIRAL

Classified By: DCM Dennis Hankins for reasons 1.4 (b and d)


1. (C) Summary: Opposition leader Ahmed Ould Daddah
continues to see fraud in the July 18 presidential elections
even as he remains at a loss to explain how. He regrets that
the U.S. -- "the last hope for Mauritania" -- has accepted a
mechanical definition of democracy and opted for security
over real democracy. He welcomed possible U.S. initiatives
to support the fragile institutions of democracy. He sees no
political program for Aziz other than staying in power.
Without political vision, the Aziz government will continue a
downward economic and security spiral ending inevitably in
another coup. End Summary


2. (C) They stole it, but they were clever doing it: DCM
met August 11 with defeated presidential candidate Ahmed Ould
Daddah in the first embassy contact since the July 18
elections. A dejected Ould Daddah questioned the U.S.
position finding that Aziz had passed the technical criteria
of having won the elections, insisting the Aziz camp had
committed massive fraud but adding "they did it very well."
While speaking briefly of chemically altered ballots that
changed from "Ould Daddah" to "Aziz" votes after being put in
the ballot box (noting that unfortunately they had been
unable to get their hands on a single specimen of the 1.2
million ballots printed),Ould Daddah based most of his
argument of fraud on percentages for Aziz that just seemed
too consistent across voting precincts and far above what any
prior reading would have suggested possible. Despite
international recognition, Ould Daddah said, "this is not a
democracy -- it is just a continuation of military
government." He was disappointed that the U.S. had accepted
the results but added, "I understand why." He reserved his
true antipathy for the French who he saw as having abandoned
democracy for misplaced self interest.


3. (C) A Non-State: Ould Daddah said that Aziz "a petty
soldier" and his cohorts had succeeded in gaining power but
that Mauritania lacks any real government. He accused Aziz
of having no political ideology and no program to face
Mauritania's multiple challenges. Instead, he saw Aziz

driven by narrow self interest and, above all, by the desire
to stay in power. He added that he was extremely upset by
the August 8 suicide bombing in front of the French Embassy
which he saw as the first step in a downward spiral that
could make Mauritania another Somalia in two years. He
added, The French, and you to a lesser extent, are deceiving
yourself if you think you can tackle terrorism with Aziz."
While accepting that military and intelligence liaison could
mitigate some of the immediate threats of AQIM, he noted
"Mauritanians used to be peaceful -- there were no
Mauritanian terrorists ten years ago" arguing that the roots
of radicalization could only be addressed through development
and good governance. Stating again that Aziz had no
political vision beyond his survival, Ould Daddah saw him
incapable of addressing -- indeed, more likely to provoke --
the underlying radicalization of Mauritanian society.


4. (C) Gresham's Law: Ever the economist, Ould Daddah
lamented that Aziz would have neither the vision nor interest
to secure Mauritania's fragile economy. He predicted ever
more corruption (even as Aziz' anti-corruption campaign is
used to punish enemies) and increased access for narco
traffickers. Citing Gresham's Law, Ould Daddah said "bad
money" (corruption and drug money) will push out "good money"
(legitimate capital and investment in Mauritania). He
contended that a good administration that paid attention to
costs and invested wisely would be able to overcome the
current economic fragility within two years. He still saw
hope that Mauritania's resources could some day be properly
managed to make it the "Dubai of West Africa."


5. (C) Democracy Strategy: Ould Daddah said he remained
committed with the FNDD in non-recognition of the Aziz
government and that his party would not accept participation
in any Aziz government absent a broad agreement on democratic
consensus he did not see Aziz giving (Comment: It was
reported later in the day that former Abdallahi Prime
Minister Waghef had met with President Aziz in an effort to
consult with the FNDD about the creation of a new government

NOUAKCHOTT 00000510 002 OF 002


under Prime Minister Laghdaf.) Ould Daddah said the best way
to ensure democracy would be to re-do the presidential
election but added "I know that's not realistic." He was in
favor of new legislative elections before the end of the year
to serve as a "counterweight against Aziz" but only if those
elections were not rushed, were under the auspices of a new
and credible CENI electoral commission, and had full blown
international observation -- all things he saw lacking in the
rush to presidential elections. Absent new legislative
elections, Ould Daddah said his parliamentarians would
participate in the legislature using their minority position
to challenge the Aziz government. DCM noted that the Embassy
hopes to have NDI re-engage with the National Assembly as
part of an overall program of supporting fragile democratic
institutions including local governments and the media. Ould
Daddah welcomed the idea and called also for efforts at civic
education (which is, in fact, part of the Mission's pending
proposal for remaining FY-09 DA funds).


6. (C) Comment: Ould Daddah is perhaps the biggest political
loser from the July 18 elections. While his dramatic drop in
voter support would be called trickery by Ould Daddah,
throughout the year of the coup his party saw defections and
Ould Daddah lost the respect of many previous supporters for
what was seen as political flip-flopping relative to the
coup. Assuming Aziz completes a five year mandate, Ould
Daddah will be constitutionally too old to run again.
Despite the set backs, DCM found Ould Daddah's party
headquarters active as ever. End Comment.
BOULWARE