MAURITANIA -- ENGAGEMENT STRATEGY WITH THE AZIZ

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 06 NOUAKCHOTT 000500

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/28/2014
TAGS: PREL EAID MASS ASEC PTER AMGT MR
SUBJECT: MAURITANIA -- ENGAGEMENT STRATEGY WITH THE AZIZ
GOVERNMENT

REF: NOUAKCHOTT 496

Classified By: Ambassador Mark M. Boulware for Reasons 1.4 (b and d)


1. (C) New Environment Needs New Strategy: Mission Country
Team (including visiting Rabat-based LEGAT) held an off-site
July 27 to consider revisions of the Mission Strategic Plan
in light of the July 18 election of President-elect Mohamed
Ould Abdel Aziz and the June 23 killing of Christopher
Leggett -- the first American victim of AQIM terrorism in the
region. The Ambassador briefed the Country Team on his
meeting with President-Elect Aziz of July 26 (REFTEL) where
Aziz said all the right things about being a president for
all Mauritanians and paying attention to the many challenges
facing the country rather than picking fights with the
opposition. Aziz said he looked forward to close cooperation
with the U.S. on counterterrorism but also hoped to engage
the U.S. in all areas of bilateral cooperation. The
Ambassador told the Country Team that, while Mauritania will
not be able to regain the reputation as a "model of democracy
for Africa and the Arab world" that the Abdallahi Government
had enjoyed, there were good prospects to rebuild a normal
relationship with Mauritania.


2. (C) New Assumptions: Before discussing how to engage the
new government, the Country Team took stock of changes in the
environment that will affect our ability to do business.

On the Positive Side:

-- CT Commitment: Having seen the Mauritanian response to
the Christopher Leggett murder, we are convinced of the depth
of Mauritanian commitment as a partner against terrorism.
President-Elect Aziz told the Ambassador he is ready to "open
the floodgates" in terms of security cooperation. New
relationships forged with the police, Attorney General, and
Ministry of Justice open new areas of vital CT cooperation in
the judicial and police field where Mauritania is weakest.

-- Good Will: The principled position held by the U.S. has
gained the U.S. the admiration of those Mauritanians who
fought the coup and perhaps the respect even of those who
supported the coup. That, coupled with the region-wide boost
in the U.S. image driven by President Obama's election and
new policies for Africa and the Arab World, provides the
opportunity to cultivate a Mauritanian public that is well
disposed to the U.S. Beyond the general interest in having a
positive U.S. image, this shift in public sentiment has a
direct impact on our counter-extremism efforts and,
ultimately, on embassy security.

-- Better Contacts: The past year has significantly
increased the breadth of Mission contacts as the Mission
worked hard to monitor the political crisis with all parts of
Mauritanian society. Our political contacts at the level of
parties but also in the parliament have greatly expanded as
have contacts with media and civil society. The depth of
many of these contacts, especially with those who were
opposed to the coup, has also increased as we built an
effective international/domestic pro-democracy partnership
that forced our Mauritanian partners to go well beyond
superficial diplomatically nice talk.

-- Better Mission Base: The Mission is better prepared for
an expansion of our engagement than we were following the
2007 elections. Additional American positions have been
created and staffed in all our reporting offices that will
allow us to handle increased programs in Mauritania while
maintaining reporting contacts. Our LES ICASS base has also
increased compared to 2007.

-- More Sophisticated Partners: The past year has
significantly increased the professionalism and effectiveness
of political parties. Important institutions such as the
Constitutional Council and the Independent National Electoral
Commission have played well their important constitutional
role. Cybermedia has grown in impact and sophistication.

-- Stronger Donor Liaison: The continual meetings between
European embassies, the UN, EU and the U.S. embassy followed

NOUAKCHOTT 00000500 002 OF 006


by the more formal International Contact Group (ICG) have
built a greater degree of discussion and coordination between
main donor countries. A similar level of coordination took
place during the 2005-2007 political transition but fell away
following Abdallahi's election. As the Dakar Accord speaks
of continued ICG engagement with the new government, it will
be important to keep our partners meeting with us and we, as
a group, meeting with the Aziz government.

On The Negative Side:

-- Weakened Economy: No matter who had won July 18, the
stark economic realities would have been the same. The
government coffers are assumed to be empty, hard currency
remains scarce, investor interest in petroleum and minerals
is reduced somewhat by lower world prices and increased
political and security risk in Mauritania, and the value of
Mauritania's exports is low. Under the best of
circumstances, Mauritania will have three lost years in terms
of international development assistance -- the year Abdallahi
spent negotiating development programs, the year of the coup,
and now another year for Aziz to (re)negotiate agreements.

-- Less "Benefit of the Doubt": While Mauritania has passed
the technical steps to once again be considered to have a
democratically elected government, nobody is likely to
embrace the Aziz government with the same hope and enthusiasm
as Abdallahi. Where Abdallahi's government may have enjoyed
a softening of criteria for some development programs (like
the MCC threshold program) for heading in the right
direction, we expect the Aziz government will be held to
strict criteria.

-- Damaged Opposition: The electoral loss comes as a blow to
the opposition parties that had successfully built and
sustained a remarkable political coalition during the coup.
Whether from an internal unraveling or due to harassment by
the new government and Aziz' majority party, that coalition
runs the risk of collapse. Such a collapse would promote
negative tendencies in the new government.

-- Increased Terrorist Risk: The past year has increased
both push and pull factors that have strengthened Al Qaeda in
Mauritania. Economic stagnation and undemocratic governance
have added to the factors that convince some young
Mauritanians to join AQIM. A number of successful (from
their perspective) AQIM operations have increased the street
credibility and drawing power of this northwest African
franchise of Al Qaeda, even as multiple ransom payments have
increased AQIM's financial ability to conduct operations in
the region.

-- Reduced Stability: The economic challenges alone ensure
that Aziz will not be able to meet his multiple campaign
promises. We anticipate financial shortages, currency rate
changes, and inflation will make life more difficult for
average Mauritanians leading to the risk of food riots as
seen in September-October 2007. With an opposition keen to
highlight every misstep, Aziz will face criticism no matter
how well intentioned his efforts. Should he simultaneous
re-arrange the security apparatus, he may find some other
general or colonel thinking he could do better.

-- Diplomatic Rivalries: After their tacit (and
not-so-tacit) support for Aziz over the past year, European
bilateral partners (especially the French) may challenge U.S.
re-engagement with Mauritania. Though they may see
otherwise, this is clearly not a competition. We have no
trade interests here -- we were never able to generate
serious U.S. business interest during the Abdallahi period.
If the French were prepared to do everything needed to ensure
Mauritanian counterterrorism capacity, we would likely say
"you're welcome to it." But we don't see the French having
the resources or desire to do much more than embed with the
Mauritanians -- giving them access and influence -- but not
doing much to build capacity.


3. (C) Reporting Priorities: With a fragile democracy that
must demonstrate its commitment to civil liberties within a
changing security environment, the Mission will need to

NOUAKCHOTT 00000500 003.2 OF 006


maintain a significant level of reporting contacts. We see
our main priorities as:

-- Political Stability: This encompasses a wide range of
issues including (a) building an understanding of the inner
dynamics of the military and security hierarchy, (b)
monitoring alliances and tensions within and between the main
political groups, and (c) monitoring alliances and tensions
between tribal, ethnic and regional groups. Reporting on
parties is relatively easy while getting a clear picture of
High Command or tribal dynamics is challenging.

-- Economics: As an early warning device for political and
social unrest or for pending humanitarian emergencies, we
will need to monitor economic trends carefully recognizing
that official data may be intentionally altered to hide
problems. We will also look for the expansion of negative
trends in corruption as well as indicators of narcotics money.

-- Regional Dynamics: Any trend towards instability in
Mauritania will be of keen interest to neighbors Morocco,
Algeria, and Senegal with the two countries to the north
having the ability to influence domestic affairs. The
possible development of a relationship with Iran will be of
importance to us and is likely to affect both internal
politics as well as relations with Morocco, Egypt, Saudi
Arabia and the Gulf States. The possibility of greater
counterterrorism cooperation between Mauritania and Algeria,
Mali, and Niger will be of keen interest. The evolution of
policy relative to Israel will continue to have international
as well as domestic interest. As many of these issues have a
North African and Middle East focus, Post will increase its
emphasis on diplomats from those regions.

-- Abuses: The new government will be judged by many in the
West on its performance in preserving and improving human
rights. We will be particularly concerned about respect for
political and press freedoms. Given Mauritania's slide into
Tier III TIP status, reporting on slavery, trafficking, and
child abuse will have a priority.

-- Security: We will, of course, closely follow Al Qaeda
activities in Mauritania as well as the government's response
to the AQIM threat. Reporting will also look at social
issues and public awareness related to extremism.

--------------
PROGRAM PRIORITIES
--------------


4. (C) Counterterrorism (Hard): The June 23 killing of
AQIM's first American victim in the region coupled with
increased AQIM capacity for operations here and elsewhere in
the region makes "hard" counterterrorism cooperation our
first priority and the area where we expect to have a great
deal of access with the new Aziz government. Looking out at
a six month timeframe, we would hope to accomplish the
following:

-- Mauritanian Strategy: We will engage the new government
to ascertain the status of the comprehensive "Hard" and
"Soft" CT strategies that were in development prior to the
coup.

-- Agreement on military needs: We will first want to assess
the current capabilities and needs of Mauritania's three
military counterterrorism units as well as other related
units (the parachutists and camel battalions) with a view of
renewing training and equip with, at least, the former GLATR
and FUMA units in FY-10. In principle, we would be open to
5-7 JCETS and possibly the creation of two JPATs in FY-10.

-- Discussion on Police and Judicial cooperation: We would
like to start a dialogue with the new government to see areas
of greatest common concern. The need for increased forensics
capability as well as training in defusing IEDs was clearly
demonstrated in our liaison with the Mauritanians following
the Leggett killing. Over the long-term, we would like to
see Mauritania actively participate in a new regionally-based
ILEA academy as well as FBI advanced training courses.

NOUAKCHOTT 00000500 004 OF 006



-- Staffing SOFLE Programs: We will again be able to fully
staff the SOFLE, CMSE and MIST offices to build upon programs
already underway and prepare for new mil-to-mil engagement.
Resolving questions of SOFLE LES personnel requirements (we
need them to get some local staff of their own),temporary
CAA space, and delinquent/discontinued ICASS payments will be
needed before any JCETs commence.

-- Creeksand: We will want to have Creeksand complete its
familiarization of local air bases where it may be needed to
conduct operations in support of the Mauritanians. Depending
on AFRICOM determination of regional operating priorities,
Mission would be open to renewed non-emergency operations in
Mauritania.

-- French Deconfliction: Whether done bilaterally in
capitals, as part of the P3 security assistance review
scheduled for September or October, or done locally, we will
want to have a comprehensive review of counterterrorism
programs with the French to ensure we neither get into an
unproductive competition or leave key assistance areas
uncovered. We would look for Department guidance on the best
route for these consultations but caution that we should not
let our own engagement strategy get to far advanced without
that consultation.

-- Counter-narcotics Engagement Decision: We are aware of
the growing significance of narcotics trafficking through
Mauritania and the region. While the U.S. is not generally
seen as a destination for these drugs, the trade itself poses
a risk in terms of money paid to AQIM by traffickers and the
potential for internal corruption of Mauritanian civil,
security and judicial authorities by narco-traffickers.
While all reporting offices in Nouakchott have reported on
the drug trade, we do not have a program response. We
understand that AFRICOM is looking at a regional program and
DEA is also interested in increasing its attention to west
African trade; however, we look to Washington to decide
whether this is an area we are prepared to put personnel and
program money against.


5. (C) Counterterrorism (Soft): While the "hard" threat
posed by AQIM forces operating out of Mali poses the greatest
immediate risk for the Mission and Mauritania, the gradual
internal radicalization of Mauritanian society remains the
greater long-term threat to U.S. interests. We are serious
when we speak about Mauritania's form of Islam as being
peaceful and moderate. The vast majority of Mauritanians
abhor the terrorism they have seen in their country and are
horrified to see radicalization take root in their country.
That said, we are seeing some young Mauritanians drawn to Al
Qaeda. Our six-month goals:

-- Reactivate USAID Counter-extremism Program: We were
making excellent inroads prior to the coup in creating an
anti-extremism program with key ministries, moderate Islamic
leaders, other donor partners, and civil society for programs
that would start to address the root causes of extremism and
to bolster the positive elements of Mauritanian society.
While the USAID funding itself was modest relative to the
task, USAID's presence had a catalyst effect in driving the
discussion with Mauritanians and international partners. The
DOD MIST team has been able to advance some of this program
during the coup with a pilot program in Aleg, but we see
limitations on taking this to a national level or working
with the GIRM without USAID.

-- National Strategy: As we engage on a "hard" CT strategy,
we will also want to engage the new government on their
"soft" strategy. Many of the concepts of our own USAID
program were mirrored in a draft strategy developed during
the Abdallahi administration -- with key elements concerning
the drivers of extremism coming from Mauritania's security
services. We will need to see how great a priority an Aziz
government will give to this area of counterterrorism and how
comfortable they will be working with the U.S. As before the
coup, we will be keen in assisting the Mauritanians develop
their strategy. The MIST program would be well placed to
support public information aspects of such a strategy.

NOUAKCHOTT 00000500 005 OF 006



-- Country Specific TSCTP Conference: We would welcome an
August Mauritania TSCTP conference in Nouakchott in August
or, at the latest, early September to develop a coordinated
"hard" and "soft" strategy. We would like the conference to
include State AF/RSA, INL and S/CT as well as USAID, AFRICOM,
LEGAT and possibly DHS and Coast Guard.


6. (C) Democratization: We cannot expect Mauritania to
serve as the example of emerging democracies we had seen
after President Abdallahi's election. Over the next year or
so, our goal is to promote a stable government that respects
its own law and constitution that pursues a positive social
and economic agenda while maintaining a constructive
relationship with opposition parties. Support for this goal
will drive much of our reporting and contact work. Our six
month programming goal:

-- Implement the FY-09 program submitted to the Department
and USAID July 23 for an NDI and NEDWA collaboration to
support grass-roots civic education, the National Assembly,
and press professionalization.

-- Develop an FY-10 program to support fragile institutions
including capacity training for civil society, support of the
Association of Mayors, and development of partnerships
between the Constitutional Council as the National
Independent Electoral Commission with U.S. and good regional
counterparts.

-- We would like to develop a strategy to expand ties to the
future leaders of Mauritania. Part of this would include
expansion of language training programs at the National
Administration School (where all mid-level and senior-level
civil servants are trained) as well as new programs at the
National Military Academy, Command and General Staff School,
and Police Academy. English language skills are in dire
demand across the Mauritania government. English courses
allow interaction with future leaders and, through guest
speakers and instructional materials, offers the opportunity
to stimulate democratic discussion.


7. (C) Human Rights: Mauritania continues to slide against
key human rights criteria making the promotion of viable
development less credible and creating the conditions that
promote extremism. Mission goals:

-- Slavery Framework: We hope to work with the new
government to develop an ambitious but achievable strategy
allowing Mauritania to address the vestiges of slavery still
present in the country including child servitude. The
strategy would also need to address newer trafficking issues
that have arisen over the past year including the export of
child brides to Gulf states. We will also seek Department
programming resources aimed at reinforcing Mauritania
enforcement of existing legal structures and forging greater
trust and cooperation between anti-slavery advocates and the
Mauritanian authorities charged with the problem/

-- Refugee Assistance: We expect the repatriation of
refugees from Senegal to Mauritania to be completed within a
short period. Reintegration of those refugees remains a
significant challenge. We will welcome a visit by PRM to
develop an engagement strategy with the GIRM and our partners.

-- Human Rights Monitoring: We will develop a proposal to
increase the professional capacity of local human rights
organizations and interested media to identify and document
human rights abuses to a level that meets legal requirements.


8. (C) Public Diplomacy: Post will be opening its first
public access Information Resource Center in October 2009.
PD is hiring an additional staff member who will direct this
IRC as well as the outreach in posts existing American
Corners in Nouakchott and help with the opening of another in
the interior of the country. PD,s outreach will extend to
contacts it could not reach post-coup and will continue to
work with journalists, alumni and cultural contacts to
forward mission,s priority goals. The new on-embassy public
access space will increase outreach to key audiences and

NOUAKCHOTT 00000500 006 OF 006


provide a platform from which to disseminate information on
democracy, human rights and counter-extremism. Given that
the assumption among Mauritanians had been one of lack of
activity on the part of the US Embassy in Mauritania, post
intends to combat this misperception highlighting all of the
activities since August 2008 including visiting speakers and
cultural events, book donations, humanitarian aid to refugees
and journalist training.



9. (C) Development and Humanitarian Assistance: We expect
humanitarian assistance priorities to remain high over the
coming year both because of the habitual natural impact of
desertification but because of anticipated financial
difficulties for the new government that may lead to severe
shortages of food in urban areas -- or at least of food
Mauritanian poor can afford. We expect the next year to
focus on the creation and negotiation of new development
assistance projects with donors. Mission goals:

-- Proceed on OFDA and FFP staffing proposals for Mauritania.

-- Review USAID expansion plan for Africa to consider
bilateral mission in Mauritania starting in FY-10 focused not
only of humanitarian programs but also on democracy and good
governance initiatives.


10. (C) Resource Management: Our 2007-2008 experience
provides lessons learned on the challenges of rapid program
expansion. The year of the coup allowed the Mission to build
its personnel base to avoid the "flooding of the engine" we
encountered before, but we will remain keenly aware of the
risks of taking on more programs than we have staff and
facilities to support. The new political and security
environment raise quality of life issues we will want to
address as well. Mission Goals:

-- New Rightsizing exercise: We expect to revive our efforts
to obtain property for an NEC (or gain permission for our
preferred option of building the NEC on our existing
compound) in the coming months. As a part of that effort, we
are reviewing our Rightsizing data to ensure that the NEC
reflects the increased counterterrorism reporting and
operations activities as well as long-term USAID presence.

-- School: We will gauge the new government to determine
whether this is the time to seek a bilateral school agreement
that will give the American school a more secure legal and
tax status in Mauritania. Avoiding any problems in this
regard is key to the schools survival and has significant
impact on our ability to recruit American staff.


BOULWARE