Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09NOUAKCHOTT480
2009-07-20 11:29:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Nouakchott
Cable title:  

THE MAURITANIANS DISAPPOINT -- AZIZ ELECTED

Tags:  PREL PGOV KDEM MR 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXYZ0000
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHNK #0480/01 2011129
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 201129Z JUL 09
FM AMEMBASSY NOUAKCHOTT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8641
INFO RUEHZK/ECOWAS COLLECTIVE
RUCNMGH/MAGHREB COLLECTIVE
RUEHDO/AMEMBASSY DOHA 0711
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 0787
RUEHMD/AMEMBASSY MADRID 2317
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 1139
RUEHSM/AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM 0163
RHMFISS/COMSOCEUR VAIHINGEN GE
RHMFISS/HQ USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS
RUEHDS/USMISSION USAU ADDIS ABABA
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 1234
C O N F I D E N T I A L NOUAKCHOTT 000480 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/19/2014
TAGS: PREL PGOV KDEM MR
SUBJECT: THE MAURITANIANS DISAPPOINT -- AZIZ ELECTED

Classified By: Ambassador Mark M. Boulware for
Reasons 1.4 (b and d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L NOUAKCHOTT 000480

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/19/2014
TAGS: PREL PGOV KDEM MR
SUBJECT: THE MAURITANIANS DISAPPOINT -- AZIZ ELECTED

Classified By: Ambassador Mark M. Boulware for
Reasons 1.4 (b and d)


1. (C) Summary: The Mauritanian people appear to have
selected General Mohamed Ould Abdel Aziz as their next duly
elected president. Although there are isolated reports of
inappropriate efforts to influence voters, the election
itself proceeded reasonably well offering the population a
chance to express its free will. The percentage of potential
fraud does not seem sufficient to have changed a plurality
win for Aziz -- although it might have forced a second-round
runoff. After a year of activist diplomacy meant to ensure
the Mauritanian people had the right to chose their own
leaders, it appears the majority opted for a traditional
approach of supporting those with the power (or chose to give
up their vote for short-term gain.) An Aziz victory poses
significant challenges for U.S. engagement with Mauritania.
End Summary

--------------
"No We Can't"
--------------


2. (C) While it will be several days before an official
count is certified, it appears that General Mohamed Ould
Abdel Aziz has secured a first-round victory in the July 18
presidential elections. The Minister of Interior (an
opposition FNDD appointee) released the preliminary results
in a statement July 20 indication that general Aziz had won
the election with 52.58% of the votes cast followed by the
FNDD's Messaoud Ould Boulkheir with 16.29% and the RFD's
Ahmed Ould Daddah with 13.66%. Reports from election
observers (including Mission personnel) indicate that most
voting booths operated smoothly on election day providing
those who chose to vote that right. Election monitors and
experts working with the National Independent Electoral
Commission report no significant irregularities. Sporadic
incidents of heavier-than-normal police/military presence
that may have been intended to influence the vote are
unlikely to have been significant enough to have changed the
plurality vote for Aziz. The CENI is supposed to forward its
comments today to the Constitutional Council which will have
up to ten days to certify the results.


3. (C) Opposition candidates have already rejected the
election as a sham but are unable to document credible

irregularities. The FNDD's Abdel Kaddous Ould Abeidna was at
a loss to explain how, but saw the massive majority of votes
for Aziz as impossible. An Ould Daddah emissary told DCM the
RFD feared the ballots had been chemically altered to change
votes two hours after being deposited. The opposition
parties fear for their futures should the U.S. join the rest
of the international community in recognizing the vote.
Mauritanian analysts unsympathetic to Aziz reluctantly accept
the general trend of the elections suggesting that both
elites and the poor were influenced by Aziz's financial
largess throughout the campaign and, more fundamentally, by a
Mauritanian penchant to "follow the one in power." When
given the chance, it appears most Mauritanians followed
traditional practices over the more theoretical ideas of
democracy.


4. (C) While Mission is surprised by the spread, we have
from the beginning considered an Aziz victory as a very real,
if not the likely, eventual outcome. We assess that the July
18 results are a reasonable reflection of the Mauritanian
will -- however poorly thought out that will may be. Even if
20% of Aziz' votes were obtained fraudulently (and we have
seen no evidence of that level of fraud),he would still have
the plurality of votes.

--------------
An Aziz Presidency
--------------


5. (C) An Aziz presidency will establish an unfortunate
precedent for Mauritania. Although domestic and
international pressure prevented the August 2008 coup from
becoming a fait accompli, the restoration of constitutional
order stemming from the Dakar Accord has, in the end,
effectively resulted in the confirmation of that coup.
President Aziz will now face a very difficult economic
situation that will not allow him to meet the many promises
he made over the campaign. While we fully expect him to do
everything he can to secure his base, it may well be just a
matter of time before another coup removes him from power.
It will be difficult for Aziz to rally the international
defense of democracy enjoyed by President Abdallahi if and
when that day comes. Political opposition representatives
have already -- only half jokingly -- suggested justice will
only be reached via Aziz' death.


6. (C) Aziz' past actions and campaign rhetoric give reason
to fear that the institutions of democracy may be assailed as
Aziz strikes back at his political enemies. The press, civil
society, and opposition politicians will be subject to keen
scrutiny looking for opportunities to constrain their
activities. We expect legislative elections to follow which,
if Aziz maintains the level of support shown in these
presidential elections, could well result in a virtual
one-party state reminiscent of the Taya years.


7. (C) Aziz campaigned on a strong "anti-corruption"
platform promising to fill the jails with the corrupt
political leaders of the past. There are few politicians in
Mauritania who are not stained to some degree by corruption,
but all signs are that the anti-corruption campaign will be
used selectively to punish political enemies rather than to
clean up how government works.


8. (C) Aziz will face a very difficult economic outlook as
he assumes legitimacy. We expect most government funds were
spent to bolster his position for these elections. Even if
major donors unblock suspended assistance projects, there
will be substantial lead time before those funds come on
stream. The Deputy European Commission Representative
(protect) expressed a cautious approach likely to be followed
by most donors by saying, "Under Abdallahi we negotiated a
number of political and financial conditions that would have
to be met in 2007 and 2008 AFTER we released funds. If I
have any say in it, we will insist that Aziz meet those
conditions BEFORE we give him one Euro." An Aziz government
will certainly not reignite the international adulation
Abdallahi received in 2007 when his government received some
$500 million in development pledges than requested. Coupled
with anemic international assistance, will be low world
prices for Mauritania's export goods -- iron ore and
petroleum -- and relatively flat prices for its fish. While
there are persistent rumors of a "big" oil find in the
interior, it will take a decade for that to come on stream
provided investors see the necessary price point and
political risk to proceed.


9. (C) The Aziz camp and the opposition are so far apart, it
is difficult to see them reaching some level of majority
versus loyal opposition stability. A weakened opposition
will continue to condemn Aziz at every turn. Not one to take
criticism gracefully, he is likely to retaliate.

--------------
U.S. Relations
--------------


10. (C) 11 months of activist diplomacy against General
Aziz' coup will complicate our relations as we deal with a
legitimate President Aziz. Effective U.S. recognition will
probably lessen the problem, but Aziz will remain highly
distrustful of Washington's political intent. As noted
above, we will approach Aziz with a "prove us wrong"
predisposition to assuming he will perform poorly on human
and political rights, on rule of law, and on economic
transparency. At the outset, the U.S. would be best served
to respect the legitimacy conferred by this vote and not work
in opposition to the new Aziz government. While we hope we
are wrong, we do not expect great things from Aziz -- but we
should give him the chance to prove us wrong.


11. (C) Throughout the Abdallahi period and the ensuing coup
d'etat, General Aziz has proven himself a credible ally
against Al Qaeda -- we expect him to remain so. Although
there may be some competition for attention from the French
military and security services, we believe the Mauritanians
will be receptive to renewed and increased counter-terrorism
cooperation in the intelligence, military, police and
judiciary realms. The cooperation seen in the investigation
and the apparent apprehension of the killers of AMCIT Chris
Leggett have highlighted both Mauritanian weaknesses and
their desire to work towards addressing those weaknesses. We
would continue to want to limit military and police
cooperation to hard counterterrorism priorities that, until
concerns over an Aziz record on human rights and good
governance are assuaged, are unlikely to be used against
Mauritanian civilian populations.


12. (C) We are uncertain how an Aziz government will
approach our previous efforts at anti-radicalization ("soft"
counterterrorism). The Aziz government is likely to be more
focused on "hard" counterterrorism although many of the
moderate imams previously identified for the USAID
counter-extremism program are pro-Aziz. The degree to which
the previously identified ministries needed for an effective
anti-extremism campaign will be comfortable working with the
U.S. will have to be seen. Post would welcome a mini-TSCTP
conference in Nouakchott in mid-August to develop a
coordinated Nouakchott CT strategy between AFRICOM, USAID,
DOJ and State (both AF/RSA and INL).


13. (C) Democratization and Human Rights will be our
significant policy priorities under an Aziz government. The
election results sadly demonstrate the lack of development of
democratic institutions -- particularly of parties, the
media, and civic organizations. Despite the solid and
committed core of Mauritanian anti-coup activists over the
past year, the general population was not sufficiently
affected to respond when given the chance to vote. Over the
past year the role of parties in advancing broad political
agendas beyond their own leaders interests has been enhanced.
Bridges have been built between parties, civil society and
unions. The role of the Senate and National Assembly has
been greatly enhanced. The Constitutional Council has played
a crucial and unbiased role at key points in the political
crisis. These are all areas for further development.


14. (C) The Israeli Embassy's two remaining security
officers advised the Embassy July 19 that they would be
leaving Mauritania that evening for a 10-day "vacation."
Given the anti-Zionist tone Aziz used in his campaign, we
assume Tel Aviv sees little chance of "unfreezing" their
relationship with Mauritania at this time.


15. (C) General Aziz is likely to favor expansion of ties
with the European countries that gave him tacit support
(France, Spain, Germany, and Portugal) over the U.S. --
choosing the Americans only in areas where there is no
suitable option elsewhere. Some suggest that with U.S.
recognition, Aziz may try his best to patch up the
relationship to ensure we remain, at worst, neutral. Given
the probable financial difficulties facing any Mauritanian
government, Aziz will probably continue to be open to Iranian
influence and financial support.

--------------
What We Should Say
--------------


16. (C) While no great day for democracy in Africa, we
accept that the July 18 elections reflect the Mauritanian
will. Vocal opposition to an Aziz government before that
government has had the opportunity to prove its merits will
only prolong debilitating political strife and ultimately
close off any chance of constructive engagement.


17. (SBU) Mission proposes a Washington statement along the
following lines once election results have been confirmed by
the Constitutional Council:

Despite a certain number of irregularities, the United States
in convinced that the Mauritanian elections of July 18
reflected the general will of the Mauritanian people. We
respect that vote and congratulate former General Mohamed
Ould Abdel Aziz on his victory and look forward to working
with his government on the multiple challenges facing his
country. The Dakar Process succeeded in building the
necessary basis of national consensus to return Mauritania to
constitutional legitimacy and affording the Mauritanian
people to freely choose their own leader. We call on General
Aziz as well as all of Mauritania's political leaders to
continue to work together constructively and respectfully in
the interests on their people.
BOULWARE