ABDALLAHI'S EMISSARIES' CONCERNS ABOUT MEDIATION

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NOUAKCHOTT 000352

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/26/2014
TAGS: PGOV PREL MR
SUBJECT: ABDALLAHI'S EMISSARIES' CONCERNS ABOUT MEDIATION

Classified By: Ambassador Mark M. Boulware for reasons 1.5 (B) and (D).


1. (C) Summary: Sidney Sokhna, Diplomatic Advisor to
President Abdallahi, called on Ambassador to provide
background on the Senegalese mediation and seek clarification
of the USG position. Sokhna said that pro-democracy forces
in the FNDD and RFD suspected the impartiality of mediators
and were surprised to be presented with a draft political
accord rather than being able to work one out through
discussion. He argued that the proposed election date of
July 11 did not provide enough time to review electoral
lists, establish a national union government and new
electoral commission and to prepare for and conduct
elections. He called on the international community to
reiterate its warning against a "unilateral" solution.
Ambassador affirmed that the USG supported mediation efforts
and wanted to see a consensual solution to the crisis but
urged maximum flexibility and engagement by all parties to
achieve that consensus. End summary.


2. (C) Sidney Sokhna, Diplomatic Advisor to elected
President Abdallahi, called on Ambassador May 24 at the
President's request to discuss the ongoing Senegalese efforts
and to inquire about the position of the USG and the
international community. Sokhna indicated that President
Abdallahi as well as the democratic forces opposing the
August 6, 2008 coup d'etat had serious doubts about the
mechanics of the mediation as well as Senegal's impartiality.


3. (C) Sokhna said that there had been no direct talks
between the three parties involved: the FNDD (the coalition
of parties supporting President Abdallahi),the RFD (Ould
Daddah's party) and General Aziz' supporters. Moreover, he
said that even when President Wade visited President
Abdallahi in Lemdem, there had been no substantive
discussions about the terms of any eventual consensus
agreement. Sokhna indicated that both the FNDD and the RFD
were surprised to be presented with a framework agreement
that did not represent the fruit of dialogue and discussion
but rather a ready made draft that favored General Aziz'
position over that of the democratic opponents of the coup.


4. (C) Calling the proposed date of July 11 for delayed
elections completely unrealistic, Sokhna said that there was
far too much to be done in the interim to stage credible
elections by that date. He observed that an interim
government of national union would take time to negotiate as
would a new electoral commission not to mention the necessary
revision of the electoral lists. Rather than establishing an
arbitrary date for new elections, Sokhna argued that there
should first be discussion and agreement on the details of
the preparations and the time necessary to complete them. He
found the draft accord's rationale for early elections, the
six month limit given under the AU Charter for the return to
constitutional order, to be unconvincing. He said that both
the FNDD and the RFD believed that free and fair elections
could not be organized that quickly.


5. (C) Sokhna lamented that there was no sign of
flexibility or good faith gestures from the Aziz camp.
Recalling that both the FNDD and the RFD had asked that
political prisoners be freed and that the junta-organized
Presidential campaign be suspended in order to facilitate
good faith efforts to find a consensus, he noted that neither
issue had been positively addressed. Aziz continues to
campaign vigorously, he said, while the "interim government"
was making special distributions of food to the poor to build
support for Aziz.


6. (C) According to Sokhna, President Abdallahi and his
supporters wondered what had happened to the international
community and the position it had taken at the February 20
meeting of the International Contact Group condemning a
unilateral approach as "counterproductive and unacceptable."
He noted that the unilateral approach was in the process of
being implemented and said that President Abdallahi called on
the US and other members of the international contact group
to publicly reiterate that position.


7. (C) Asked to clarify the US position, Ambassador

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Boulware said that the US position remained unchanged citing
the Department's statement of May 20. He affirmed US support
for the Senegal's mediation precisely because it appeared to
be the last best chance to avoid a unilateral solution. He
noted growing concern both inside and outside Mauritania that
the political impasse was detrimental to Mauritania and posed
ever greater risks. Asked about the role of the US and the
international community in crafting the draft accord, the
Ambassador noted that members of the contact group had been
briefed on the essential elements of the proposal by Foreign
Minister Gadio and his fellow mediators on May 21 and had
been previously consulted about general parameters of a
potential agreement but, speaking for the US, had not been
involved in drafting the particulars. Ambassador said that
the US considers that any agreement must be consensual but
urged the greatest possible flexibility by all parties in the
interest of the nation.


8. (C) Sokhna said that President Abdallahi had been
advised of a new initiative by President Wade who had invited
leaders of the three political groups to send delegations to
Dakar on May 26 to "discuss and finalize" the draft agreement
for a political solution. Sokhna noted that the FNDD and RFD
were discussing whether to accept the invitation and would
likely do so although he thought the date would probably slip
by a day or two. He shared strong reservations about using
the draft proposal as a basis for discussion, saying that
there should be a regular and neutral agenda noting the
points to be discussed and resolved. He promised to stay in
touch with the Ambassador and advise him of their decision.


9. (C) Comment: The briefing to members of the
International Contact Group by mediators on May 21 left the
impression that there was general agreement on the major
points of the draft accord even though some key issues
remained to be resolved. Not only do those points, i.e.
suspension of the ongoing campaign and freeing the political
prisoners, remain unresolved but there still are very
significant differences between Aziz and his supporters and
the two groups opposing the coup. Although the USG should
support a consensual solution, even an imperfect one, that
would permit an acceptable resolution of the crisis and a
return to constitutional order via anticipated elections,
that consensus remains elusive. Pro-democracy forces are
wary of mediation efforts that will leave them to choose
between hasty elections that can only legitimize the coup
d'etat and advocacy of a more careful transition that may
leave it vulnerable to blame for any failure to achieve
consensus.
BOULWARE