AMBASSADOR MEETS WITH PRESIDENT ABDALLAHI IN LEMDEN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 NOUAKCHOTT 000328

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/12/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM MR
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR MEETS WITH PRESIDENT ABDALLAHI IN LEMDEN

REF: A. NOUAKCHOTT 315

B. NOUAKCHOTT 306

Classified By: Ambassador Mark M. Boulware for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary: President Abdallahi, still determined to
fight the coup and very much active in the opposition,
declared himself open to concessions as long as proposed
solutions respected the constitution. The president thinks
the Senegalese, rather than coming to the negotiation table
with a ready-made plan, should play the role of facilitators
and let political parties find a solution. Nevertheless, he
explained it was unlikely the Senegalese mediation would lead
anywhere as General Aziz and his supporters -- who originally
claimed they were open to negotiations -- were not willing to
reschedule the election. According to Abdallahi, pro-coup
supporters declared themselves amenable to finding a solution
only because they expected President Abdallahi to obstruct
the negotiations but were very much taken aback when they
found out he was willing to participate. End summary.


2. (C) Ambassador Boulware traveled to Lemden May 11 to
meet with deposed President Sidi Ould Cheikh Abdallahi for
the first time since the Ambassador's return to Mauritania.
The people of Lemden came out in full force to greet the
Ambassador, who was accompanied by Mrs. Boulware, PolOff and
EconOff. Members of President Abdallahi's entourage included
Diplomatic Advisor Sidney Sokhona, Spokesman Ahmed Samba Ould
Abdallahi Ould Samba and Tawassoul Member in Charge of
External Relations Mohamed Lemine Ould Mohamed Moussa.
President Abdallahi's wife Khatou Mint Boukary, their
daughter Amal, and Mohamed, one of their three sons, were
also present.


3. (C) President Abdallahi, who was in good spirits, was
thrilled to see the Ambassador. He thanked Ambassador
Boulware for U.S. support and its strong stance against the
coup. He highlighted that, against all expectations,
opposition to the coup had strengthened over the past nine
months and that this was the first time in Mauritanian
history that the population had opposed the military.
According to Abdallahi, General Aziz's supporters, who sided
with him only because he was the man in power, are starting
to realize Aziz will not succeed in consolidating the coup or
delivering on all his promises.


4. (C) President Abdallahi then provided an overview of the
political crisis since Ambassador Boulware's departure. He
summarized the positions of neighboring Morocco, Algeria,
Mali, Senegal, and Tunisia, and said his neighbors were
influenced by their interests in Mauritania. The president
also commented on the Qadhafi mediation as well as French,
German, AU and Arab League positions. During the President's
summary, a member of his entourage entered the room and
whispered something to his ear. The President looked amused
and told the Ambassador that pro-coup parliamentarians had
prevented anti-coup ones from entering the National Assembly.
Comment: Later on, EmbOffs were informed by the entourage
that what had really happened was that pro-coup majority
parliamentarians and ministers started making noise when
their opposition colleagues suggested the session should
focus on the political crisis in Mauritania. Since
opposition parliamentarians would not back down, the pro-coup
majority decided to leave the session. Opposition
parliamentarians then decided to hold the session without
them and to occupy parliament for 24 hours. President
Abdallahi and his entourage were elated at the news. Local
media outlets reported a different story, where anti-coup
parliamentarians drowned out pro-coup parliamentarians (see
Septel). End comment.

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THE SENEGALESE MEDIATION
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5. (C) The President stated his displeasure at the

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Senegalese as both he and the FNDD felt the Senegalese had
sent negative signs after the coup. President Abdallahi
criticized Senegalese President Abdoulaye Wade for wanting to
solve the crisis in what he described as the "African way" or
under the "arbre a palabres." Note: The "arbre a palabres"
is a tree where traditional community leaders and elders meet
to discuss problems and reach agreements. End note.
President Abdallahi explained Wade wanted to bring him
together with Aziz in the same room, join their hands in a
handshake and tell them they could not leave until they
sorted out their differences.


6. (C) President Abdallahi explained that Wade had invited
him to Senegal as he wanted to gather elements to draft a
mediation initiative. At the beginning, Abdallahi was
skeptical but after General Aziz's resignation he told
himself he would give Wade a chance. Abdallahi proposed a
date for the visit but things did not work out as expected.
According to Abdallahi, the Senegalese waited three days
before the visit to start planning. Abdallahi was also
disappointed the Senegalese decided to accept the junta's
Ambassador credentials the night before his visit. Abdallahi
was also told he could not meet with Mauritanian students nor
with the Senegalese opposition. Wade, said the president,
wanted him to meet exclusively with religious leaders.
Abdallahi felt Wade wanted his visit to be a personal visit
rather than a political one. As a result, Abdallahi decided
to postpone his visit (See Refs A and B).


7. (C) According to Abdallahi, the Senegalese proposed a
solution in which the president would return to create a
government of national unity and then would resign. This
would open the way for President of the Senate (and current
interim president of the republic) Ba M'Bare to be appointed
as legitimate interim president. A new CENI would be formed
and amnesty would be given to political prisoners and the
military. Abdallahi stated this solution did not make much
sense to him. He advised Senegalese Foreign Minister Gadio
that instead of bringing a pre-drafted plan, Wade should play
the role of a facilitator and create the necessary conditions
for dialogue. President Abdallahi suggested political
parties should meet to find a solution. He said that, as
constitutional guarantor, he would consider any
constitutional solution.


8. (C) President Abdallahi thinks that General Aziz
declared himself open to negotiations because he thought the
FNDD would refuse to participate in the Senegalese mediation.
As soon as the General found out that Abdallahi was amenable
to negotiations and willing to make concessions, he backed
down. Pro-coup parliamentarians then appeared on Al-Jazeera
saying they would not accept a delay in the election.
According to Abdallahi, at a meeting with Gadio, General Aziz
did not agree with rescheduling the election.


9. (C) In a subsequent one-on-one meeting with the
Ambassador, President Abdallahi reiterated his warm
appreciation for both for the U.S. position as well as the
assistance given to his emissaries by U.S. missions in Europe
and Africa. While he discouraged direct expressions of U.S.
support for the Senegalese plan but noted that support for a
consensual solution would be welcome. He said that he
planned to send his close advisor Sidi Mohamed Ould Amajar as
his representative to the U.S. to speak for him in dealing
with both the U.S. and the U.N., noting that resources
precluded having representatives in both New York and
Washington. The Ambassador indicated that we would provide
appropriate assistance in facilitating Ould Amajar,s
mission. Abdallahi further noted that he was considering
sending a delegation to visit the U.S. and was even thinking
of traveling there himself but wanted our input before
deciding. Ambassador Boulware noted that we would need to
engage Washington colleagues to assess the best course of
action and promised that we would get back to him. Finally,
Abdallahi noted that supporters in the U.S. had explored the
possibility of booking satellite broadcast time to enable the

NOUAKCHOTT 00000328 003 OF 003


President and his supporters to reach a Mauritanian audience
given that local broadcast media under control of the junta
was not open to them. Although admitting that he was
skeptical that USG support for this initiative could be
found, the Ambassador promised to inquire.

10. (C) Comment: President Abdallahi was relaxed, in good
spirits and was closely following events in Nouakchott. He
seems convinced that time is on the side of pro-democracy
forces and that disillusionment with the junta and its
unilateral agenda is growing and efforts to legitimize the
coup will ultimately fail. End comment.
BOULWARE