Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09NOUAKCHOTT323
2009-05-11 16:12:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Nouakchott
Cable title:  

AMBASSADOR'S LUNCHEON WITH ANTI-COUP POLITICAL

Tags:  PGOV PREL KDEM KHUM MR 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO1340
PP RUEHBZ RUEHDU RUEHMR RUEHPA RUEHRN RUEHTRO
DE RUEHNK #0323/01 1311612
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 111612Z MAY 09
FM AMEMBASSY NOUAKCHOTT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8402
INFO RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE
RUEHZK/ECOWAS COLLECTIVE
RUCNMGH/MAGHREB COLLECTIVE
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 0628
RUEHMD/AMEMBASSY MADRID 2170
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 0975
RUEHDO/AMEMBASSY DOHA 0565
RUEHRL/AMEMBASSY BERLIN 0643
RUEHPG/AMEMBASSY PRAGUE 0200
RUEHSM/AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM 0046
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS
RHMFISS/HQ USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE
RUEHDS/USMISSION USAU ADDIS ABABA
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 0642
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 1086
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 NOUAKCHOTT 000323 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/10/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM KHUM MR
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR'S LUNCHEON WITH ANTI-COUP POLITICAL
PARTIES

REF: A. NOUAKCHOTT 0289

B. NOUAKCHOTT 0312

C. NOUAKCHOTT 0321

Classified By: DCM Dennis Hankins for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 NOUAKCHOTT 000323

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/10/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM KHUM MR
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR'S LUNCHEON WITH ANTI-COUP POLITICAL
PARTIES

REF: A. NOUAKCHOTT 0289

B. NOUAKCHOTT 0312

C. NOUAKCHOTT 0321

Classified By: DCM Dennis Hankins for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary: During a lunch with the Ambassador, RFD and
FNDD political leaders talked about repression of
demonstrations, President of the Senate Ba M'Bare's
"presidency," and the role played in the political crisis by
Mauritania's neighbors. The FNDD and RFD asked the U.S. to
pressure France into firmly opposing the coup, and declared
that they had little faith in the Senegalese mediation, which
they do not perceive as neutral and disinterested. While all
parties participated in the luncheon, divisions between the
FNDD and RFD remain obvious. End summary.


2. (C) Leaders of RFD and FNDD parties attended a lunch
hosted by DCM in honor of recently-returned Ambassador
Boulware on May 7. RFD's Ahmed Ould Daddah, who was in
Zouerate for a political rally, was represented by the
party's Chief of Staff Ismael Ould Amar. FNDD guests
included Messaoud Ould Boulkheir (president of the National
Assembly and APP),Mohamed Ould Maouloud (president of UFP),
Ba Mamadou Alassane (president of PLEJ),Boidiel Ould Houmeid
(president of PNDD-ADIL),and Member in Charge of External
Relations Mohamed Lemine Ould Mohamed Moussa on behalf of
Tawassoul president Jemil Ould Mansour.


3. (C) Opposition leaders were in low spirits and did little
to conceal it. When greeted with the traditional "Ca va?,"
some frankly responded they were "not doing so well."
Mohamed Ould Maouloud, Ould Boulkheir, Alassane and Ould
Houmeid arrived late as they were coming directly from a
sit-in demonstration at the Ministry of the Interior, which
was interrupted by the announcement of spiritual leader Imam
Bouddaha Ould Bousseiry's death. Comment: Imam Bousseiry's
death follows by one week the passing of Imam Mohamed Salem
Ould Addoud, another of Mauritania's beloved spiritual
leaders. Mauritanians have been deeply affected by these
losses and many make a connection between the deaths and the
climate of division in the country. They think something
must be really wrong in Mauritania if the country has been
deprived of these saintly mens' presence at almost the same

time. End comment. One of the first things Ould Boulkheir
asked the Ambassador was to put pressure on France to oppose
the coup and refuse to recognize the June 6 election.

--------------
THE CLIMATE OF REPRESSION SOFTENS
--------------


4. (C) Guests noted a shift in the regime's approach to
demonstrations. During the past week, demonstrations have
been authorized and the police has refrained from repressing
them. The last violently repressed demonstrations were the
women's sit-in in front of the United Nations building and
the Palais de Justice sit-in (Ref A and B). The
demonstration in front of TV Mauritanie, the joint FNDD/RFD
march and the joint FNDD/RFD youth march took place without
incident (Ref C). Alassane wanted to know who had given the
orders to violently repress demonstrations. There was little
consensus on whether it was the Wali of Nouakchott or
Director General of National Security (DGSN) General Hadi,
but guests agreed the orders were ultimately coming from the
High State Council (HSC). Guests described General Hadi as a
"crazy man," stating that even members of his family feared
his brutality. Ould Maouloud pointed out that the women's
demonstration stirred disagreements on the policy towards
demonstrations between the HSC's radical and more moderate
factions. As the repression at the Palais de Justice was the
last time police used force to disperse demonstrators,
Maouloud suspects the HSC faction favorable to freedom of
expression finally won.

--------------

NOUAKCHOTT 00000323 002 OF 004


M'BARE'S POWER OR LACK THEREOF
--------------


5. (C) The discussion then shifted to President of the
Senate and interim President Ba M'Bare. The guests aired
negative opinions about M'Bare, who they criticized for being
weak and lending himself to the military's game. They noted
M'Bare's appointment as interim president is only symbolic
and that in reality he has no power -- General Aziz's
portrait still presides over government offices. Alassane
argued that, as interim President, M'Bare could reschedule
the election and take actions to redress the situation. Ould
Boulkheir reacted very strongly by saying that M'Bare had no
power because he had no constitutional legitimacy. Alassane
insisted that the FNDD and RFD should talk to M'Bare and
convince him to reschedule the election. Most guests
rejected this idea, stating it was not realistic. Ould
Houmeid pointed out that M'Bare's family had said M'Bare is
"afraid" and that all his movements are under close
surveillance by the military.

--------------
MAURITANIA'S NEIGHBORS
--------------


6. (C) The RFD's Ould Amar argued that Senegal and Morocco
are conspiring to destabilize Mauritania. According to Ould
Amar, these countries want a weak Mauritania in order to
"divvy up the territory" and fully pursue their "interests"
here. Ould Amar stressed that Aziz, who is of Moroccan
descent and was raised in Senegal, has surrounded himself
with a "little Rabat," a group of individuals partial to
Morocco's interest. A discussion ensued about Cheikh Ould
Horma, one of Aziz's main advisors. Ould Horma's father,
Ahmedou Ould Horma, was the first Mauritanian deputy during
the French colonial period. After failing to be re-elected
and receiving assassination threats in Dakar, he moved to
Morocco to promote Mauritania's annexation by Morocco. After
many years, he was invited by the Mauritanian government to
return to Mauritania. His children are now influential in
Mauritanian circles of power and keep close ties to Morocco.


7. (C) Ould Amar highlighted the role played by Qadhafi in
shaping Morocco's policy towards Mauritania. He stressed
that Morocco and Qadhafi were now on good terms thanks to the
Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD). The Moroccans
allowed Qadhafi to use CEN-SAD to implement his regional
agenda and supported CEN-SAD's role as an election observer
in Mauritania.


8. (C) Guests declared themselves puzzled with Algeria's
radical change in policy towards Mauritania. Algerians, who
were originally opposed to the coup, have seemingly become
favorable to the junta. They commented on the recent
television interview by Algerian Minister for Maghreb and
African Affairs Abdelkader Messahel, in which he said the
June 6 elections would "normalize the situation" in
Mauritania. The guests were puzzled at Algeria's change of
position and could not pinpoint the cause.


9. (C) Mali's change of attitude towards the junta was also
discussed. Guests stated that Mali had accepted the junta
because they were afraid General Aziz would use his influence
to fuel the Touareg revolt if Mali continued to reject the
regime. Maouloud characterized the junta's policy as
"blackmail" against Mali. Ould Houmeid asserted that during
the "last attack" (presumably he meant the attack on Malian
forces in Nampala in December 2008),the Touaregs had
received help from Mauritania.

--------------
NO FAITH IN SENEGALESE MEDIATION
--------------


10. (C) Ambassador Boulware asked guests for their views of
the Senegalese mediation and if they wanted the U.S. to speak

NOUAKCHOTT 00000323 003 OF 004


with the Senegalese on their behalf. Ould Boulkheir
responded he had "no faith" in the Senegalese mediation. He
stated it was obvious the Senegalese were working for the
junta. He suspects the junta wants to delay the elections
and is using the Senegalese to introduce that item in the
negotiation agenda to make it seem like a concession to the
opposition. Ould Boulkheir feels the FNDD has been trapped
for too long in the junta's agenda and that they will
participate in this agenda if they ask to delay the
elections. The FNDD's and RFD's goal is to thwart the coup
d'etat, said Ould Boulkheir. Moving the elections by a few
months does not change anything if they cannot ultimately
achieve that goal. Guests pointed out that the Senegalese
were keen on moving forward with the mediation and that
Senegalese Foreign Affairs Minister Cheikh Tidiane Gadio was
arriving in Mauritania the next day. Comment: Gadio arrived
that same day with a plan drafted by President Wade. The
FNDD, while still suspicious, seems inclined to now consider
it as a basis for discussion -- SEPTELs will report on
Ambassador's May 11 meeting with President Abdallahi and
DCM's meeting with FNDD "Foreign Minister" Ould Maouloud.
End comment.


11. (C) Ould Houmeid, who sat morosely for most of the lunch
(at times with his head in his hands),came out of his
silence to stress the role that Qadhafi had played in
obstructing a solution to the crisis. He said the Benin
Ambassador to the AU had been sent home because he made a
statement against Qadhafi's handling of the Mauritanian
crisis. According to Ould Houmeid, this event has dissuaded
others from challenging Qadhafi's decisions.


12. (C) Ould Maouloud further expounded on Ould Boulkheir's
statements. According to Ould Maouloud, the FNDD wants the
military to reach the conclusion they need to reschedule the
election on their own. The FNDD refuses to ask for a delay
as it does not want General Aziz to use the election as a
bargaining chip by saying "I'll reschedule the election if
the FNDD gives up Abdallahi's return and if the RFD accepts a
military candidacy." Ould Maouloud thought Aziz was already
convinced of the need to delay the election, but was trying
to get a "deal" that would have the FNDD and RFD yield on
their two redlines. Ould Maouloud stated that Aziz's
unilateral agenda was set without consulting the FNDD or the
RFD. They therefore refuse to acknowledge his agenda by
asking him to move the elections. They told Ambassador and
DCM that they would rather see the election take place on
June 6 than give Aziz more time than he has already had.


13. (C) The guests feel that they have failed if Aziz is
able to start his campaign. "If nothing happens before May
15," Ould Maouloud said, "that means we will start applying
our agenda." Ould Amar also said "the next 10 days are
decisive," implying that the RFD would also change its
tactics. Comment: The presidential campaign is scheduled to
start on May 22. Maouloud and Amar did not explain why they
were using the May 15 date as a point of reference, what
event they were expecting would happen before that date, and
what agenda the FNDD/RFD plans to adopt. Nevertheless, their
statements sounded like a threat of more violent tactics.
End comment.


14. (C) Comment: The luncheon was amicable with multiple
statements of support for the U.S. position in the aftermath
of the coup. Divisions between the FNDD and RFD concerning
the role of President Abdallahi remained clear. The RFD's
Ould Amar made his FNDD partners bristle when he argued that
the Constitutional Council's decision that there was a
"presidential vacancy" was an unfortunate but unappealable
fact meaning that "Ba M'Bare is now the president of
Mauritania." Ould Boulkheir challenged the legal foundation
of a ruling that cited documents such as the declarations of
the High State Council on an equal footing with the
constitution. Ould Amar made clear that the RFD saw the need
for consensual elections as an exit strategy for Mauritania
-- but made clear that Abdallahi's return was not necessarily

NOUAKCHOTT 00000323 004 OF 004


an important element in that process. End comment.

BOULWARE