EAC REVIEWS INCREASED AQIM THREAT, UTILITY

S E C R E T NOUAKCHOTT 000292

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/26/2014
TAGS: ASEC MR
SUBJECT: EAC REVIEWS INCREASED AQIM THREAT, UTILITY
SHORTAGES, AND SWINE FLU

REF: STATE 41745

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Dennis Hankins for reason 1.4 (g)


1. (S) EAC was convened by the Charge on April 26 to review
mission preparedness for the likelihood of renewed and
increased AQIM activity in Mauritania in the aftermath of the
Canadian hostages release, contingency planning should fuel,
electricity and water become unavailable in coming months,
and Mission preparation for pandemic disease.

--------------
AQIM
--------------


2. (S) EAC reviewed the circumstances surrounding the
release of Canadian diplomatic hostages held by AQIM in
northern Mali and concluded AQIM is likely to refocus
attention on operations in Mauritania including use of VBIEDs
and the possible taking of western hostages. EAC judges AQIM
primary targets would remain Mauritanian government and
military facilities with diplomatic missions being secondary
targets. Following the expulsion of the Israeli ambassador
and the closure of their embassy, the EAC judged the relative
AQIM attention on U.S. facilities had increased. EAC
reviewed and agreed to recommendations for improved interior
and perimeter defense against a VBIED attack and recommended
limited re-engagement with Mauritanian military units to
allow improvement in their ability to identify and interdict
AQIM units transiting to or from Mali. EAC recognized a
general threat of AQIM to take western hostages but judged
that, given the known U.S. policy of not paying ransom, that
U.S. citizens were relatively less at risk than other
westerners from hostage-taking plans aimed to generate income
for AQIM.


3. (S) Interior Defense: Acting RSO briefed the EAC on the
plausibility of creating a limited armed defense element
within our local guard force designed to serve as a visible
deterrent against possible incursion onto the embassy grounds
and to allow mission personnel additional stand-off time to
allow them to reach their safe haven in the case of embassy
incursion following a VBIED attack. Acting RSO advocated the
arming of at least two properly vetted and trained local
guards per shift with the erection of a hard firing point
inside the compound opposite the primary vehicle entrance.
Acting RSO also briefed EAC concerning ongoing Mission
efforts to include appropriately trained U.S. military
personnel as part of the Mission react team to provide, if
time and circumstances allow, some capability to provide
internal defense capability for safehavened personnel outside
of the CAA and to assist personnel in reaching their
safehavens. The EAC concurred with the Acting RSO's
recommendations. RSO will work with DS to gain technical
advice and funding to implement.


4. (S) Perimeter Defense: Acting RSO noted that the Mission
enjoys excellent set-back but added that the National Guard
units at the end of the frontage road remains somewhat
vulnerable to being overrun. If bypassed, a VBIED would be
able to reach our outer perimeter wall which, if breached,
would allow foot access to our outer parking lot and primary
perimeter wall. Acting RSO outlined plans to install a drop
gate at the end of the street that would hamper vehicles
quickly bypassing the National Guard detachment. Acting RSO
also outlined plans to provide training for our host country
National Guard use to enhance their skills in responding to a
threat. The EAC concurred with the Acting RSO's
recommendation. RSO will work with DS to obtain funding for
the drop gate.


5. (S) Mauritanian military capabilities: Charge briefed
the EAC that the current post-coup political situation does
not allow for the resumption of pre-coup military training
and equipping activities. Charge noted, however, that EAC
could make recommendations for limited engagements that would
have an immediate effect (within 3 months) that could help
the Mauritanian military identify and interdict AQIM units
crossing Mauritania's border for an attack or to take western
hostages. Charge outlined three activities that could be
undertaken that would coincide with renewed CREEKSAND
surveillance flights operating out of Burkina Faso scheduled
to start in May. First, the Mission would authorize SOCCE
and AFRICOM elements to engage in limited interactions with
the three primary Mauritanian counter-terrorism elements in
Zouerate, Atar and Nema to ensure familiarity with the
Creeksand platform and to ensure they have the ability to
communicate with the aircraft if called in against a credible

and actionable threat. Provision of radio and other
communication equipment to ensure communications with the
aircraft would be authorized if needed. Second, in view of
the recent Mauritanian military acquisition of two
helicopters from Morocco, counter-terrorism units may have
for the first time air mobility capability that would allow
them to interdict mobile AQIM units. A U.S. military
assessment of those aircraft, their range and capapilities,
their equipment and maintenance package would be needed to
determine whether the Mauritanians will be able to retain
that air mobility capability (since previous helicopters
given by China quickly became hanger queens for lack of spare
parts and mechanic training). Third, the Mauritanians have
indicated the desire to upgrade an isolated and deserted
airstrip on the Malian border that could serve as a forward
operating base against AQIM elements attempting to attack
targets in central and northern Mauritania. A U.S. military
assessment of that airstrip would determine what upgrades
would be needed to make that forward operating base mission
capable. In the case of both the helicopter and air field
assessment, follow-on equipment and training would be
warranted, despite the political situation, to ensure
interdiction capability essential for the security of
American citizens. The EAC concurred with the
recommendations. Subject to Department concurrence, SOCCE
will coordinate implementation with the Mauritanian military,
SOCEUR and AFRICOM. Should these recommendations be
implemented, Post Management would authorize the staffing of
the SOCEE NCO and second MLE positions that have been held
vacant since the coup.

--------------
Utilities
--------------


6. (C) EconOff briefed EAC on press reports stating that the
sole exporter of petroleum products to Mauritania, Fall Oil,
had threatened suspension of shipments to Mauritania due to
non-payment. EconOff noted that private companies were
making their payments so the commercial availability of fuel
is unlikely to be negatively impacted for the next six
months. The state power company, however, is in arrears and
is threatened with suspension of fuel supplies. As over 80%
of Mauritania's power in fuel-generated, the possibility
exists for massive power shortages just as Mauritania enters
the hot season. The lack of power would, in turn, affect
water availability. The Management Officer noted that GSO
and RSO had been looking at contingency planning. Post's
fuel reserves would be able to meet mission demands for up to
two weeks. EAC determined that the unavailability of
commercially available fuel would serve as a tripwire leading
to fuel and water rationing and requiring Mission personnel
to limit their residential generator use. Should shortages
be significant enough to suggest an extended period of forced
rationing, the EAC would consider a recommendation of
Voluntary Departure. Prolonged fuel and water shortages that
would prevent Mission from supporting residences would
constitute a tripwire for consideration of Ordered Departure.
The EAC determined that while there are reasons for concern,
the situation is not yet serious enough to warrant a change
of operations. The EAC did decide to procure additional
Jerry cans for use as emergency water supplies in residences
and to clean and fill an unused water cistern under the
Mission volleyball court. Mission will also ask the regional
facilities manager to determine the feasibility of running
the CMR and essential security systems off a smaller
generator than the Mission's primary backup to minimize fuel
use after working hours.

--------------
Swine Flu
--------------


7. (SBU) Charge drew the EAC's attention to REFTEL
concerning the recent outbreak of swine flu. EAC assessed
that while Mauritania may have rudimentary capabilities to
detect and monitor the spread of pandemic diseases, it has
virtually no capacity to combat them. EAC determined it
would consider that low host country capabilities should a
pandemic disease be detected in Mauritania.
HANKINS