CONSIDERING THE SENEGALESE MEDIATION

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NOUAKCHOTT 000290

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/23/2014
TAGS: PREL PGOV USAU MR
SUBJECT: CONSIDERING THE SENEGALESE MEDIATION

REF: A. NOUAKCHOTT 282

B. NOUAKCHOTT 269

C. BOULWARE/HANKINS VTC OF APRIL 22

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Dennis Hankins for reasons 1.4 (b and
d)


1. (C) Summary: Democratically elected president Abdallahi
intends to travel to Senegal on Sunday, April 26, accepting
an invitation from President Wade. The FNDD and RFD remain
open to participation in a Senegalese/African Union mediation
subject to several large reservations. They believe (perhaps
erroneously) General Aziz is, in fact, looking for a delay in
the electoral process; therefore, they are pushing for a
number of significant concessions. The French see little
utility in the Senegalese mediation and no chance of a delay
in the June 6 elections; however, they recognize the
elections will do nothing to gain Aziz domestic or
international legitimacy. End Summary


2. (C) FNDD Sees Itself on a Roll: Charge met April 23 with
FNDD "Foreign Minister" Mohamed Ould Maouloud at his bustling
party headquarters. Ould Maouloud explained the activity was
do to the unexpected decision by the Governor of Nouakchott
to authorize three anti-coup rallies later in the day. Ould
Maouloud said the FNDD had been caught off guard since they
assumed the regime would refuse the marches -- the FNDD's
main point being to highlight the repression of political
dissent. Organizers were now scrambling to get supporters
out for marches they hadn't really expected to take place.
Ould Maouloud characterized the decision as a sign of
weakness on the part of General Ghazwany and Senate President
M'Bare.


3. (C) Senegal: Ould Maouloud told Charge President
Abdallahi had decided to accept an invitation from Senegalese
President Wade to visit Dakar. Abdallahi will come to
Nouakchott Sunday and fly to Dakar after a few meetings with
supporters here. Ould Maouloud confirmed previous comments
from him and from the RFD's Ahmed Ould Daddah that the
opposition was prepared to enter into political negotiations
in Senegal under certain conditions. Ould Maouloud
emphasized that the opposition remains highly skeptical of
Wade's intentions and certainly does not see him as devoted
to democracy -- that said, they see Wade acting primarily out
of ego. Ould Daddah insisted that any talks must be under
the auspices of the African Union with Wade ideally limiting
Senegal's role to that of "host" and, at most, serving as
"co-president" with Jean Ping. He emphasized "we will never
allow Wade to dictate internal Mauritanian policies" adding
that the FNDD leadership saw Senegal as having encouraged
ethnic strife in Mauritania for years. Touching on the
widely held belief that Senegal and Morocco had almost
succeeded in getting the French to divide Mauritania between
them at the point of independence, Ould Maouloud said Wade,
"has never considered us as a real country and would welcome
the chance to get the border territories.


4. (C) Despite their misgivings, Ould Maouloud saw political
talks in Senegal as a means of derailing Aziz' election
strategy. He confided that in the last week parliamentarians
allied with Aziz had told Senate President M'Bare that he
should consider delaying the election date and that he had
been lobbied by a friend of Aziz to call for a postponement
of the elections. He added that Senegalese Foreign Minister
Gadio had told Ahmed Ould Daddah that Aziz was willing to
push back the elections (According to Ould Maouloud, Gadio
laughed when Ould Daddah said, "I understood Aziz had
resigned. How would he be able to change the election
date?). Ould Maouloud thought Aziz wanted to get the
elections postponed since he has been unable to entice an
opposition candidate with enough clout to give the elections
the credibility Aziz needs. Perhaps overstating the strength
of his hand, Ould Maouloud suggested the opposition is now
positioned to demand the cancellation of the election
strategy, not just a postponement. Ould Maouloud also
thought they could secure the release of FNDD detainees
(especially Prime Minister Waghef) and dictate the structure
of the talks.


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5. (C) Ould Maouloud stressed that any talks should include
not just Wade and Ping but the rest of the International
Contact Group and the UNSC P5 as co-guarantors. He
backstepped a bit suggesting the Arab League should be
excluded because they had offered to send observers to the
June 6 elections "in violation" of the February 20
denunciation of the unilateral election process. Ould
Maouloud noted he had had a very positive meeting with the
Swedish Ambassador in Dakar who he would welcome as the
representative of the EU Presidency in any Dakar talks --
certainly over the German ambassador who currently represents
the EU Presidency in Nouakchott and who is seen as a bit of a
cheerleader for the coup.


6. (C) Ould Maouloud thought an opposition delegation to any
Dakar talks would include Prime Minister Waghef as
Abdallahi's representative, President of the National
Assembly Ould Boulkheir, an FNDD Troika, and Ahmed Ould
Daddah. On the regime-side, he initially saw only General
Ghazwany but then added Senate President Ba M'Bare could be
included in his senate role but not as "Interim President."


7. (C) Despondent French: French Charge Marc Flattot
(protect) told Charge April 23 the French were disappointed
that no significant opposition candidates had filed their
candidacy before the midnight deadline April 22. Flattot
confided that France had heavily lobbied Ahmed Ould Daddah to
participate in the elections but had been rebuffed. Former
Prime Minister Zein Zeidane had been hoped for, but he also
had decided against participation. Flattot recognized the
final six candidates include Aziz, four "nobodies", and "one
guy we've never heard of." He added, "We have a nice picture
-- Aziz, another White Moor, a Haratine, and an
Afro-Mauritanian," but he lamented the weakness of the
opposition will result in elections, "that won't win Aziz any
credibility either with other Mauritanians or with the
international community." That said, he saw no chance the
Aziz would delay the elections because Aziz recognized
Mauritania's economic situation would only get worse as time
goes on which could derail his election chances no matter how
well he planned things. Flattot dismissed the Senegalese
mediation saying "Wade just wants to prove he exists and get
another chance for his Nobel Peace Prize." In the end,
Flattot saw no way to turn off the Aziz electoral strategy
but also saw no way to move forward after those elections.


8. (C) Recommendation: Mauritania is going nowhere fast.
The looming June 6 elections will only complicate things by
creating three degrees of separation from constitutional
order that can be traced through the coup, the current
"Transition Government," and a future illegitimately
"elected" government. Without a wide range of options, the
Senegalese mediation is the first effort the opposition has
signaled they would participate in. Post recommends
approaching the Senegalese to urge them to pursue their
efforts based on the conditions posed by the FNDD and RFD.
We believe that the opposition will eventually back off on
their demand for the cancellation of the June 6 elections and
release of detainees, but believe the indefinite postponement
of the elections would be a non-negotiable precondition for
talks.
HANKINS