ACCORDING TO VALL, PRO AND ANTI-COUP PARTIES WANT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 NOUAKCHOTT 000288

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/23/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM MR
SUBJECT: ACCORDING TO VALL, PRO AND ANTI-COUP PARTIES WANT
AN AGREEMENT

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Dennis Hankins for reasons 1.4 (b) and
(d).


1. (C) Summary: According to Colonel Ely Ould Mohamed
Vall, political actors are ready for a consensual solution
but Mohamed Ould Abdel Aziz remains the main obstacle to an
agreement. Vall believes the time before the election is
crucial to finding a solution. Once the election takes
place, he fears Mauritania will be torn by discontent and
instability, which could have dangerous consequences. Vall
doubts Ghazouani will stage a counter-coup and even though he
stated Aziz has no support base in the military, he said Aziz
has attempted to turn the military into a militia that caters
to him. Vall also criticized the French and Spanish
positions and asked the US to convince the AU and the EU to
remain strong in their condemnation. For Vall, the Libyan
mediation was extremely damaging and Mauritania's new
relation with Iran is pure folly. He stated that Al Qaeda
could also attempt to exploit the political crisis. End
summary.

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EVERYBODY WANTS AN AGREEMENT
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2. (C) Charge and PolOff met April 22 with Vall at his
request. He started by saying the political class agrees the
current crisis is dangerous for the country. According to
him, both pro and anti-coup factions are desperate for a
consensual solution. Nevertheless, Mohamed Ould Abdel Aziz
is obstructing an agreement and remains keen on moving
forward unilaterally. Vall stressed that was not the case
with other High State Council (HSC) members.


3. (C) Vall thinks that Mauritania will be in a dangerous
position if the election takes place. The election,
according to Vall, will not result in a political solution
and will not afford Aziz any legitimacy. The population will
reject the outcome and the situation will most likely
degenerate sooner or later. The reaction, whenever it
occurs, could be explosive and beyond anybody's control.
Vall believes it is still possible to find a solution before
the election. Internal and external pressure is needed to
dissuade Aziz from holding elections. Aziz has to be
isolated and his own supporters have to be pushed to ask him
for consensus.


4. (C) Vall agreed with Charge there has been increasing
collaboration between the FNDD and the RFD in spite of
differences. Vall stated that maintaining a strong, united
front is crucial. He believes all differences should be put
aside in the interest of opposing the election and Aziz. He
thinks once the crisis is solved and a minimal agreement has
been reached, parties will have free reign to express their
differences and follow their agendas.


5. (C) Vall stated he does not agree with the
Constitutional Council's presidential vacancy decision. He
stated the constitution is very specific about the conditions
leading to a presidential vacancy and, objectively, those
conditions are not reunited. For him, Ba M'Bare's mandate
has no legitimacy.


6. (C) "Ghazouani will not attempt a coup," stated Vall
with conviction. He also highlighted that Aziz has no
support base within the military and that he has attempted to
transform the military from an institution into a militia.
Vall stressed that everything is centered around Aziz's
person and all promotions go through him. The Charge asked
Vall if he had done anything during the 2005-2007 transition
to curtail the presidential security battalion's (BASEP)
power. Vall stated 19 months was too short a time period to
tackle the BASEP problem. At the time, he was focused on
ensuring the military left politics; otherwise the military
would have been torn apart by political forces. He told
President Abdallahi this was a concern and suggested that he

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name retired Colonel Cheikh Sid Ahmed Babamine to the
Ministry of Defense. Note: Colonel Babamine was an
Ambassador under Taya and served as president of the CENI
during the 2005-2007 democratic transition. End note. As
retired military, Babamine had no power aspirations and could
have restored the military to its institutional role.
President Abdallahi ignored his suggestion and continued
giving Aziz more power, even promoting him and others in
utter disregard for military hierarchy. Comment: Depending
on which conspiracy theory one ascribes to, Vall did nothing
to rein in the power and influence of the BASEP during the
transition since he assumed it was loyal to him. The theory
holds that Vall left Aziz to mind the store for an eventual
Vall political comeback. Unfortunately for Vall, Aziz
decided he could keep the reins for himself and turned on
Vall -- hence the current depth of Vall's discontent. End
Comment

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THE FRENCH, THE SPANISH, AND THE LIBYANS
--------------


7. (C) Vall was critical of French and Spanish positions.
He said he was appalled at their tacit acceptance of the
coup, particularly in light of their strong interests in
Mauritania. He stressed the international community should
oppose the coup because it will lead to social strife. The
United States should ensure the African Union and the
European Union stick to their positions.


8. (C) Vall brought up rumors about French complicity with
Aziz. Apparently, the General has told Ghazouani and others
that the French support the HSC. According to Aziz, the
French encouraged him to run but stressed he needed at least
another candidate to run against him, such as Ibrahima Sarr.
Vall has been in touch with the French and urged them to be
aware of the potential impact of their actions and their
responsibility in Mauritania. "You are playing a very
dangerous game," he told the French, "There are elements
among you encouraging a radicalization of positions." Vall
noted that the French invariably say something to buoy the
regime every time they suffer a political setback.


9. (C) Vall is convinced that Qadhafi's mediation did
nothing but encourage Aziz. He also brought up rumors that
Qadhafi and the French had struck a deal to install Aziz in
power.

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THE SOLUTION
--------------


10. (C) Regarding a solution to the crisis, Vall stated
that the election should be postponed and planned in a
transparent manner. Also, any future elections should be
observed by the international community. Vall seemed to
agree with a solution along the lines of Ould Daddah's views
in which President Abdallahi would return to name a
government of national unity and then resign. He said the
military will never accept a solution in which Abdallahi
continues governing the country until elections take place.


11. (C) When Charge asked if he had anyone in mind to lead
the transition as prime minister, he responded immediately
that Colonel Babamine would be a good candidate.
Nevertheless, he agreed it would be best to draft a list of
candidates and choose one consensually. As for the length of
the transition, he thinks between two to four months maximum
would be appropriate. (Comment: Most technical experts
suggest a full-blown electoral process with international
involvement would take nine to twelve months.)

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AL QAEDA AND THE IRANIAN PRESENCE
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12. (C) Vall stated that Al Qaeda is a dangerous element in
the region. Disenfranchised Mauritanian youth can be easily
co-opted. Mauritania cannot fight the Al Qaeda threat on its
own. Vall believes capacity has to be reinforced with the
help of the West. Vall also warned Charge that Al Qaeda could
exploit the political conflict.


13. (C) Engagement with Iran is a senseless decision, said
Vall. He stated he knows first-hand the reasons that led
Mauritania to expel the Iranian Ambassador in the nineties.
The Iranians had organized cells and were creating the
conditions for an Islamic revolution. Vall said they were
even attempting to change the meaning of Islam in Mauritania.
Aziz's decision shows a lack of good political judgment,
stated Vall. According to Vall, if Morocco sent away the
Iranians, it was for good reasons. Comment: The normally
calm and collected Vall became visibly agitated when
discussing the Iranians -- sputtering over his words over the
threat they pose to Mauritanian security.


14. (C) Comment: Vall has kept a low profile through the
crisis. Nevertheless, his contacts with the French and
discussions with other actors show that he is getting
involved from the background. It is obvious Vall does not
support Aziz although we always take his democracy talking
points with a very large grain of salt. He remains a
significant player but one who remains in the shadows. Vall
told Charge he had not taken a public position against the
coup since he thought he still had the potential to influence
the military leadership if the opportunity presents itself.
Openly opposing the coup would cut off that access. Vall
termed the June 6 elections as his "red line" after which he
will come out in open dissent. End comment.
HANKINS