Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09NOUAKCHOTT277
2009-04-16 13:12:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Nouakchott
Cable title:  

THE ELEPHANT IN THE ROOM: ETHNIC RELATIONS AFTER

Tags:  PGOV PHUM KDEM 
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 NOUAKCHOTT 000277 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/16/2019
TAGS: PGOV PHUM KDEM
SUBJECT: THE ELEPHANT IN THE ROOM: ETHNIC RELATIONS AFTER
THE COUP

REF: A. NOUAKCHOTT 251

B. NOUAKCHOTT 271

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Dennis Hankins for reasons 1.4 (b and
d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 NOUAKCHOTT 000277

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/16/2019
TAGS: PGOV PHUM KDEM
SUBJECT: THE ELEPHANT IN THE ROOM: ETHNIC RELATIONS AFTER
THE COUP

REF: A. NOUAKCHOTT 251

B. NOUAKCHOTT 271

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Dennis Hankins for reasons 1.4 (b and
d).


1. (C) Summary: Mauritania's political crisis keeps
stirring longstanding ethnic rivalries. The media talks
about a "war" between junta leader General Abdel Aziz and
anti-coup Haratine political leaders. Some of the leaders
themselves describe it as the regime's "permanent" war with
anyone refusing to cooperate with the Moor's Arab national
identity project. Haratine discontent is also shared by the
Afro-Mauritanian population. Despite Aziz's efforts to
co-opt Afro-Mauritanians through political appointments, the
speedy return of the refugees, the resolution of the "passif
humanitaire" and promises of better services to poor
communities, many believe most main issues remain unsolved.
For Kane Hamidou Baba and Ibrahima Sarr, respected
Afro-Mauritanian opposition leaders who have accepted to
participate in General Aziz's elections, the real problem is
political under-representation of Haratines and
Afro-Mauritanians -- perceived by many, despite the lack of
reliable demographical statistics, as representing the
majority of the population. Both groups want acknowledgment,
inclusion, and equal access to power and opportunities.
Sociologist Cheikh Saad Bouh Camara thinks that Nasserists
and Baathists are purposely exacerbating ethnic divisions and
obstructing national unity. These pan-Arab elements, who
believe in white Moor supremacy, fear a coalition between the
Haratines and the Afro-Mauritanians that would threaten White
Moor power. Past governments have tried to build a divide
among Haratines and Afro-Mauritanians by, for instance,
language programs that taught Haratines Arabic and
Afro-Mauritanians French. This strategy has ofetn worked as
Haratines often self-identify as "Arab" before "Black" and
often do not rally to what are seen as Afro-Mauritanian
causes. Discussions about the "passif humanitaire" --
formerly a taboo subject -- and about what Mauritanian's
refer to as "the Obama phenomenon" make White Moors
increasingly uneasy. In the absence of a more inclusive
political approach -- that an authoritarian regime is
unlikely to provide -- exacerbated frustrations could lead to

unrest and, potentially, more violence. End summary.


--------------
AT WAR WITH THE HARATINES
--------------


2. (U) Newspaper L'Eveil Hebdo published March 30 an article
titled "Trench Warfare" that states General Aziz is at war
with Haratine leaders and staunch coup detractors like Samory
Ould Beye (labor union leader),Boubacar Ould Messaoud
(president of SOS Esclaves),Boydiel Ould Houmeid (former
minister secretary general to President Abdallahi),and
Messaoud Ould Boulkheir (National Assembly president). Note:
Haratines are black Mauritanians who were (and some still
are) slaves to the Moors and who were raised in the Moor
language, culture and tradition. They are also referred to
as Black Moors although some, through intermarriage, may be
lighter-skinned than some White Moors -- linkages to a slave
past are more determinant than skin color. They are among
the poorest and most underprivileged elements of society and
have traditionally supported the White Moor agendas.
Nevertheless, since the 70s, Haratine leaders have developed
a strong political conscience and have attempted to assert
themselves through the abolitionist movement. End note.


3. (C) The week of April 1, Boubacar Messaoud was
singled-out by white Moor police inspector Mohamed Ould Nejib
and beaten unconscious by the regime's anti-riot police in a
peaceful demonstration. Messaoud Ould Boulkheir was
tear-gassed during the same demonstration (Ref A). On April
8, only a week after the demonstration, the press stated Ould
Nejib was rewarded with a promotion for his role in the


***********************
* Missing Section 002 *
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NOUAKCHOTT 00000277 003 OF 005


in 1966 and again during the passif humanitaire events of the
late eighties and early nineties. End note) To illustrate
his point, Baba stressed that out of 90 young recruits to the
Army's officer candidate school only one was
Afro-Mauritanian. Likewise, only 18 out of 95
parliamentarians are Afro-Mauritanian and Haratine, which
shows the National Assembly does not reflect Mauritania's
electoral composition because much of the population,
concentrated in the South, is Afro-Mauritanian or Haratine.
Baba stated he was happy with the resolution of "passif
humanitaire," even though he believed it was only a
beginning.

8. (C) PolOff and PolAsst met April 13 with Ibrahima Sarr, a
Pulaar opposition leader and president of the AJD-MR party
who was the first to announce his candidacy for the June 6
junta-orchestrated election. For Sarr, the problem of power
sharing remains Mauritania's main issue and the main obstacle
to democracy. According to Sarr, the Moors as a minority
have amassed all the power and influence whereas the
Afro-Mauritanians and Haratines have been relegated to a
minor, almost nonexistent role. Sarr believes the Moors have
undertaken a conscious, planned effort to exclude
Afro-Mauritanians and Haratines from the Mauritanian national
project by curtailing their access to the administration, the
military, education, health, land, the civil registry, radio
and television. For this reason, Sarr rejects the current
constitution as he believes it does not reflect the true and
diverse face of the Mauritanian nation. Sarr's political
platform is based on these identity issues. He calls for a
revision of Mauritania's identity; the officialization of
other languages like Halpulaar, Soninke and Wolof; political
power-sharing between all the communities; and the abolition
of slavery (Ref B). Sarr stresses the symbolic importance of
Ba M'Bare's presidency. Even if short lived and devoid of
power, he believes M'Bare's opportunity to preside over the
country is a tremendous political success for
Afro-Mauritanians that will shift mindsets and lead people
into accepting Afro-Mauritanians in power. He stated General
Aziz had encountered opposition from his tribe about M'Bare's
appointment but that he moved forward with it. Comment: Aziz
was probably weighing the value of a minority appointment in
the eyes of the international community. End comment. Sarr
also commended Aziz's resolution of the passif humanitaire,
saying it was a difficult question because two torturers were
at the High State Council. He's aware of the limits of
General Aziz's plan but thinks this is a base
Afro-Mauritanians can build on to achieve recognition and
justice.


9. (C) PolAsst met with PLEJ president and FNDD activist Ba
Mamadou Alassane on April 14. Alassane stated he had
relatives who were killed during the "passif humanitaire."
As a Pulaar and anti-coup politician, he was not surprisingly
disapproving of Aziz's unilateral efforts to resolve the
"passif humanitaire." He said that Aziz was very close to
President Taya (who was president during the "passif"),and
that several of the colonels on the current High State
Council were directly implicated in the killing of
Afro-Mauritanians. Whereas President Abdallahi had been
trying to find a genuine consensual resolution to the issue,
Aziz had merely bought out susceptible Afro-Mauritanian
leaders in the South in an attempt to lend credibility to his
"solution." "No one has been tried or judged," or held
responsible, Alassane reasoned, so there could be no
"resolution" at this time. Alassane also noted that many
Afro-Mauritanian community leaders were just "opportunists"
searching for posts or other tangible rewards, whereas the
masses as a whole rejected Aziz out of hand. When asked
about Ibrahim Sarr, Alassane stated that he had lost much
credibility among Afro-Mauritanians since he had begun
dealing with Aziz, and that the "majority" of Pulaars were no
longer with him.


10. (C) In an article published April 14, newspaper Le
Renovateur highlights the role played by Afro-Mauritanian
leaders like Ibrahima Sarr and Kane Hamidou Baba in providing

NOUAKCHOTT 00000277 004 OF 005


legitimacy to Aziz. President of the Senate Ba M'Bare is
also considered "a puppet" of the junta. Comment:
Afro-Mauritanian leaders like Sarr, Kane Hamidou Baba and
Professor Camara are aware of the limits of General Aziz,s
actions on behalf of the Afro-Mauritanian community and of
the junta,s unilateral march towards consolidating the coup.
Nevertheless, they favor a logic of participation as opposed
to a logic of boycott. Some Afro-Mauritanians are so power
hungry that they will take any opportunity to access power --
even that afforded by a dictator eager to consolidate his
power and willing to cater to disparate groups like
Baathists, Iranians and Libyans. As many Afro-Mauritanians
have stated, they are willing to "play with the devil" if he
will have them, in the hopes that they can beat him at his
own game. End comment.

-------------- --------------
PAN-ARABISTS FEAR HARATINES AND AFRO-MAURITANIANS
-------------- --------------


11. (C) PolOff met April 6 with Professor Cheikh Saad Bouh
Camara, reputed Afro-Mauritanian sociologist of both Haratine
and Afro-Mauritanian descent, to inquire about the junta and
ethnic relations. Professor Camara's candidacy to the
National Independent Electoral Commission (CENI) had been
opposed by many on the grounds that he would be "one
Afro-Mauritanian too many in the government" (Ref A).


12. (C) Professor Camara stated that the coup d'etat had
given pan-Arabist Nasserists and Baathists -- two groups
whose influence has been declining -- an opportunity to make
a comeback in the political scene. These elements were
behind the interruption of relations with Israel. Nasserists
and Baathists feel threatened by General Aziz's resolution of
the "passif humanitaire" as many of them took part in the
purges. The "passif humanitaire" was a taboo issue in
Mauritanian society and the fact that the establishment
recognized the events did not sit well with this group and
has caused extreme apprehension. Comment: Camara,s
assessment of the passif humanitaire is similar to Sarr's and
Baba's. These Afro-Mauritanians believe Aziz's
acknowledgment of what happened is a huge step forward and,
even though imperfect, something Mauritanians can build on.
End comment.


13. (C) Camara thinks that Arab extremists are afraid of
the triumph of democracy and of black accession to power.
"Fear has changed sides," he stated, "now they are afraid of
us." For Camara, Obama's election has been pivotal in
stirring Haratine and Afro-Mauritanian hopes. President
Obama, a bi-racial individual who has succeeded on his own
merits, has become an inspiration and a model they can copy.
These groups are waiting for a "Mauritanian Mohamed Ould
Obama." During the transition of 2005, traditionally
under-represented groups had the opportunity to voice their
opinion. They cherish democracy. Comment: Camara's
assessment of the hard-line Baathist constituency behind Aziz
is difficult to square with his willingness to accept the
leadership of the CENI. Senior LES empoyees who studied
under Camara and considered him a mentor are now deeply
disappointed -- believing he has finally decided to ensure
his retirement than stand on principle. End Comment.


14. (C) Camara said that the Moors feared a
Haratine/Afro-Mauritanian alliance. These groups, according
to Camara, constitute a majority in Mauritania and, if
democracy were to follow its due course, would take over
through the ballot box. The coup has unified people. The
coup has brought Haratines from different political parties
together, for example the Haratines of Tawassoul and the APP.
Comment: The APP political party is a coalition of
Nasserists and Haratines. Despite supposed frictions within
the party on the wake of Qadhafi's visit and rumors of a
split, it still remains strongly anti-coup and an example of
how Nasserists and Haratines can join forces.


NOUAKCHOTT 00000277 005 OF 005



15. (C) Comment: Racial and ethnic relations in Mauritania
are extremely complex. White Moors reign supreme in this
society and inequality is tangible -- there is an all too
visible imbalance between the population's composition and
the circles of power. Some think the coup d'etat against
President Abdallahi was the White Moors' ultimate attempt to
defend their absolute power against the pressures of a more
inclusive and transparent democratic order. Surprisingly,
General Aziz, by appropriating President Abdallahi's
political platform and applying it unilaterally, has broken
taboos in Mauritanian society that nobody thought could be
tackled. The symbolism of a Moor regime leader acknowledging
the "passif humanitaire" and allowing an Afro-Mauritanian to
direct the country even if only for 45 days is a huge leap
forward for Mauritanian minds. Sadly, these advances have
been made in an entirely unilateral and unconstitutional
manner. Lack of representation and exclusion lead to
frustrations that can become hard to control -- especially if
one takes into account Mauritania's still recent history of
ethnic violence. If we add Mauritania's growing
disenfranchised youth into the mix, all the ingredients for
renewed ethnic strife may be present. The impossibility,
under authoritarian regimes and at the doors of the 21st
century, of finding their rightful place in the nation could
be the spark that lights the Haratine and Afro-Mauritanian
ethnic fire. In its efforts to bring democracy to
Mauritania, the United States should seek to support leaders
and initiatives that include and celebrate Mauritania's
diversity and that contribute to a more equitable nation
building effort. End comment.

HANKINS