Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09NOUAKCHOTT260
2009-04-12 09:31:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Nouakchott
Cable title:  

MAURITANIAN ECONOMY DETERIORATING AND LIKELY TO

Tags:  ECON EFIN EMIN PGOV MR 
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 SCRS-00 DSCC-00 PRM-00 DRL-00 G-00 CARC-00 NFAT-00 
 SAS-00 FA-00 SWCI-00 /004W
 ------------------52026D 121029Z /38 

 
P 120931Z APR 09
FM AMEMBASSY NOUAKCHOTT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8311
INFO ECOWAS COLLECTIVE
MAGHREB COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY PARIS 
AMEMBASSY LONDON 
AMEMBASSY BERLIN 
AMEMBASSY MADRID 
AMEMBASSY PRAGUE 
AMEMBASSY DOHA 
HQ USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE
CDR USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
USMISSION USAU ADDIS ABABA
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 
USEU BRUSSELS
C O N F I D E N T I A L NOUAKCHOTT 000260 


E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/09/2019
TAGS: ECON EFIN EMIN PGOV MR
SUBJECT: MAURITANIAN ECONOMY DETERIORATING AND LIKELY TO
WORSEN

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Dennis Hankins for reasons 1.4 (b) and
(d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L NOUAKCHOTT 000260


E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/09/2019
TAGS: ECON EFIN EMIN PGOV MR
SUBJECT: MAURITANIAN ECONOMY DETERIORATING AND LIKELY TO
WORSEN

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Dennis Hankins for reasons 1.4 (b) and
(d).


1. (C) Summary: The foreign exchange market in Mauritania has
stopped functioning and the Central Bank has been rationing
foreign currency since November 2008. The difference between
the parallel and official exchange rates has grown from zero
to 10%. While large companies with connections abroad
continue to import goods, smaller companies and individuals
are having difficulty obtaining credit and foreign exchange.
Imports are currently down by about 25% compared to a year
ago. Mauritania's current account deficit has increased to
15% of GDP and the 2008 budget deficit rose to 8% of GDP due
to increased government spending. There was an acute
treasury crisis in January and February when the Government
of the Islamic Republic of Mauritania's (GIRM) current
account went negative. The GIRM was forced to take a number
of emergency measures, including limiting all government
expenditures to only salaries and interest payments on its
debt. Mauritania's economic and financial problems are
likely to worsen in the coming months. SNIM will renegotiate
its iron ore contracts in April and prices are likely to be
down 40-60% compared to 2008. Given that approximately 45%
of Mauritania's export earnings coming from iron ore exports,
this steep decline in prices is likely to have a significant
negative impact on the country's economic and financial
situation. Most troubling is that because the junta is not
providing data and the World Bank and IMF have stopped their
programs, there is little information available to provide
any early warning prior to a serious deterioration in
economic conditions. End Summary.


2. (C) IMF Country Representative Marc Carre told EconOff
April 8 that the foreign exchange market has stopped
functioning in Mauritania. Rather than letting market forces
set the exchange rate for the ouguiya as it did before, the
Central Bank is rationing foreign exchange to deal with
growing shortages. Carre stated that the Central Bank began
rationing currency in November 2008 and has now segmented the
foreign exchange market. For example, one day the Central

Bank will allow only the petroleum sector to obtain foreign
exchange and on another day only food importers will be able
to obtain foreign exchange.


3. (C) Since January, the exchange rate on the parallel
market has begun to move away from the official exchange
rate. The government had made a concerted effort to close
the gap between the official and parallel exchange rates in
2006 and 2007. By 2008, the two exchange rates were nearly
identical. Since January, there is now a 10% difference
between the two rates. Carre stated that given the foreign
exchange shortage, he would expect to see a much wider gap
between the parallel and official exchange rates. He
speculated that there is enough illegal and black market
activity occurring in Mauritania to keep the parallel market
supplied with foreign exchange. Carre said that eventually
Central Bank officials may be forced to change strategies and
devalue the ouguiya. However, he thought that the Central
Bank would do everything that it could to forestall any
devaluation until after the planned June 6 elections so as
not to diminish consumers' purchasing power before the
elections.


4. (C) Carre stated that he was surprised that there was not
yet a more visible effect from the foreign currency
rationing. He noted that stores still appear fully stocked,
food is widely available, and there has been no significant
price increase for basic goods. Maersk representative David
Ware told EconOff that maritime shipping companies were
currently experiencing about a 25% drop in imports compared
to last year. He said that the large importers are
continuing to import, but many of the smaller importers have
stopped or significantly decreased their imports. Ware
blamed the decrease on small importers' inability to obtain
credit. Given the foreign exchange shortage and decrease in
imports, it is still difficult to explain why there do not
appear to be more shortages on the market. The most likely
explanation is that merchants are selling the stock that they
already have on hand and the shortages will only become more
apparent several months from now when their stocks have been
depleted.


5. (C) Carre noted with alarm that Mauritania's current
account deficit has reached 15% of GDP. He said that the
GIRM started experiencing serious difficulties in January and
February when it was unable to refinance its debt. Since the
August 2008 coup, the junta had issued large amounts of
treasury bills to finance its spending. In January and
February many of the treasury bills fell due, but the GIRM
was not able to find enough buyers and thus unable to
refinance its debt. Carre said that there was an acute
treasury crisis when the GIRM's current account went negative
in January. When that happened, the GIRM issued a decree to
a number of public companies and required them to transfer
all of their funds to the Treasury so that the GIRM would
have access to them. Carre's report confirms other reports
that post received from provincial representatives in January
and February who said that they had been ordered to bring all
of their money to the Central Bank. Carre said that during
January and February the GIRM paid only salaries and interest
on its debt. It made no other expenditures during that
period. He said that he has not yet received the data for
March, but suspects that the same thing may have happened
then too. Carre added that he has heard rumors that the
junta recently obtained a $400 million line of credit from
Libya, but noted that he has nothing concrete to substantiate
the rumor.


6. (C) Carre stated that the GIRM's current financial
problems are primarily a result of policy failures and could
have been avoided in large part. Carre said that the
national iron ore mining company SNIM cut production in the
second half of 2008, which should have signaled to the GIRM
that it was necessary to decrease spending. Instead, the
GIRM increased spending. Carre said that government
expenditures were very high in the second half of 2008 as the
GIRM tried to fulfill all of the promises that it made. He
added that imports remained strong during this period in
spite of the global financial crisis, likely as a result of
strong government spending. As a result of the increased
spending, the 2008 budget deficit reached 8% of GDP, far
above the 3% cap that had previously been agreed upon with
the IMF.


7. (C) Carre is one of the few people outside of the GIRM to
have received a copy of the line by line 2009 budget. He
said that he believes that the GIRM has significantly
overestimated revenue projections for 2009. In addition,
current expenditures have been cut significantly compared to

2008. He questioned whether such drastic cuts were realistic
or if perhaps they were too much. GIRM officials told him
that they would be able to cut current expenditures with
little harm to the population but reducing waste, but Carre
said that he thought their explanation was unrealistic. He
said that investment expenditures in the 2009 budget were
very high. He noted that these would be easy to reduce if
revenues ended up being less than expected.


8. (C) Carre assessed that Mauritania is already facing a
difficult economic situation but that the coming months will
be even more difficult. He said that the impact of the
international financial crisis has not yet hit Mauritania,
but is likely to soon. He explained that the national iron
ore mining company SNIM will renegotiate its iron ore
contracts in April. Prices are expected to be 40-60% lower
compared to 2008. Reduced revenues from iron ore exports
will have an enormous impact on the Mauritanian economy
because they accounted for approximately 45% of export
revenues in 2008. Because the IMF has stopped its program in
Mauritania, it is not making official GDP projections. Carre
said that he had done some rough calculations, but was
unwilling to provide any specific figures. When EconOff
asked if it was possible that GDP growth would be negative in
2009, he said yes, noting that the main drivers of the
economy were all expected to be down sharply in 2009.


9. (C) The GIRM's mismanagement of government finances is
slowly becoming more visible. Carre said that suppliers have
told him that the GIRM is in arrears in its payments to them.
The national power company SOMELEC has not yet paid its fuel
bill for March. If SOMELEC is unable to purchase fuel, this
could lead to widespread power shortages throughout the
country. The GIRM has also fallen behind in its payments to
SOMAGAZ, which distributes bottled propane for cooking. The
problems at SOMAGAZ were exacerbated by the junta's decision
to lower consumer prices for bottled gas without any means to
make up for reduced revenues. There are continuing shortages
of bottled gas on the market and there are now reports that
SOMAGAZ was unable to obtain credit to purchase its next
shipment of gas from abroad.


10. (C) There are reports that the fuel distribution company
NAFTEC is on the verge of ceasing its activities in
Mauritania. NAFTEC is 51% owned by the Government of Algeria
(GoA),34% owned by the GIRM, and 15% owned by a private
Mauritanian investor. The Government of Mauritania is
reportedly nearly $8 million in arrears in its payments to
NAFTEC. The GoA stopped transferring funds to NAFTEC after
the coup, demanding that the GIRM pay its debt to the company
before it considers making any new fuel transfers. NAFTEC
was able to obtain credit from private banks for the past two
months while it tried to find a solution, but local banks are
now refusing to loan it any more money and are requesting
that their debt be paid back immediately.


11. (SBU) The GIRM is late on monthly stipend payments to
students at the University of Nouakchott. Students from the
interior of Mauritania and poor students from Nouakchott
receive a monthly stipend of approximately $42 to help defray
their cost of living while they are students. Students
protested the non-payment April 7 and began burning tires in
front of the university. Police had to be called in to
disperse the students with tear gas.


12. (C) World Bank Country Representative Francois Rantrua
told EconOff that he had little information about the
Mauritanian economy since the coup. World Bank programs have
all been suspended and the staff is either on administrative
leave or has been temporarily assigned to other countries.
Rantrua said that he has been able to get little data, and he
has little confidence in what data he does receive. He noted
that importers have been telling him for months that they
have not been able to obtain foreign exchange. He said that
what they say is probably true, yet somehow people continue
to import. He noted that if Mauritania really were on the
verge of economic collapse, he would expect to see a much
greater difference between the parallel and official exchange
rates. Rantrua called Mauritania a high risk country because
of its heavy dependence on a single export commodity (iron
ore). He strongly suggested that the World Bank be allowed
to do macroeconomic monitoring in Mauritania in order to
avoid a sudden economic collapse with little or no warning.
He added that he was in no way suggesting that the World Bank
reengage with the GIRM, but did think that macroeconomic
monitoring was necessary. He noted that any change in the
Bank's policy would have to be carefully presented so that it
was not misconstrued as a sign that the World Bank was
reengaging with Mauritania.


13. (C) Comment: There has been speculation for months that
Mauritania is on the verge of economic collapse, yet there
had been few signs to suggest that it was actually occurring.
However, we may now be starting to see the first signs.
Carre's confirmation that the GIRM actually did run out of
money in January and February provides the first concrete
indication of the seriousness of the financial problems that
the GIRM is facing. Furthermore, it is unclear how much
longer the Central Bank will be able to continue to ration
foreign exchange before it will be forced to devalue the
ouguiya. The renegotiation of the iron ore contracts will
strike another major blow to the economy. The junta is
likely to do everything in its power to maintain economic
stability through the scheduled June 6 elections. What will
happen after the elections is almost impossible to say, but
economic conditions are almost certain to further
deteriorate. Unless the junta is able to secure financing
from somewhere, it is unclear how much longer it will be able
to maintain some semblance of macroeconomic stability. Given
the current political situation, there is little early
warning system in place that might be able to signal if
Mauritania is on the verge of economic collapse. End
comment.


HANKINS