ROUND UP OF CURRENT EUROPEAN DIPLOMATIC VIEWS ON

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 NOUAKCHOTT 000240

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/01/2014
TAGS: PREL PGOV USEU MR
SUBJECT: ROUND UP OF CURRENT EUROPEAN DIPLOMATIC VIEWS ON
MAURITANIA

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Dennis Hankins for reason 1.4 (b and
d)


1. (C) Summary: Marked differn*ces exist between the French,
Germans, Spanish and European Commission in Nouakchott. The
EC sees the Europeans poised to join the American hard-line
against the coup with the release of its Article 96
conclusions o/a April 6 (but at a lamentable cost for the
Mauritanian people). The French see an extended period of
political and economic limbo under a short-sighted Aziz
regime that increasingly causes concern. The Spaniards warn
that things could be worse than Aziz and note their main
security concern -- illegal migration -- is well under
control. The Germans seem to believe that Aziz can still win
credibility if he can get enough people out to vote on June

6.

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France -- The situation is confused
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2. (C) Charge met March 31 with French Charge Marc Flattot
in the wake of the flap over President Sarkozy's statement
that there was no opposition to the August 6 coup. Flattot
(protect) was obviously having a bad week and said there
seemed to be radio silence from Paris since he was getting no
guidance on how to handle his president's remarks -- even as
all of Mauritania's elite are calling to either praise or
condemn the French. Flattot said that Sarkozy's statement
was obviously wrong and probably made without much thought.
Unfortunately, Sarkozy's remark, as well as Foreign Minister
Kouchner's Jeune Afrique quote suggesting President Abdallahi
should return only to administer the June 6 elections being
organized by General Aziz, had taken on far greater
significance in Nouakchott than what the French leaders had
intended. Flattot recognized that anti-coup rallies being
organized by Ahmed Ould Daddah's party on April 1 and by the
FNDD on April 2 were "Sarkozy Protests" meant to underline
that there is real resistance. Flattot noted that French
Ambassador Vanderpoorter (who has been away for over a month
due to a detached retina) was livid over anti-coup statements
that Sarkozy must have been ill-advised by his Ambassador to
say what he said.


3. (C) Flattot assumed that Aziz will go forward with his
election program lamenting the process will leave him and the
country no better off than it is now. He recognized that
under the current circumstances there is no chance of a
credible election. While he assumes Aziz will be able to
rustle up opponents from the dissident branches of Ould
Daddah's RFD and Abdallahi's ADIL parties, he did not expect
Ould Daddah to run except under the very doubtful
circumstance where Vall also decided to run. Flattot worried
that Aziz would have a tenuous position at best as resources
dry up -- suggesting Mauritania will be bankrupt by October.
Flattot doubted Arab cash flows would be sufficient to offset
Western assistance.


4. (C) Flattot saw Aziz' outreach to the Iranians as
indicative of his poor policy skills. While being able to
gain some modicum of international recognition and much
needed cash injections by playing with the Iranians, Flattot
saw that Aziz had both upset his regionally powerful
neighbors in Rabat and, perhaps more importantly, was
undermining his own military support base by angering the
anti-Shiite Bathist core of the military hierarchy. Flattot
saw this as typical of Aziz who, "takes actions quickly for
the immediate situation but doesn't think through the
consequences."


5. (C) While increasingly critical of what type of leader
Aziz is proving to be, Flattot doubted the ability of the
opposition to do anything about it. He saw the FNDD and RFD
foolishly allowing themselves to be divided over a personal
animosity between Abdallahi and Ould Daddah.

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Spain -- It Could Be Worse
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NOUAKCHOTT 00000240 002 OF 004




6. (C) Charge met April 2 with Spanish Ambassador Alejandro
Polanco Mata who, as always, was frank in citing Spanish
security concerns as driving their policies. Polanco noted
that Spain was very pleased with the Aziz regime's efforts in
controlling illegal immigration to the Canary Islands. Now
is the period of ideal conditions for boat people sailing
from Nouadhibou to the Canaries. Last year in February and
March, 23 boats made it to the Canaries. With Aziz getting
out the word to stop the flow, this year there were only 2
boats. Asked about Mauritanian military involvement in drug
trafficking that also affects Spanish security, Polanco
responded that he knew the rumors but that, frankly, the
drugs issue was less of a priority than alien smuggling. He
also emphasized that he had no way of assessing the validity
of the rumored military involvement in trafficking or even of
evaluating how serious that traffic is. He did note he saw
an increasing number of resident Latin Americans who have no
obvious reason for being here.


7. (C) Polanco was curious whether there was likely to be
any change in U.S. position after the June 6 elections.
Charge responded that we had already made clear our
opposition to the unilateral election initiative that offered
no chance of resulting in a credible process. Assuming Aziz
sticks to his plan, Charge said we will dismiss it as a waste
of time and money that does nothing to alter his
(non)legitimacy. Polanco accepted the U.S. position but
worried that it will result in a long-term stalemate that
will make Mauritania effectively a "non-country."


8. (C) When asked about Aziz' overtures to Iran, Polanco
responded, "sadly, I have to say that is primarily the result
of the American and European Commission positions." Polanco
argued that Aziz had ardently hoped for an eventual softening
of U.S. opposition given his decades of counter-terrorism
cooperation with the West. When that change was not
forthcoming, Aziz was "forced" to reach out to Iran both for
short-term money and recognition and as a political signal to
the U.S. and Europeans that he has other options if aid is
cut off. Polanco acknowledged that the Iranian gambit caused
Aziz problems with Morocco, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and his own
military base but termed the Iranian initiative as mainly
"theater." He did question whether Aziz is capable of
managing the Iranian relationship once he starts it.


9. (C) Polanco voiced concern about civil unrest in the
months leading up to the June elections starting with the
anti-coup march scheduled for today (April 2). While saw the
call to "take to the streets" is an unfortunate reaction to
Sarkozy's dismissal of the opposition to the coup, but
worried that the FNDD was not sophisticated enough to manage
their supporters to avoid violence. Polanco was particularly
concerned by the rhetoric being used by President of the
National Assembly Messaoud Ould Boulkheir which ran the risk
of inciting violence on ethnic lines. He hoped the
international community would urge the FNDD not to prevent
people from voting on June 6.


10. (C) Charge and Polanco discussed how vulnerable Aziz will
be between the time he resigns (April 18) and the June 6
elections. Polanco agreed that, "if anyone wants to move
against him, that's the time." That said, he did not believe
anyone in the military -- even those who dislike Aziz -- will
run the risk of turning on Aziz and potentially unleashing
tremendous instability. If anyone acts against him, Polanco
assumed it would be from the business community that is
seeing less revenue in a quickly shrinking economy and is
worried by Aziz' anti-corruption efforts Polanco acknowledged
Aziz' anti-corruption efforts are targeted on his political
enemies and shelter his friends but added, "you have to start
somewhere. Polanco argued, "One thing the FNDD hasn't
figured out is that there are far worse than Aziz,"
suggesting that any military counter-coup would likely be by
more extreme elements who would make no effort to gain
democratic legitimacy and would likely handle dissent with a
gun.

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NOUAKCHOTT 00000240 003 OF 004


Germany -- Aziz can still gain legitimacy
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11. (C) Charge met with German Ambassador Eberhard Schanze on
April 1. Schanze was more cautious than normal in his
conversation, no doubt aware of previous U.S. concerns about
his outspoken pro-coup positions. Still, he managed to
project the most supportive view of the regime of the three
European missions.


12. (C) Schanze spoke of the June 6 electoral process in a
technical manner avoiding reference to its legitimacy.
Despite the public dismissal of the unilateral process by the
European Commission, the African Union, and the U.S., Schanze
believes Aziz will be satisfied with Arab recognition
confident that, eventually, the rest of the international
community will come around. "If he can get a good sized
turnout and get a strong majority," Schanze argued Aziz will
have the foundation of a legitimacy argument. Schanze tended
to dismiss the ability of the RFD and FNDD to muster much
public opposition to the coup. Concerning the European
Commission's Article 96 process (Schanze represents the Czech
European Union Presidency as part of a rotation system
between the three European embassies),Schanze repeated
veiled criticism of EC Commissioner Louis Michel who he saw
as personally responsible for the harsh line taken by the
Commission in response to the coup. Schanze welcomed the
idea of Louis Michel going back to Belgian politics offering
the chance for a new (and presumably better) Commissioner.


13. (C) Schanze lamented the expulsion of the Israeli
Ambassador and the specter of enhanced relations with Iran,
but added carefully, "One could argue Aziz did both of these
things because the U.S. gave him no option." The German
Ambassador said he was not particularly concerned about the
Iranians, "Aziz is using them now because he needs him. If
he gets legitimacy, he won't need them any more."

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European Commission -- In a week we'll be with you, sadly.
-------------- --------------


14. (C) European Commission Charge Geza Strammer told Charge
April 1 he expected that the conclusions of the Article 96
consultations would be released on or about April 6 putting
the European Union, "on the same level as the U.S.," in
condemnation of the coup. Strammer, who will have the
dubious pleasure of briefing Aziz, said, "this is going to be
the end of the process, there will be nothing else Aziz can
do to get around sanctions." Strammer emphasized, "this is
not something I'm happy about," because the European decision
will stop hundreds of millions of Euros of development
activity that has a direct impact on the Mauritanian people.
Strammer noted the Mauritanians -- primarily Aziz -- could
have avoided this but made no serious effort at finding a
consensual solution. Strammer, who has always sided with the
U.S. in his frustration with the positions of the European
member states present in Mauritania, said the Article 96 will
leave the door open for future negotiation but only on the
basis of a fundamentally different and consensual plan. He
emphasized the declaration will even commit the EC to finance
and fully monitor any elections coming out of a truly
acceptable political dialogue.


15. (C) Strammer raised concerns about the security of his
staff after the European decision comes down. Charge noted
that despite the rough U.S. relations with the regime, they
had not done anything yet to threaten our security. That
said, some local staff have reported increased negative
comments from White Moors for their affiliation with the
Embassy (Strammer said his staff reported the same thing).
Strammer was also concerned about social unrest as we go into
the summer due to the combination of political tensions
related to the June 6 elections, rising temperatures that
will frequently knock out Nouakchott's power grid, and the
possibility that the lack of hard currency will prevent
importers from stocking food shelves -- leading to an urban
food shortage.


NOUAKCHOTT 00000240 004 OF 004



16. (C) Strammer was confident (or, at least tried to make a
good show of it) that the European ambassadors would not
stray from the unanimous European Union position once
declared. "That will be the EUROPEAN common position," he
stressed saying he assumed those who didn't fully personally
embrace it, "will just stop talking." Strammer said that
press reports alleging that the German Ambassador had
criticized Louis Michel's leadership on Mauritania, "are
completely false." Charge spared telling Strammer how
Schanze had done just that 30 minutes earlier.


17. (C) Strammer lamented that the opposition allowed itself
to be divided. Noting the planned RFD rally for April 1 and
FNDD march for April 2, a bemoaned, "why couldn't they have
done it together?" (In fact, the FNDD leadership ended up
going to the RFD rally and RFD President Ahmed Ould Daddah
urged his supporters to join the April 2 FNDD march).
Strammer saw the opposition as spending too much energy
worrying about the international community instead of trying
to reach an internal political resolution.
HANKINS