POLISARIO DISSIDENT VISITS

C O N F I D E N T I A L NOUAKCHOTT 000024

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/09/2013
TAGS: PREL PGOV SNAR WI AG
SUBJECT: POLISARIO DISSIDENT VISITS

REF: 2007 NOUAKCHOTT 986

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Dennis Hankins for reasons
1.4 (b and d)


1. (C) Summary: Sahrawi dissident Mahjoub Saleck of the Khat
al-Shahid faction of POLISARIO saw a significant decrease in
nationalist fervor among young Sahrawi in his first
authorized visit to POLISARIO controlled areas of Western
Sahara since 2006. Saleck saw a disturbing focus instead on
making money -- legitimately or illegitimately -- which he
sees as posing a risk of increased contraband smuggling, drug
trafficking and, potentially, support for terrorism. While
Saleck sees no possibility of a linkage between POLISARIO and
AQIM, he sees regular deconflicting of activities between the
POLISARIO, AQIM and Tuareg involved in drug trafficking.
Saleck says POLISARIO is concerned about the perceived
affinity of Mauritania's General Aziz to Morocco but believes
their business connections with the Mauritanian military in
smuggling activities will protect them. End Summary


2. (C) Saleck visits: Khat al-Shahid President Mahjoub
Saleck called on Charge January 8 following a two week visit
to POLISARIO controlled areas of Western Sahara.
Spanish-based Saleck, who last visited the Embassy in 2007
(REFTEL),said he had been able to get authorization for his
fist visit in two years because of a December Human Rights
Watch report that had chastised the POLISARIO for suppressing
dissident Sahrawi voices who advocated settlement options
other than independence. As in his previous visit, Saleck
angled for funding for his organizations information
activities in the camps and thoroughly condemned the POLISARO
leadership under Muhammed Abdelaziz as corrupt and more
interested in the profitable status quo than the welfare of
the Sahrawi people. Saleck saw everyone looking to the new
U.S. administration for the future of talks. He said Morocco
would accept Ambassador Ross as SRSG but had "played tough
for five months to show they could bring down an SRSG as
easily as the Algerians." He suggested the Moroccans would
have preferred a "third-world" SRSG "because they can be
bought off." Comment: Post has seen web references
suggesting that Saleck was expelled from his presidency of
Khat al-Shahid in December 2008 following an interview in
which he advocated autonomy negotiations. Saleck presented
himself as though he is still the dissident movement's head.
End Comment


3. (C) All About Money Now: Saleck told Charge he had seen
a significant change in the orientation of his Sahrawi
contacts noting, "nobody is talking politics anymore --
everything is about how the make money (legally or
illegally),how to get a passport, and how to get a visa."
Saleck noted that 75% of the Sahrawi are under 35 and had
been born in the camps. He claimed most were politically
disillusioned seeing POLISARIO President Abdelaziz profiting
handsomely from the status quo. He noted significant
increase in wealth noting some of his contacts had gone "from
owning 20 goats two years ago to five Toyotas now" with most
of the wealth coming from contraband sale of UN relief
supplies and, more importantly, the growing drug trade. He
worried that the newer generation of politically disaffected
Sahrawi youth were increasingly drawn to these illicit
activities and were making themselves available for hire to
anyone -- including Al Qaeda.


4. (C) An Illicit Crossroads: Saleck saw illegal activity
throughout his trip starting at the main bordering
Mauritanian town of Zoerate where POLISARIO openly sells U.N.
assistance. He noted that the Mauritanian's actively support
this because the goods are cheap -- smuggled fuel, for
instance, being half the cost of fuel elsewhere in
Mauritania. Saleck crossed over into Western Sahara near the
extreme northeastern Mauritanian border town of Bir Mogrein
which he saw as a crossroads of illicit activity. Aside from
POLISARIO contraband activities, SALECK claimed there are
active drug smuggling convoys (often escorted by Tuareg
serving as security),Pakistani alien smugglers, and the
regular presence of Al Qaeda. Saleck emphasized he did not
see any direct cooperation between Al Qaeda and POLISARIO
noting that AQIM/GSPC was an enemy of the government in
Algiers -- the same Algiers government that is the principle
benefactor and protector of the POLISARIO. He did believe
that POLISARIO coordinates with both AQIM and the Tuareg to
deconflict their activities (with the POLISARIO getting a
commission on the Tuareg drug activities). He did believe
that individual Sahrawi are being recruited by AQIM and noted
that, compared to past years, he saw many more Sahrawi
"long-beards" who had trained in Algeria preaching a radical
form of Islam.


5. (C) Concern About Mauritania: Noting that most Sahrawi
have a closer personal and ethnic affinity to Mauritania than
Algeria, Saleck noted that the POLISARIO was concerned about
the August 6 could led by General Aziz who is seen as having
close ties to Rabat. He added that there had nearly always
been a senior Mauritanian military or government figure of
Sahrawi stock and that none are included in Aziz' government.
He alleged that the POLISARIO is still reasonably
comfortable because they maintain business dealings with
senior Mauritanian military in the contraband and narcotics
realms.
HANKINS