Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09NOUAKCHOTT215
2009-03-20 11:38:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Nouakchott
Cable title:  

MAURITANIA: POLITICAL ROUNDUP FOR THE WEEK OF

Tags:  PGOV PREL KPAO KDEM LY MR 
pdf how-to read a cable
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 NOUAKCHOTT 000215 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/19/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL KPAO KDEM LY MR
SUBJECT: MAURITANIA: POLITICAL ROUNDUP FOR THE WEEK OF
MARCH 15-19

REF: A. NOUAKCHOTT 202

B. NOUAKCHOTT 210

C. NOUAKCHOTT 204

D. 08 NOUAKCHOTT 699

E. NOUAKCHOTT 211

F. 08 NOUAKCHOTT 718

NOUAKCHOTT 00000215 001.2 OF 003


Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Dennis Hankins for reasons 1.4 (b) and
(d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 NOUAKCHOTT 000215

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/19/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL KPAO KDEM LY MR
SUBJECT: MAURITANIA: POLITICAL ROUNDUP FOR THE WEEK OF
MARCH 15-19

REF: A. NOUAKCHOTT 202

B. NOUAKCHOTT 210

C. NOUAKCHOTT 204

D. 08 NOUAKCHOTT 699

E. NOUAKCHOTT 211

F. 08 NOUAKCHOTT 718

NOUAKCHOTT 00000215 001.2 OF 003


Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Dennis Hankins for reasons 1.4 (b) and
(d).


1. (SBU) Summary: For the week of March 15-19, the effects
of Qadhafi's visit reverberated throughout the political
scene. Aziz began a series of trips around the country that
were widely viewed as campaign stops, and launched direct
verbal attacks on President Abdallahi and former presidents
Vall and Taya. Several more refugees returned from Senegal
in the ongoing repatriation process. The government cracked
down on an outspoken online news site, and arrested dozens of
people in the south of the country after they threw rocks at
a gendarmerie convoy. End summary.


2. (SBU) Fallout from Qadhafi visit: Effects from Qadhafi's
visit last week continued to reverberate through the
Mauritanian political class (Ref A),while the FNDD released
a letter March 16 asking the international community to
distance itself publicly from Qadhafi's statements (Ref B).
Qadhafi's visit appears to have accomplished two things: (1)
it has emboldened General Aziz and allowed the junta to claim
international (and even African Union) support for their
unilateral elections plan; (2) it has created common cause
(at least temporarily) for the RFD and FNDD. This new common
ground led to the first ever joint declaration for the two
groups regarding Qadhafi's blatant favoritism of the junta
over opposition forces (Ref C). As for media reaction to
Qadhafi's visit, the front-page headline in the March 15
edition of the "L'Eveil Hebdo" newspaper was representative:
"QADHAFI'S 'MEDIATION': FIREMAN OR PYROMANIAC?" Numerous
Mauritanians of all political trends felt insulted by
Qadhafi's condescending rhetoric and the large Libyan
military presence that came with him. The sour taste of his
visit hurts Aziz on the margins.


3. (SBU) Aziz visits the people: Widely regarded as the
start of his presidential campaigning, Aziz visited his

hometown of Akjoujt in the region of Inchiri March 14.
Coming on the heels of Qadhafi's visit and unqualified
support for the junta, a clearly emboldened Aziz delivered a
speech in which he lambasted the "lying and corrupt" press,
as well as President Abdallahi and former presidents Vall and
Taya. Aziz is scheduled to begin a multi-region visit to
Assaba, Brakna, and Gorgol March 19.


4. (C) Aziz targets Vall: Besides Aziz's verbal attacks on
Vall in Akjoujt, two other incidents this week appeared to
have political undertones and possible repercussions for
Vall. First, tax authorities closed the headquarters of the
mobile phone company Chinguitel (the actual phone network,
however, continues to function). The ostensible reason for
the closure was that Chinguitel owes 200 million ouguiyas
(approximately $769,000 USD) in back taxes. However, Vall is
believed to hold a major stake in Chinguitel and to have
profited from the granting of operating licenses (Ref D).
Additionally, he supposedly owns the land for all of the
Chinguitel relay towers, collecting rent each month on all of
them. The second incident with implications for Vall
involved statements made by Aziz while in Akjoujt. Aziz
stated that the contract the government holds with mining
companies is unfair. The government currently only receives
2% of the revenues for copper and 2.2% for gold -- amounts
that were negotiated by Vall during the 2005-2007 transition
period. Additionally, Vall supposedly still has business
interests in the mining sector. Aziz proposed raising the
percentage of government profits to 3% for copper and 4% for
gold, a 55% net increase in government profits. Comment:
True to form, Vall has remained silent after these latest
attacks by Aziz. The targeting of Vall's business interests

NOUAKCHOTT 00000215 002.2 OF 003


would seem to indicate that Aziz is concerned about a
possible Vall candidacy and is warning him to back off.
However, Aziz's targeting of Chinguitel may prove to be
short-sighted. Chinguitel is a Sudan-Mauritania joint
venture, with Sudatel owning a majority stake (51%). Given
that Sudan has been favorable towards the military junta in
Mauritania, Aziz may be antagonizing his own friends. End
comment.


5. (C) Vall as presidential candidate: Rumors of a possible
RFD/FNDD/Vall alliance in the upcoming June 6 elections
appeared. The supposed plan was that each group would put
forth a candidate in the first round of elections, and
whoever won the most votes would proceed to the second round,
presumably to face Aziz. The possibility of Vall standing as
"the" FNDD candidate was even floated. Comment: There are
several problems with this plan, not the least of which is
that Vall is still officially a Colonel in the military, and
therefore, unable to stand as a presidential candidate.
Additionally, it is hard to envision UFP President (and FNDD
co-leader) Mohamed Ould Maouloud and other FNDD leaders
accepting Vall as the standard-bearer for the FNDD during
elections. Departing FNDD President Abeidna told Charge
March 19 the rumor was being put out by Vall who was trying
to destabilize the FNDD, End comment.


6. (SBU) Government press crackdown: A popular online news
site was temporarily blocked in Mauritania and the editor
arrested (Ref E),after a story appeared comparing one of the
High State Council members to Nazi Germany's propaganda chief
Joseph Goebbels. The site has since returned to normal
operation, and the editor was released from jail March 18.
Additionally, Attorney General Cheikh Sidi Mohamed Ould
Cheinne was sacked March 18, presumably for being a little
too over-zealous in his pursuit of media hostile to the
junta. Though attacks on web sites in post-coup Mauritania
are not new (Ref F),this is the first time that the High
State Council-led government has been directly implicated in
the muzzling of an online media outlet.


7. (U) Refugees return: 76 families (225 people total)
arrived March 16 from Senegal as part of the ongoing refugee
repatriation process started under President Abdallahi and
run by UNHCR and ANAIR. Over 9000 total refugees have
returned since the start of the program in January 2008.


8. (C) RFD sends letter to UN: Post received on March 16 a
copy of a letter sent from RFD President Ahmed Ould Daddah to
UN Special Envoy for West Africa Said Djinnit. Asserting
that a return to constitutional order and establishing a new
democratic regime were paramount, RFD raised the "neither
Abdallahi, neither Aziz" option again by stating this must be
done "above any ambition to retake power that has been lost,
or to maintain power taken by force." Characterizing
Qadhafi's mediation efforts as a "patent failure," the letter
outlined several RFD grievances:

- Qadhafi's visit to Mauritania as president of the AU
constituted international recognition of the military regime.
- There were not enough meetings between Qadhafi and the
"three principal actors" (RFD, FNDD, and High State Council
supporters),and what meetings there were suffered from a
lack of organization.
- The RFD was "particularly shocked" by Qadhafi's "brazen
acceptance of the unilateral agenda put forth by the High
State Council" for June 6 elections.

With these points in mind, the letter concluded that the
"mediation" did not conform to the requirements put forth by
the International Consultative Group in Paris February 20.
The RFD reiterated its "categorical rejection" of the
unilateral process undertaken by the High State Council, and
stated that its own initiative put forth on February 3 was
still a viable way out of the crisis.


9. (C) Senator wants help from Israelis: Charge met March

NOUAKCHOTT 00000215 003 OF 003


18 with pro-Abdallahi Senator Yousef Ould Tijani Sylla.
Sylla is leaving "very soon" on a trip to Portugal, Spain,
and Brussels to try and drum up anti-coup support. "We are
seeking support from external actors to use against the
military," he stated. Stressing numerous times that he was
against the "freezing" of relations with Israel that had been
undertaken by the junta, he asked Charge for assistance in
facilitating contact with Israeli embassies in Europe. Sylla
noted that he would be traveling on his own initiative, not
as an official representative of the entire FNDD. Comment:
Senator Sylla frequently requests meetings with Charge.
According to LES however, he has limited credibility, has
switched sides in the past, and is always claiming that it is
time to "rise up" against the junta, even violently. As a
result, his trustworthiness and role as a reliable partner
are in doubt. Sylla suggested he wanted to get talk with the
Israeli's for material support to "do something" about Aziz.
He has previously claimed to be in contact with Mali and
Algeria for the same purpose. End comment.


10. (U) Anti-coup sentiment: According to local press
reports, more than 50 people were arrested March 18 in the
town of Magta Lahjar (180 miles southeast of Nouakchott)
after they threw rocks at a convoy of gendarmerie vehicles
and shouted anti-coup slogans. The gendarmes were doing
advance preparation work for General Aziz's visit to the
region later in the week.


11. (C) FNDD Rotation: In keeping with their practice of
rotating presidencies, the FNDD leadership shifted March 18
from Abdel Kouddous Abeidna's National Democratic Party (PND)
to Messaoud Ould Boulkheir's People's Progressive Alliance
(APP). Charge met March 19 with Abeidna who clearly was
happy to pass on the mantle. Abeidna -- a very Westernized
Anglophone who openly entered politic just a few years ago
(against the wishes of his wealthy business/trading family),
expressed frustration with his more experienced but
traditional FNDD allies. He felt he had been successful in
pushing the FNDD objectives forward during his
month-and-a-half tenure, but said, "I could have done a lot
more except the others are too timid and prone to a
wait-and-see attitude." He said he had told the others,
"Aziz has weaknesses we can work against, but giving him time
plays in his favor." Abeidna was disappointed that, "It is
not in their political mentality to think of strategy and
contingencies," noting he had been unable to get the alliance
to seriously discuss what their real redlines are if and when
they get into political negotiations. Although worried by
the notable lack of international comment following the
Qadhafi mediation fiasco, Abeidna saw the net result as
positive in having forged closer ties between the FNDD and
Ould Daddah (who he still distrusts) and actually undermining
support for Aziz among his own supporters who were ashamed by
the way Qadhafi treated Mauritanians. Abeidna also believed
Aziz' shifting of Mauritanian interests towards Libya and
Iran would shake the confidence of Arab and European
countries who had calculated that Aziz offers security and
stability in the region. Abeidna noted that the FNDD
leadership was struggling to reach a decision on what to do
about upcoming Senate elections. He thought the FNDD would
decide to boycott the process because it is being
administered by the junta's administration, but he worried
that sitting FNDD senators would run anyhow "because they
like their salaries."

HANKINS