Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09NOUAKCHOTT204
2009-03-15 17:05:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Nouakchott
Cable title:  

OULD DADDAH AND THE FNDD: UNITED AGAINST QADHAFI,

Tags:  PREL PGOV USAU LY MR 
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FM AMEMBASSY NOUAKCHOTT
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RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0977
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NOUAKCHOTT 000204 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/14/2014
TAGS: PREL PGOV USAU LY MR
SUBJECT: OULD DADDAH AND THE FNDD: UNITED AGAINST QADHAFI,
COMMON CAUSE (FOR NOW) AGAINST MILITARY, DIVIDED (AS
ALWAYS) ON ABDALLAHI

REF: NOUAKCHOTT 155

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Dennis Hankins for reasons 1.4 (b and
d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NOUAKCHOTT 000204

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/14/2014
TAGS: PREL PGOV USAU LY MR
SUBJECT: OULD DADDAH AND THE FNDD: UNITED AGAINST QADHAFI,
COMMON CAUSE (FOR NOW) AGAINST MILITARY, DIVIDED (AS
ALWAYS) ON ABDALLAHI

REF: NOUAKCHOTT 155

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Dennis Hankins for reasons 1.4 (b and
d)


1. (C) Summary: In the wake of Qadhafi's "mediation," Ahmed
Ould Daddah and President Abdallahi's FNDD have again been
pushed towards cooperation in denouncing Qadhafi and
renouncing the military strategy for June 6 elections. Ould
Daddah remains fixed in opposition to President Abdallahi's
return but in incrementally more open to a return long enough
to set the stage for a viable transition. Ould Daddah feels
Aziz is stupidly leading Mauritania towards a relation with
Iran that Aziz will be unable to manage. He also fears drug
interests will play upon Aziz' desperation for financial
support. End Summary


2. (C) Charge met March 15 with opposition leader and RFD
party president Ahmed Ould Daddah. Ould Daddah provided
Charge with a copy of the joint RFD / FNDD declaration of
March 14 that had denounced Qadhafi's support for the
military's unilateral election strategy and called for the
international community to again take charge of the political
dossier without Qadhafi as its spokesman. Ould Daddah noted
he had been impressed with Qadhafi's knowledge of the
Mauritanian personalities and state-of-play when he went to
Tripoli but found Qadhafi had little interest in
re-establishing democracy. Qadhafi stroked Ould Daddah's ego
somewhat by telling him, "We know you really won the
elections, but Aziz would have launched the coup
then-and-there had you been declared the winner." Ould
Daddah lamented that Qadhafi had missed a chance to act the
statesman by bargaining away his political support for the
short-term benefit of seeing Israel expelled.


3. (C) Ould Daddah told Charge he will be working in closer
collaboration with the FNDD in opposing the military's
agenda. He is in the process of writing parallel letters to
President Abdallahi's to the international community
leadership seeking a restatement of international
condemnation of the coup over Qadhafi's statements. Ould
Daddah said he would have been open to joint RFD/FNDD letters
but did not think those could clear his own internal party

clearance procedures in time. Ould Daddah stressed the
importance of the international community -- notably the AU,
EU, France and the U.S. to restate their opposition to the
coup and to renounce the regime's June 6 election plan.


4. (C) Charge noted his understanding that the FNDD had
offered to resolve Ould Daddah's strong opposition to
President Abdallahi's return by offering a largely symbolic
return wherein Abdallahi would yield his executive power to a
strong new Prime Minister who would head a government of
national unity including RFD members. Ould Daddah initially
retorted with a "I will never accept Abdallahi's return"
insisting that "Abdallahi is largely responsible for the
coup" in the first place for having accepted military support
in the campaign and allowing the military to manipulate his
presidency. Charge noted that, by making Abdallahi's return
the main issue, Ould Daddah allows the question of the
military's political departure to take second place --
effectively dividing the opposition. Ould Daddah then
relented somewhat (has he did previously in REFTEL) by
allowing he would accept Abdallahi back symbolically if that
was an effective measure to pressure the military -- but
insisting that the return lead immediately into a resignation
in favor of the President Senate. Charge pushed some more
asking if Ould Daddah really wanted the President of the
Senate (a man who has been politically gutted by regime
intimidation) to be responsible for a transition leading to
elections?. If so, with what government -- the current
regime government or the last Abdallahi government? When
pushed on the practicalities of his position, Ould Daddah
clarified that he could see Abdallahi coming back long enough
to establish a strong government of national unity with
reinforced executive authority and then resigning. As such,
the weak President of the Senate could take interim power
but, consistent with the constitution, would be unable to

NOUAKCHOTT 00000204 002 OF 002


alter the last appointed government.


5. (C) While welcoming Israel's departure because of his
views concerning the Palestinian process, Ould Daddah worried
that Aziz had kicked the Israeli Ambassador for less
principled reasons -- to gain Qadhafi's support in the
mediation and to win Iranian financial backing. Terming Aziz
as one of the least intelligent military leaders, Ould Daddah
said Aziz was playing a dangerous game thinking he can manage
those two relationships -- "Qadhafi and the Iranians are a
lot smarter than Aziz and will eventually pull us into a
jamahiriya with Libya and a Shi'ah outpost for Iran." Ould
Daddah said Aziz "will sell anything to stay in power" and
worried that "the same drug traffickers who knocked off the
government in Guinea Bissau will find a willing partner here."


6. (C) Comment: Ould Daddah and the RFD are again working
together, but Ould Daddah's personal animosity against
Abdallahi make the coalition tenuous at best. Ould Daddah is
aware that a transition government authored by President
Abdallahi (versus the military's plan) offers a far greater
chance of free and fair elections Ould Daddah can win but he
still hopes for a "ni - ni" option that allows him to
dispense with both Abdallahi and Aziz. Key FNDD leaders like
Messaoud Ould Boulkheir could probably agree with Ould Daddah
with an arrangement including Abdallahi's resignation once a
credible transition government is in place but the FNDD is
unlikely to put it in writing until Ould Daddah accepts
Abdallahi's return, albeit temporarily.
HANKINS