Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09NOUAKCHOTT203
2009-03-15 08:13:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Nouakchott
Cable title:  

MAURITANIA: POLITICAL ROUNDUP FOR THE WEEK OF

Tags:  PGOV PREL PROP KPAO MR 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO9743
PP RUEHPA RUEHTRO
DE RUEHNK #0203/01 0740813
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 150813Z MAR 09
FM AMEMBASSY NOUAKCHOTT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8228
INFO RUEHZK/ECOWAS COLLECTIVE
RUCNMGH/MAGHREB COLLECTIVE
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 0519
RUEHMD/AMEMBASSY MADRID 2061
RUEHDO/AMEMBASSY DOHA 0456
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 0866
RUEHRL/AMEMBASSY BERLIN 0534
RUEHPG/AMEMBASSY PRAGUE 0094
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 0023
RHMFISS/HQ USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE
RHMFISS/COMSOCEUR VAIHINGEN GE
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS
RUEHDS/USMISSION USAU ADDIS ABABA
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 0562
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0975
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NOUAKCHOTT 000203 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/12/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL PROP KPAO MR
SUBJECT: MAURITANIA: POLITICAL ROUNDUP FOR THE WEEK OF
MARCH 8-12

REF: A. NOUAKCHOTT 187

B. NOUAKCHOTT 189

C. NOUAKCHOTT 191

D. NOUAKCHOTT 195

E. NOUAKCHOTT 137

NOUAKCHOTT 00000203 001.2 OF 002


Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Dennis Hankins for reasons 1.4 (b) and
(d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NOUAKCHOTT 000203

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/12/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL PROP KPAO MR
SUBJECT: MAURITANIA: POLITICAL ROUNDUP FOR THE WEEK OF
MARCH 8-12

REF: A. NOUAKCHOTT 187

B. NOUAKCHOTT 189

C. NOUAKCHOTT 191

D. NOUAKCHOTT 195

E. NOUAKCHOTT 137

NOUAKCHOTT 00000203 001.2 OF 002


Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Dennis Hankins for reasons 1.4 (b) and
(d).


1. (SBU) Summary: For the week of March 8-12, Muammar
Qadhafi's visit to Mauritania dominated events. Qadhafi
pressed hard for a joint declaration between the parties to
the crisis, without success. Adding insult to injury, FNDD
leaders walked out on his speech at the Palais des Congres
when he called on Mauritanians to "forget the past" and
attempted to exonerate General Aziz for his coup. Qadhafi
left Mauritania March 12, having accomplished little to
resolve the political crisis. End summary.


2. (C) Israeli embassy closed: Mauritanian security forces
pulled back from the Israeli embassy March 6, forcing the
staff to evacuate (Ref A). The Israeli ambassador left the
country March 7, while three Israeli employees remained in
Nouakchott at their ambassador's residence. FNDD and other
Mauritanians, many of whom never supported the relationship
with Israel, see General Aziz' motivation being to "sell"
cutting relations in exchange for Libyan, Iranian and Qatari
support.


3. (C) President Abdallahi travels: President Abdallahi
entered Nouakchott March 6 as part of a large motorcade (Ref
B). He left in the afternoon for Tripoli, where he met with
Muammar Qadhafi twice, before returning to Mauritania March 8
and going directly to his native village of Lemden (Ref C).
The FNDD has hailed the size of Abdallahi's arrival in
Nouakchtt as having debunked the regime's contention that he
has no popular support.


4. (C) Qadhafi makes grand entrance: Qadhafi arrived in
Nouakchott March 9 to much fanfare. Crowds lined the road
all the way from the airport to the presidential palace,
though many of these crowd members were bussed in from poor
neighborhoods (presumably paid) and given Qadhafi T-shirts to
wear. (Note: Charge participated in the diplomatic corps'
reception for Qadhafi at the airport, but did not attend any

of the state dinners hosted by Qadhafi or General Aziz. End
note.) Beyond the predictable sea of Aziz and Qadhafi
portraits, Ahmed Ould Daddah's RFD party members turned out
in force, making their presence known with banners and flags.
The FNDD was nowhere to be seen.


5. (C) Qadhafi the Imam: Qadhafi led the evening prayer at
Nouakchott's Olympic Stadium March 10. Covered live by
state-run TV Mauritanie and Libyan Jamahiriya TV channels,
Qadhafi's meandering speech was 45 minutes long. Qadhafi
extolled the virtues of Libya's "revolutionary" calendar and
the role of Mauritania in the peaceful spread of Islam. He
railed against slavery, drug smuggling, and other activities
in the Sahara, but avoided discussing the political crisis in
Mauritania. Multiple Mauritanian contacts criticized Qadhafi
desire to lead grandiose prayers as the Leader of traditional
leaders as inherently inconsistent with the tenets of Islam.
Many noted that Qadhafi frequently flubbed the Koran verses.


6. (C) Qadhafi tries to obtain joint declaration: Realizing
that a full solution to the crisis was not forthcoming,
Qadhafi pressed hard on all sides to agree on a joint
declaration (Ref D). However, given that Qadhafi did not
meet with President Abdallahi while in Mauritania, and the
growing enmity between Qadhafi and the FNDD, such a joint
declaration was all but dead by March 12. Comment: The only
new developments to emerge during all the back and forth
negotiating on the points for the joint declaration were: (1)
the junta was willing to consider releasing political
prisoners to save Qadhafi's mediation efforts, and (2) the
FNDD was willing to consider signing the declaration if

NOUAKCHOTT 00000203 002.2 OF 002


political prisoners were released and elections delayed. End
comment.


7. (C) FNDD walks out: In a speech delivered at the Palais
des Congres March 11, Qadhafi called on all parties to
"forget the past" and participate in the June 6 elections.
He further absolved General Aziz from blame, saying he could
not be criticized for having done what had been done before
(i.e., coups) in Mauritania since 1978. At that point FNDD
leaders (Messaoud Ould Boulkheir, Ahmed Ould Sidi Baba, Abdel
Koudouss Abeidna, Mohamed Ould Maouloud, and others) walked
out of the room. The spectacle was the top story on Al
Jazeera's nightly "Maghreb Roundup," with the clip of FNDD
members walking out on Qadhafi replayed several times (and
FNDD co-leader Mohamed Ould Maouloud appearing as the guest
of the night to explain their actions). More surprisingly,
state-run TV Mauritanie covered the walk-out (albeit with
just a one sentence statement),saying that "oppositionists"
left the room at one point during Qadhafi's speech. RFD
President Ahmed Ould Daddah, despite opposing the June 6
elections, remained in the room.


8. (C) Rumors of impending schism within APP: Rumors
continue that the pro-Nasserist wing of Messaoud Ould
Boulkheir's APP party will support Aziz and June 6 elections,
thus splitting the party (and by extension, the FNDD). It is
widely believed that the Nasserist wing, led by APP Vice
President Khalil Ould Teyib, receives financial support from
the Libyans. Observers also noted that during the FNDD
walkout on Qadhafi at the Palais des Congres, Ould Teyib did
not leave with APP President Boulkheir, leaving instead after
the rest of the FNDD had left. He also made no statements to
the press about the walkout, in contrast to other FNDD
figures. Furthermore, Ould Teyib was the only FNDD member to
attend the dinner in honor of Qadhafi hosted by Aziz at the
Presidential Palace March 9. Note: Tales of friction within
the APP are not new (Ref E, para 4),and are often propagated
by political opponents. Still, given the amount of money the
Libyans are rumored to have thrown around while in
Nouakchott, a possible split within APP cannot be ruled out.
End note.

HANKINS