THE NATIONAL DIALOGUE ON DEMOCRACY - AN INSIDER'S

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 NOUAKCHOTT 000002

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/02/2014
TAGS: PREL PGOV MR
SUBJECT: THE NATIONAL DIALOGUE ON DEMOCRACY - AN INSIDER'S
PERSPECTIVE

REF: A. 2008 NOUAKCHOTT 775

B. 2008 NOUAKCHOTT 601

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Dennis Hankins for reasons 1.4 (b and
d)


1. (C) Summary: The respected moderator of the National
Dialogue on Democracy (Etats Generaux de la Democratie) sees
the process as the best chance to get out of an untenable
situation. The 'pragmatists" in the process are looking to
establish a framework that will get democracy back on track
even though via a detour that essentially accepts the coup as
a fait accompli and gives up on Abdallahi's presidency. Some
see signs that the majority of the military want to extricate
themselves from their political dead end -- perhaps via a new
"understanding" with Ould Daddah. Anti-coup elements within
the Dialogue hope it will serve as a basis for discussion
between President Abdallahi and all political parties rather
than a roadmap leading towards elections. End Summary


2. (C) An Old Friend of the Embassy: Charge met January 2
with the overall moderator of the Dialogue Cheikh Saad Bouh
Camara at Camara's home. As moderator, Camara is responsible
for the mechanics of the Dialogue and coordination of the
various working groups. Camara is well known to the Mission
having previously headed the National Electoral Commission
and as one of the members of the Contact Group that had
attempted (unsuccessfully) to mediate between Abdallahi and
Aziz in October (REFTEL B). Camara is well respected in
Mauritania and in the region (prior to the coup, we had
worked with Embassy Tunis to set up a video conference with
Camara for Tunisian political parties and civil society to
learn about the "Mauritanian Model" as a template for
Tunisian democratization." While Camara had been reluctant
to come to the Embassy while the Dialogue is open or be seen
in public with the Charge, he has welcomed the chance to
essentially "explain himself." A senior FSN, who had studied
under Camara and views him as a "mentor" noted that Camara is
getting flooded with questions from old students asking "why
did you do it?" Camara said he had been offered the
Presidency of the Dialogue but had said he would only accept
if Abdallahi was fully released and given complete freedom of
movement and communication and if the Dialogue was delayed
until Abdallahi had been out awhile. In the end, Abdallahi
Ould Cheikh, was given the leadership of the Dialogue.


3. (C) Better to be heard than be ignored: Camara termed his
participation in the Dialogue much as he had termed his
participation in the earlier Contact Group -- an effort to
get democracy back on track given the realities of the
military's current effective control of power. He noted that
the earlier Contact Group effort had petered out because they
couldn't generate interest in the political parties
(particularly Abdallahi's FNDD) to begin a dialogue. Camara
approaches the Dialogue saying "the majority of the
participants believe the coup was wrong" and, in his own
case, adding, "the FNDD position is 'correct' and they have
done a great service in opposing the coup." That said, the
military still has control so the FNDD's "correctness"
becomes somewhat secondary -- there is still a need for a
political resolution that, if it is to be peaceful,
recognizes the military must be prepared to yield power.
Camara does not see a peaceful solution that includes
Abdallahi's return so he is looking for the next best thing.
Camara added he was impressed with the structure set up for
the Dialogue comparing it in some ways to the discussions
immediately after independence -- a real discussion of what
type of democracy Mauritania needs for its own reality.
While acknowledging that the Dialogue leaves no room for a
serious discussion of Abdallahi's return (particularly since
the FNDD is boycotting),Camara saw a broad range of views
being raised inside the Hall. He saw the chance for those
who oppose the coup to voice an agenda that would get the
military out while firming up aspects of the political
process to avoid future political gridlock -- and future
military coups. Without his presence, and that of parties
such as Ould Daddah's RFD, there would have been no

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alternative voices raised. When asked to what degree the
process was subject to auto-censorship, Camara said there
were plenty of delegated being critical of the junta but in a
Mauritanian indirect approach "le non-dit."


4. (C) Just a coronation? Charge told Camara the U.S. sees
little chance of a credible outcome from a Dialogue organized
by General Aziz and his cronies. Camara recognized the
skepticism but said he had met with enough military to
believe that many of the High State Council were looking for
a way out. "They are trained as military -- to deal with the
fight against terrorism or drugs. They aren't trained or
capable of handling politics and economics and most of them
recognize that." Camara was told "Aziz has not decided
whether he wants to stay on or not," giving him some optimism
that the right political framework might get the military to
withdraw. Camara insisted the Dialogue was starting from a
clean sheet of paper. He acknowledged some confusion at the
beginning of the Dialogue because delegates were expecting
some type of discussion framework but instead got "a piece of
paper with a title, and nothing else." Camara said he and
others had insisted, and appear to have succeeded, in
creating the Dialogue to create a conclusion that doesn't
just present one position as "the consensus view" but gives
due credit and credibility to dissenting opinions. Camara
said the biggest difficulty was trying to keep "a bunch of
nomads" on topic -- noting delegates would go from one
working group to another rather than where they were
assigned, that they would raise issues not germane to their
topic, and (always a problem here) they couldn't respect time
limits on remarks. Camara said the Dialogue leadership was
working hard to keep the discussion focused on a solution to
the current problem by trying to avoid questions of
constitutional revision prior to new elections (although
there will be recommendations for revisions for some future
President),or political statements (for instance holding the
line on no statements about Gaza or calls to severe
relations).


5. (C) A basis for discussion, not a decision: Camara said
that despite Aziz's pledge to "abide by the decisions or
recommendations of the Dialogue," he did not see the Dialogue
producing a binding document. Camara recognized that the
Dialogue has no constitutional authority so, in effect, it is
mainly an extended discussion to find a common roadmap.
Camara thought the final declaration would try to be specific
on some key points such as the length of the transition, the
mechanisms for governance during the transition, and the
mechanics of election preparation and monitoring but the
declaration itself would not be binding. Camara hoped the
recommendations would provide a viable enough political plan
that the FNDD might be able to use them as a basis for
discussion with other parties. He looked to the recent FNDD
participation in a televised debate on the political crisis
as a sign that they would not reject all discussion out of
hand. Looking particularly at National Assembly President
Ould Boulkheir, Camara saw the FNDD as first and foremost
opposed to the military. Camara said Ould Boulkheir had told
him, "we insist on the return to constitutional order, but we
are not married to Sidi." Camara hoped the U.S. would
encourage the FNDD to engage in such a political dialogue
rather than allow the crisis to continue and deepen. Camara
suggested that those, like himself, who have respected the
principled U.S. approach would change their view if the U.S.
rejected out of hand a plan that might offer a real chance at
democracy without violence. Perveresely, he added that if
the U.S. was seen as ultimately unwilling to support
something reasonable, he and others would want to see us
punished, "by recommending we cut ties with Israel."


6. (C) President Ould Daddah? Charge asked Camara whether
he believed that after the Dialogue Aziz would present
himself as a presidential candidate and win. Camara said he
didn't think so noting that strangely, Aziz seemed more
concerned about blocking Vall than promoting his own
position. Camara thought the behind-the-scenes negotiation
was between Aziz and Ahmed Ould Daddah that would lead to an

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Ould Daddah presidency, with Aziz' ongoing influence and
security being enshrined in a National Security Council he
would head. Camara thought the FNDD feared new elections no
so much on the grounds of principle (i.e. because they insist
on Abdallahi's rightful return) but because they doubt they
could maintain their unity and field a winning candidate.
Camara did see Ould Boulkheir as probably the most willing to
participate in new elections and probably the most likely to
be able to challenge Ould Daddah. Camara was clearly willing
to accept Ould Daddah as President even if that required "an
arrangement" with the military.


7. (C) Comment: In this meeting as in past meetings, Camara
comes across as someone sincerely looking for the best
resolution to a bad situation. He views himself a pragmatic
who doesn't see the utility in fighting battles he sees no
chance of winning (like getting Aziz out and Abdallahi back
in). He says, "most of those who say they support the coup
don't and hope they can find a better way out." For Camara
and others, getting democracy back on track may mean a rather
lengthy detour that requires another 5 years or more of
giving the military some special role and hoping the next
President will better control the men in uniform than the
last one. Another week or so will show whether the Dialogue
will actually come up with something representing something
serious or if, in the end, the paper will be a rubber stamp.
End Comment
HANKINS