QADHAFI WILL SETTLE FOR A JOINT DECLARATION ON

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NOUAKCHOTT 000195

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/09/2014
TAGS: PREL PGOV USAU LY MR
SUBJECT: QADHAFI WILL SETTLE FOR A JOINT DECLARATION ON
MAURITANIA MEDIATION

REF: NOUAKCHOTT 191

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Dennis Hankins for reasons 1.4 (b and
d)


1. (C) Negative review of Libya meeting: Charge met evening
of March 9 with President Abdallahi's Chief of Staff Ahmed
Kaber Ould Hammoudi at Hammoudi's request. Hammoudi provided
much the same readout on the Libya visit as provided by FNDD
rotating President Abeidna in REFTEL (Hammoudi seemed unaware
Abeidna had already briefed the Charge). Hammoudi confirmed
that in two personal meetings with President Abdallahi,
Qadhafi had pushed hard to get the President to resign -- at
one point giving Abdallahi a pre-written resignation letter
for him to sign. Qadhafi's theme was that democracy and
political parties were inappropriate for the African context
and that progress and security demanded strong long-term
leaders. While no written plan was offered, Qadhafi wanted
essentially what Aziz wants -- both Abdallahi and Aziz resign
with the President of the Senate managing a short-term
"government of consensus" leading to elections in which Aziz
could be a candidate. Abdallahi told Qadhafi "no deal"
adding that he was determined that any solution to the crisis
has to end with the coup "failing" if there is any hope to
get Mauritania out of the cycle of recurrent military
takeovers. Hammoudi said the President left Tripoli with
confirmation of what he feared -- he can expect nothing
useful from Qadhafi because "he doesn't care about democracy
and he doesn't care about legitimacy."


2. (C) Still Playing Nice With Qadhafi: Hammoudi told
Charge that as long as Qadhafi does not openly come out with
a formal plan along the lines they heard in Libya, the
President and FNDD will not openly criticize him. He related
that the African Union's Jean Ping had voiced his frustration
with Qadhafi during his meeting with Abdallahi. Ping -- who
saw a tough year ahead working with Qadhafi -- said Qadhafi
was clearly not sticking to the policy line set by the
African Union as a whole. Ping reportedly told Abdallahi he
was prepared to publicly distance himself from Qadhafi if the
Guide tries to force a deal that is unacceptable.


3. (C) Qadhafi doesn't want to leave Nouakchott empty
handed: Hammoudi said the FNDD and President's staff have
remained in close contact with Qadhafi's staff since
Qadhafi's colorful arrival in Nouakchott March 9. Abdallahi
had declined a request that he come from Lemden to Nouakchott
to meet Qadhafi at the airport saying, "I won't stand next to
Aziz like we are two equals." Abdallahi invited Qadhafi
instead to Lemden -- with the Libyans saying "we'll consider
it." The FNDD has also decided to boycott Qadhafi's
scheduled speech to the joint houses of parliament since FNDD
co-leader and President of the National Assembly Messaoud
Ould Boulkheir -- who had met just days earlier with Qadhafi
-- was not advised of Qadhafi's desire to meet parliament.
Hammoudi said Qadhafi sees he will not be able to wrap up a
deal while in Nouakchott so is trying to put together a
face-saving "joint declaration" about his initiative. The
informal draft received by the FNDD includes:

(a) A recognition that the three parties to the crisis -- the
FNDD, the High State Council, and "opposition forces" (note
-- meaning Ahmed Ould Daddah's RFD but not saying so
implicitly) engage to reach a solution to the political
crisis.
(b) A statement by the three parties welcoming the mediation
efforts of Qadhafi who "has been asked by the international
community to find a solution."
(c) A commitment to find a solution "that restores
constitutional order and constitutional institutions."
(d) A commitment to end media campaigns that attack or
denigrate the other parties.
(e) A commitment to release the FNDD detainees

Hammoudi noted the formal commitment to release FNDD
detainees (notably Prime Minister Waghef) is obviously
attractive but indicated the FNDD would insist on at least
three changes: (a) adding President Abdallahi as a 4th party
independent of the FNDD, (b) a commitment to allow all

NOUAKCHOTT 00000195 002 OF 002


parties access to public media, and (c) having the military
abandon its plans leading to new elections in June. In
discussing with Charge Qadhafi's apparent view that he has a
personal mandate to mediate a deal, Hammoudi thought they
would also want to stipulate that they welcome Qadhafi's
mediation "with Jean Ping on behalf of and consistent with
the decisions of the African Union." Hammoudi does not
expect Qadhafi to accept these changes and assumes Qadhafi
will leave without a declaration.


4. (C) Expecting More Problems: Hammoudi said they had
learned from an un-named Libyan that, seeing he would not be
able to get an easy concession from President Abdallahi,
Qadhafi had told his staff to "come up with a solution that
doesn't include Abdallahi." While Hammoudi did not say so
directly, it appears that Abdallahi's insistence to identify
himself as a party distinct from the FNDD reflects concern
Qadhafi will now look to suborn individual FNDD leaders to
try to get them to sign a deal without the President.


5. (C) Comment -- What If? Hammoudi was caught off guard
when asked what the President would do if they got the main
things they have asked for -- Aziz drops the plans for
elections June 6 and the FNDD leaders are released from
prison. Charge noted the President had previously been
adamant that he would never accept Aziz as a party to any
negotiations on a political resolution. It did not appear
that Hammoudi had seriously considered the possibility
Qadhafi might be able to deliver on their demands and;
therefore, doesn't really have a strategy for what next. As
in most contacts with the FNDD leadership, we have found
little thinking about how they might actually accept to be
able to close an acceptable deal. They avoid discussions,
for instance, of who might be an acceptable Prime Minister
for a significantly strengthened and independent transition
government. NDI, which has been working closely with the
FNDD parties, unions and civil society groups that have been
pulled together as the National Coordination for Democracy
tends to be dominated by the parties leaving little room for
their non-political partners and closing off some important
"what next?" discussions. FNDD rotating President Abeidna
has told Charge he has been trying to get his colleagues to
build a closing and transition strategy (believing, like
Charge, that if the opportunity for an acceptable deal comes
it will come quickly and may be fleeting). So far, his more
politically experienced FNDD colleagues have told Abeidna --
"it's too early for that." The FNDD is a very diverse group.
It could be the older politicians know they will have a
tough time sticking together and suppressing individual
political ambitions if success really seems attainable.
HANKINS