Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09NOUAKCHOTT188
2009-03-08 14:05:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Nouakchott
Cable title:  

HEDGING THEIR BETS: PRO-COUP PARLIAMENTARIANS TAKE

Tags:  PGOV PREL KDEM MR 
pdf how-to read a cable
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PP RUEHPA RUEHTRO
DE RUEHNK #0188/01 0671405
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 081405Z MAR 09
FM AMEMBASSY NOUAKCHOTT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8196
INFO RUEHZK/ECOWAS COLLECTIVE
RUCNMGH/MAGHREB COLLECTIVE
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 0504
RUEHDO/AMEMBASSY DOHA 0442
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 0851
RUEHMD/AMEMBASSY MADRID 2047
RUEHRL/AMEMBASSY BERLIN 0520
RUEHPG/AMEMBASSY PRAGUE 0080
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS
RUEHDS/USMISSION USAU ADDIS ABABA
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 0553
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0958
RHMFISS/HQ USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE
RHMFISS/COMSOCEUR VAIHINGEN GE
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 NOUAKCHOTT 000188 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/08/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM MR
SUBJECT: HEDGING THEIR BETS: PRO-COUP PARLIAMENTARIANS TAKE
OPPORTUNISTIC STANCE

REF: NOUAKCHOTT 0083

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Dennis Hankins for reasons 1.4 (b) and
(d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 NOUAKCHOTT 000188

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/08/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM MR
SUBJECT: HEDGING THEIR BETS: PRO-COUP PARLIAMENTARIANS TAKE
OPPORTUNISTIC STANCE

REF: NOUAKCHOTT 0083

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Dennis Hankins for reasons 1.4 (b) and
(d).


1. (C) Summary: Consensus is not the word of the day among
pro-coup parliamentarians. General Aziz's decision to rally
his supporters under one party has found detractors. While
stating their support to the High State Council (HSC),
independent parliamentarians are distancing themselves from
Aziz by forming their own party. The party's name,
structure, and platform are still unknown but one thing is
clear -- its support to General Aziz is far from
unconditional. This group's allegiance depends on whether
the electoral commission's membership and the formation of a
transitional government stem from a consensual multi-party
agreement. According to parliamentarians Baba Ould Sidi and
Louleid Ould Weddad, a solution to the Mauritanian crisis is
unlikely given the rigidity of positions and the junta's
unilateral actions. Claiming "the West is all Mauritania
knows," both expressed their desire for U.S. mediation before
the regime turns to other support sources. Ould Baba and
Ould Weddad's position indicates doubt among the pro-coup
camp that General Aziz will be able to consolidate his power.
It may also hide a discontent with the junta's foreign
policy. End summary.

--------------
TWO NEW PRO-COUP PARTIES
--------------


2. (C) PolOff and PolAsst met March 5 with Mederdra deputy
(and former Minister under President Taya) Baba Ould Sidi to
inquire about new pro-coup parties. Ould Sidi explained the
first party assembles High State Council supporters in a
monolithic structure similar to dictator Ould Taya's PRDS.
The second, composed mostly of independent parliamentarians,
still supports the HSC but desires more independence of
action and thought.


3. (C) When asked about the reasons for forming a second
pro-coup party, Ould Sidi explained that independent
parliamentarians were resentful they had little
representation in the ministries. He also stated that, in
the past, many of the group's members had been part of state
parties -- PRDS (Taya's party) and ADIL (President
Abdallahi's party) -- that disappeared when the governments

they supported were no longer in power. He stressed that
these "independent" parliamentarians, numbering 49, wished to
form a party of like-minded individuals that would transcend
the strong man in power. They also wished to take a less
rigid approach and encourage consensus among political
actors. Comment: This desire to distance themselves from
the state may signal they have doubts Aziz will be able to
consolidate his coup. While still supporting him, they are
taking a less rigid stand to preserve their political careers
should he fail. End comment.

--------------
BONES OF CONTENTION
--------------


4. (C) Ould Sidi hinted that the group's support for General
Aziz depends on the consensual resolution of two issues:
CENI membership and the transitional government. The group
calls for political party participation in designating CENI
membership. Ould Sidi also stated his rejection of elections
organized under the current government and called for the
formation of a broad-based transitional government. Comment:
Many political actors believe that the transparency of the
elections will depend on who is appointed to CENI membership.
A consensual appointment of CENI members would likely
convince many to support the election. End comment.

--------------
ELY VALL
--------------

NOUAKCHOTT 00000188 002 OF 003




5. (C) Ould Sidi stated that General Aziz should be allowed
to run for president as long as he retires from the military.
He also said Colonel Ely Ould Mohamed Vall should be able to
run. He deplored that Vall's request to be released from the
military was denied. PolOff asked Ould Sidi whether he
thought Vall would run against his cousin and he responded
that, even though they were from the same tribe, Vall and
Aziz had been at odds for some time; therefore, Vall might
run. Comment: Ould Sidi seemed to imply that his group
could decide to stand behind Vall if it did not consider
General Aziz a viable candidate. End comment.

--------------
TOO SOON FOR ELECTIONS
--------------


6. (C) According to Ould Sidi, June 6 is not a realistic
timeframe for elections. In June, the southern part of the
country is incommunicado due to the rainy season and the
resultant flooding and washed out roads. He mentioned there
had been discussions in the National Assembly about pushing
the election date back to October or November, when the rainy
season is over and the daytime temperatures much cooler. He
also stated offhand that pushing the election back would give
more time to "find financing" sources for the elections.
Note: Presumably Ould Sidi meant Qatar and Libya, who have
been mentioned by others numerous times as possible election
financiers. End note.

--------------
A PACT WITH THE DEVIL?
--------------


7. (C) Ould Sidi stressed several times that the U.S. "does
not understand" Mauritania's socio-political context -- by
this he meant that democracy as the U.S. understands it does
not exist in Mauritania. In a criticism of the USG
principled position, he stated the U.S. does not know how to
"take the baby's toy without making her cry."


8. (C) When asked by PolAsst if he thought the Libyan
mediation would yield results, he declared himself skeptical
and "not optimistic" about Qadhafi's efforts. He stated that
the solution to the crisis lies in strong cooperation between
France and the United States. "Mauritanians are like
children," he said, "and the international community needs to
take this matter into its own hands." He suggested the
intervention of a group of Western "elders" who could bring
the different parties to reason. He believes the way the
situation is going, Mauritania is headed towards unilateral
elections organized by Aziz.


9. (C) Ould Sidi stressed that the West and the United
States are "all Mauritania knows." The USG principled
attitude is pushing the regime "to make a pact with the
devil" and ally with governments that are not Mauritania's
historical partners (specifically citing Iran and China). He
stated Aziz is "convinced his presidency is a done deal" and
won't budge.

--------------
FULL FLEDGED DISAGREEMENT
--------------


10. (C) PolOff met the same day with Ouadane deputy Louleid
Ould Weddad. Unlike Ould Sidi, Weddad was explicit about his
disagreements with General Aziz. "I'm opening my heart to
you," he said, "last night, we spent hours trying to convince
the General he needs to soften his position, but he would not
listen."

--------------
CONSENSUS IS IMPOSSIBLE
--------------


11. (C) Ould Weddad said the country is headed towards

NOUAKCHOTT 00000188 003 OF 003


chaos. He regretted the different actors' rigid positions
and responded "I frankly don't see a way out of this crisis;
they will not budge." Like Ould Sidi, he dismissed the
Qadhafi mediation as a joke. When PolOff pointed out that
President Abdallahi's position had shifted from an adamant
desire to finish his mandate to an agreement that he would
return to organize early elections, Ould Weddad responded
that "accepting to step down two months before the election
and transitioning the country to the President of the Senate
are all the compromises General Aziz is willing to make."

--------------
A WASTE OF TIME AND MONEY
--------------


12. (C) Ould Weddad stated that under the current
circumstances, the June 6 elections are a waste of time and
money. "They may as well not take place," he said. Comment:
Ould Weddad's comments about the election highlight that
many perceive the election as unilateral. End comment.

--------------
WAITING FOR THE ULTIMATE DEADLINE
--------------


13. (C) Ould Weddad was interested in finding out whether
U.S. policy towards Mauritania would change now that the
Democrats are in power. He seemed disappointed to find out
that it would not. He also asked PolOff if she knew when the
international community's "ultimate deadline" would be. "Do
you think the April one will be the last one?," he asked.
Comment: Ould Weddad sounded like someone trying to assess
the right moment to jump off a sinking ship. End comment.


14. (C) Ould Weddad said he was a supporter of a strong
Mauritania-U.S. relationship. He stated he was at the
Embassy's disposition if there was anything he could do for
the U.S.

--------------
COMMENT
--------------


15. (C) Although still supporting General Aziz, Ould Weddad
and Ould Sidi have started -- like rats off a sinking ship --
positioning themselves for a post-Aziz world. According to
political LES, Ould Weddad, Ould Sidi and other members of
the new party are former Ould Taya strongmen who favor close
ties with the United States and maintaining relations with
Israel. There is cause to wonder whether these men are also
reacting to the junta's decision to force the Israelis out of
Nouakchott (Reftel) and the regime's newfound closeness to
Iran. Given previous denunciations from pro-coup partisans
of foreign "interference" and "internationalization" of the
crisis, Ould Sidi's appeal for the U.S. and France to come in
and mediate the situation shows the growing desperation among
the political class to find a way out of the crisis as soon
as possible.
HANKINS