PRESIDENT ABDALLAHI'S CAMP INCREASINGLY WORRIED

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 NOUAKCHOTT 000175

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/04/2014
TAGS: PREL PGOV USAU LY MR
SUBJECT: PRESIDENT ABDALLAHI'S CAMP INCREASINGLY WORRIED

REF: NOUAKCHOTT 170

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Dennis Hankins for reasons 1.4 (b and
d)


1. (C) Multiple FNDD contacts are markedly discouraged
following the February 20 meeting if in International
Consultative Group on Mauritania and Muammar Qadhafi's entry
into the political mix. Qadhafi is not trusted to hold the
AU's hard line against the coup but the FNDD recognizes
rejecting Qadhafi's advances will paint them as the problem.
The broad European outreach conducted by the FNDD prior to
the February 20 convinces Abdallahi's supporters that French
intelligence services poisoned the European well after being
duped by Aziz that Abdallahi represented a latent terrorist
threat. The see some limited success in turning European
views around -- but it is a slow process. FNDD leaders see
Aziz continually under pressure and expect him to lash out
with further arrests of Abdallahi supporters if not more
violent tactics of repression.


2. (C) Charge met March 2 with FNDD leader and President of
the National Assembly Messaoud Ould Boulkheir. At their
request, Charge also met on March 3 with rotating FNDD
President Abdel Koudouss Abeidna and ADIL (President
Abdallahi's Party) President Ahmed Ould Sidi Baba. All three
voiced concern about the international state of play
concerning Mauritania.

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The Qadhafi Conundrum
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3. (C) Ould Boulkheir, who left for Tripoli on Tuesday for
what will be his third encounter with Qadhafi, told Charge is
was deeply concerned that Qadhafi was incapable of playing an
appropriate AU mediation role because he will run with his
own agenda -- not that of the African Union. He lamented
that the African Union had allowed a military autocrat who
had come to power through force to assume the leadership of
the Union. "We don't really expect one military coup leader
to exert any real pressure on a fellow military coup leader."
He added that, "Up until now, we have benefited most from
the strong positions taken by the United States and the
African Union. We fear that with Qadhafi in control, the
African Union position would be eroded leaving us with just
you." Abeidna told Charge that both he and Ould Boulkheir
had strongly urged Abdallahi not to go to Tripoli for several
reasons: (a) they fear Qadhafi will want to take advantage of
his unique historical moment as the Presidency of both the
African Union and UN Security Council to force through a
"solution" inconsistent with the African Union's position and
unacceptable for Mauritanian democracy; (b) they fear that,
once out of Mauritania, Aziz will copy the template of the
2005 coup against Taya by preventing the president from
coming back (likely with Qadhafi's connivance); and, (c) they
fear Qadhafi will exclude everyone from his meeting with
Abdallahi and then either distort what the president says to
claim their is a "deal" or paint the president as the primary
obstacle to democracy. Abeidna lamented that Qadhafi's
legitimacy as the President of the African Union poses a real
dilemma, "If we don't cooperate, we are seen as the problem.
But if we do play along, we are almost certain to be faced
with an unacceptable proposal." Abeidna said he had declined
instructions to go to Tripoli as head of the FNDD delegation
saying, "I'm not enough of the diplomat. As soon as Qadhafi
said something stupid, I would have mouthed off." Abeidna
cited FNDD "intelligence" from within Aziz' staff to say he
was greatly concerned that Aziz and Qadhafi had reached a
deal on how to deal with Abdallahi. The "Head of State"
honors bestowed Aziz on arrival in Tripoli as well as
Tripoli's acceptance of a new Mauritanian Ambassador were
cited as evidence of Qadhafi's overt support for the regime.
He suggested Qadhafi had provided Aziz the cash he needed to
meet the Mauritanian federal payroll on the 22nd of February.
Aziz, it was said, refused any of his staff to sit in on the
meeting with Qadhafi but, afterward told them, "We're good.
Continue planning for the election."


4. (C) Abeidna told Charge the FNDD was trying to put up as

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many conditions as possible to make Abdallahi's Tripoli trip
fall through -- demanding a diplomatic passport showing him
as "President" instead of "Former President;" demanding that
he be received with head of state honors. In discussing with
Charge the risk that Qadhafi would go off the African Union's
script, he decided to also demand that a senior African Union
official -- ideally Lamamra -- join in any Tripoli meetings
between Qadhafi and Abdallahi (he asked that the U.S. share
FNDD concerns about Qadhafi's motives and recommend Lamamra
try to get in the meetings). Abeidna finally said, "I told
the President he should only go if the U.S. says it's okay."
Charge said that while he doubted the President's physical
safety would be at risk under Libyan care and doubted Qadhafi
would play along with the President returning to Mauritania,
we certainly couldn't exclude the possibility Qadhafi would
distort the meeting or try to force an unacceptable agreement.

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Them French
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5. (C) Sidi Baba lamented, "We are dealing with four French
republics: the republics of the Presidency, of the Foreign
Ministry, of the Cooperation Ministry, and of the security
services" In the European diplomatic contacts leading up to
the February 20 Paris meeting, Sidi Baba said, "we were
amazed how prevalent the thought had sunk in among the
Europeans that Sidi was somehow the next Osama Bin Laden."
He said Aziz had effectively laid that seed with the French
intelligence services who had, in turn, spread the idea among
the other Europeans. Time and again, Sidi Baba said
discussions with European diplomats did not focus on any
democratic blockage that may have preceded the coup but on
whether Abdallahi was soft on terrorism. The FNDD emissaries
repeated heard concerns from the serious -- that Abdallahi
had released terrorists from custody -- to the banal -- that
he had built a mosque on the presidential grounds. On the
release of terrorists, Sidi Baba said that when Abdallahi
decided to build his parliamentary block, he told the
leadership, "The judiciary is releasing terrorists and drug
traffickers. I can't stop them because they are an
independent branch, so I need a strong parliamentary block
that can put in legislation to prevent judiciary laxity." On
the mosque, Sidi Baba said, "That was Aziz' idea. He told
the President he had to have a mosque on the grounds because
it was to difficult to organize security for trips to the
central mosque." Sidi Baba added that when the President
allowed an Islamic party to be established, "only the United
States understood the rationale of allowing a political voice
for moderate Islam. The Europeans all saw it as an Islamic
takeover."


6. (C) Abeidna, who had recently returned from a diplomatic
mission to Morocco said he had also found a distorted
understanding among European ambassadors who tended to
understand that an Abdallahi return somehow equated inroads
for Islamic radicalization. He credited previous U.S.
briefing efforts with Mauritania-watchers in Rabat as having
started to turn opinions -- something he felt he was
successfully able to build upon. Abeidna also saw a change
in Moroccan views which had previously been relatively overt
in their support for Aziz. The head of the Moroccan
intelligence service told him Morocco did not support Aziz
saying, "Have you seen us send and senior ministers down,
have we done anything to support him? No." Abeidna, noting
again that the Moroccans had noted previous U.S.
interventions, told Charge, "Either they became disillusioned
with Aziz, or they backed away from him when they saw the
international community wasn't going to roll over on the
coup."

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The Scorpion Will Strike
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7. (C) Abeidna and Sidi Baba both predicted that an
increasingly frustrated Aziz will strike back. Abeidna
noted, "A cornered scorpion will strike as its last act even
as it knows it is dead." Abeidna said they had expected FNDD
member Boidel Ould Houmeid to be arrested last week and had

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therefore included him on the delegation to Tripoli telling
the Libyans no FNDD members would travel if any were
restrained. Abeidna and Sidi Baba both believed Aziz was
planning to have them arrested along with the leadership of
the Tawwasol Islamic party. Again citing FNDD
"intelligence," Abeidna said Aziz had told his staff that if
the FNDD persistent, he would attack them personally.
Abeidna said one staffer asked, "You mean you want them to
disappear?" Aziz reportedly declined to respond.
HANKINS