Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09NOUAKCHOTT170
2009-03-03 07:49:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Nouakchott
Cable title:
PRESIDENT ABDALLAHI MAY GO TO LIBYA
how-toVZCZCXRO7566 PP RUEHPA RUEHTRO DE RUEHNK #0170 0620749 ZNY CCCCC ZZH P 030749Z MAR 09 FM AMEMBASSY NOUAKCHOTT TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8174 INFO RUEHZK/ECOWAS COLLECTIVE RUCNMGH/MAGHREB COLLECTIVE RUEHDO/AMEMBASSY DOHA 0425 RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 0487 RUEHMD/AMEMBASSY MADRID 2030 RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 0834 RUEHPG/AMEMBASSY PRAGUE 0069 RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 0022 RHMFISS/COMSOCEUR VAIHINGEN GE RHMFISS/HQ USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS RUEHDS/USMISSION USAU ADDIS ABABA RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0941
C O N F I D E N T I A L NOUAKCHOTT 000170
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/02/2014
TAGS: PREL PGOV USAU LY MR
SUBJECT: PRESIDENT ABDALLAHI MAY GO TO LIBYA
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Dennis Hankins for reasons 1.4 (b and
d)
C O N F I D E N T I A L NOUAKCHOTT 000170
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/02/2014
TAGS: PREL PGOV USAU LY MR
SUBJECT: PRESIDENT ABDALLAHI MAY GO TO LIBYA
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Dennis Hankins for reasons 1.4 (b and
d)
1. (C) President Abdallahi's Chief of Staff, Ahmed Kaber
Ould Hammoudi, told Charge March 2 that President Abdallahi
had accepted in principle a request from Muammar Qadhafi to
meet with him in Libya on Friday, March 6. Hammoudi said the
President had accepted the request from the Libyan Special
Envoy for Mauritania on three conditions; (a) he won't
travel until the 5-man FNDD delegation currently in Tripoli
returns and briefs him, (b) he expects to arrive in
Nouakchott under the same conditions as previously attempted
(i.e. with a motorcade of his delegation) and will return to
Lemden if impeded by the regime, (c) he will meet with and
brief Qadhafi on his proposition for a solution to the crisis
but is not prepared "to negotiate away the constitution."
The Libyans are to send a plane for President Abdallahi and
his delegation Thursday evening with the President leaving
Lemden early in the morning on Friday. Hammoudi said he did
not know how long the President would be in Libya but
indicated the President planned to return after the meeting
with no side trips.
2. (C) Hammoudi said that none of the Libyan contacts have
yet proposed anything to the President. The FNDD delegation
already in Libya is expected to start meetings the evening of
the 2nd. Hammoudi told Charge, "we have little expectation
of anything useful coming from Qadhafi" but suggested the
President was obliged to hear him out because the February 20
International Consultative Group on Mauritania had blessed a
Libyan effort as the presidency of the African Union and
because "it's Qadhafi." Hammoudi added the President will
work with Qadhafi as long as the Guide sticks to the
positions laid out by the African Union and doesn't run his
own bilateral initiative. He noted, "Amongst us Arabs, there
is not a deep respect for questions of legitimacy and
democracy," meaning that Abdallahi needs to deal with Qadhafi
the African, not Qadhafi the Arab.
3. (C) Hammoudi took the opportunity to again thank the U.S.
for its constant and solid support for Mauritanian democracy
and particularly for the February 23 U.S. press statement in
support of the President's political plan.
4. (C) Hammoudi noted the President had forwarded letters to
the United Nations seeking to place Sidi Mohamed Ould Amajar
aiming to name Amajar as the Mauritanian PermRep to the UN --
hoping to repeat the very fruitful experience they had in
naming their own representative to the AU. He thanked the
U.S. for the technical advice needed in framing the letter
and also noted he understood the African Union would soon be
briefing the Security Council on Mauritania soon. He hoped
the U.S. would continue to support Mauritania within the U.N.
Charge noted that the U.N. system was a particularly
complicated beast and that the naming of his envoy to replace
the existing Mauritanian PermRep would be tricky at best.
Given the politics of the U.N., Charge stressed that any
initiative be clearly seen as an African -- not American --
initiative but that the U.S. would lend its support once the
Africans put something on the table (presuming it meets what
Abdallahi wants).
5. (U) Tripoli Minimize Considered.
HANKINS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/02/2014
TAGS: PREL PGOV USAU LY MR
SUBJECT: PRESIDENT ABDALLAHI MAY GO TO LIBYA
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Dennis Hankins for reasons 1.4 (b and
d)
1. (C) President Abdallahi's Chief of Staff, Ahmed Kaber
Ould Hammoudi, told Charge March 2 that President Abdallahi
had accepted in principle a request from Muammar Qadhafi to
meet with him in Libya on Friday, March 6. Hammoudi said the
President had accepted the request from the Libyan Special
Envoy for Mauritania on three conditions; (a) he won't
travel until the 5-man FNDD delegation currently in Tripoli
returns and briefs him, (b) he expects to arrive in
Nouakchott under the same conditions as previously attempted
(i.e. with a motorcade of his delegation) and will return to
Lemden if impeded by the regime, (c) he will meet with and
brief Qadhafi on his proposition for a solution to the crisis
but is not prepared "to negotiate away the constitution."
The Libyans are to send a plane for President Abdallahi and
his delegation Thursday evening with the President leaving
Lemden early in the morning on Friday. Hammoudi said he did
not know how long the President would be in Libya but
indicated the President planned to return after the meeting
with no side trips.
2. (C) Hammoudi said that none of the Libyan contacts have
yet proposed anything to the President. The FNDD delegation
already in Libya is expected to start meetings the evening of
the 2nd. Hammoudi told Charge, "we have little expectation
of anything useful coming from Qadhafi" but suggested the
President was obliged to hear him out because the February 20
International Consultative Group on Mauritania had blessed a
Libyan effort as the presidency of the African Union and
because "it's Qadhafi." Hammoudi added the President will
work with Qadhafi as long as the Guide sticks to the
positions laid out by the African Union and doesn't run his
own bilateral initiative. He noted, "Amongst us Arabs, there
is not a deep respect for questions of legitimacy and
democracy," meaning that Abdallahi needs to deal with Qadhafi
the African, not Qadhafi the Arab.
3. (C) Hammoudi took the opportunity to again thank the U.S.
for its constant and solid support for Mauritanian democracy
and particularly for the February 23 U.S. press statement in
support of the President's political plan.
4. (C) Hammoudi noted the President had forwarded letters to
the United Nations seeking to place Sidi Mohamed Ould Amajar
aiming to name Amajar as the Mauritanian PermRep to the UN --
hoping to repeat the very fruitful experience they had in
naming their own representative to the AU. He thanked the
U.S. for the technical advice needed in framing the letter
and also noted he understood the African Union would soon be
briefing the Security Council on Mauritania soon. He hoped
the U.S. would continue to support Mauritania within the U.N.
Charge noted that the U.N. system was a particularly
complicated beast and that the naming of his envoy to replace
the existing Mauritanian PermRep would be tricky at best.
Given the politics of the U.N., Charge stressed that any
initiative be clearly seen as an African -- not American --
initiative but that the U.S. would lend its support once the
Africans put something on the table (presuming it meets what
Abdallahi wants).
5. (U) Tripoli Minimize Considered.
HANKINS