Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09NOUAKCHOTT167
2009-03-02 11:39:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Nouakchott
Cable title:  

MAURITANIAN JUNTA ASKS ISRAELIS TO LEAVE

Tags:  PREL PGOV USAU IS MR 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO6657
PP RUEHPA RUEHROV
DE RUEHNK #0167/01 0611139
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 021139Z MAR 09
FM AMEMBASSY NOUAKCHOTT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8167
INFO RUEHXK/ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE
RUEHZK/ECOWAS COLLECTIVE
RUEHRL/AMEMBASSY BERLIN 0497
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 0480
RUEHMD/AMEMBASSY MADRID 2023
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 0827
RUEHPG/AMEMBASSY PRAGUE 0062
RHMFISS/CDR USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
RHMFISS/HQ USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS
RUEHDS/USMISSION USAU ADDIS ABABA
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0934
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NOUAKCHOTT 000167 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/02/2014
TAGS: PREL PGOV USAU IS MR
SUBJECT: MAURITANIAN JUNTA ASKS ISRAELIS TO LEAVE

REF: A. A. HANKINS/OPS CENTER TELCON 3/1/2009

B. B. STATE 14163

C. C. NOUAKCHOTT 138

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Dennis Hankins for reasons 1.4 (b and
d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NOUAKCHOTT 000167

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/02/2014
TAGS: PREL PGOV USAU IS MR
SUBJECT: MAURITANIAN JUNTA ASKS ISRAELIS TO LEAVE

REF: A. A. HANKINS/OPS CENTER TELCON 3/1/2009

B. B. STATE 14163

C. C. NOUAKCHOTT 138

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Dennis Hankins for reasons 1.4 (b and
d)


1. (C) Israeli Ambassador Miki Arbel called Charge evening
of March 1 advising that he had been convoked that afternoon
by the MFA Secretary General and asked to reciprocate actions
taken by the Mauritanian authorities by closing his embassy
and leaving. The Secretary General said Mauritania had told
its Arab partners that it would take actions in response to
the Israeli actions in Gaza but that those actions were seen
as being incomplete. Arbel told the Secretary General that
he was shocked by the Mauritanian actions and would have to
seek instructions from his capital. The Secretary General
told the Ambassador that the Mauritanians had expected the
Israeli's to take these actions weeks ago when they had
advised them of their decision to freeze relations and asking
the Israeli's to take "appropriate measures" by which they
meant to say "reciprocal" actions. Arbel indicated that he
had taken "appropriate measures" by maintaining a low
profile. Arbel told Charge that Tel Aviv had asked him to
immediately brief the U.S. Embassy and indicated that Israel
would be demarching European capitals on Monday seeking
assistance to reverse the regime's decision. Arbel noted
that Foreign Minister Livni intends to raise Mauritania with
Secretary Clinton during their scheduled meeting March 3.


2. (C) Given the continued unavailability of the MFA
Director for North American Affairs Ahmed Deya who has put
off meetings, requested in response to ref B, with A/DCM for
over a week (Deya has been working out of the Interior
Minister trying to implement a new directive to allow voting
by expatriate Mauritanians during the regime's intended June
elections),Charge secured a meeting with the Secretary
General Mohameden Ould Sidi dit Bedena on March 2 to deliver
REF B demarche. In addition to the points made in reftel,
Charge stressed the negative repercussions of any decision to
sever ties with Israel including (a) publicly aligning
Mauritania with the extremist Middle Eastern view expressed
by Hamas, Syria and Iran thereby undermining the regime's

claim that it provides the best long-term option for security
and stability in the region, which would (b) undermine U.S.
relations in the long term and likely force the regime's less
severe European critics (Spain and Germany) to take a tougher
line in regards to the coup. Charge noted that soon after
the coup, the regime's Foreign Minister had cited President
Abdallahi's diplomatic contacts with Libya and Iran as a
dangerous trend that justified the coup. The actions taken
by the regime since the coup demonstrate a stronger leaning
towards extremist regimes.


3. (C) The Secretary General did not raise his discussion
with Ambassador Arbel but quickly defended Mauritanian policy
regarding Israel saying, "At the time of Taya, the government
took a courageous decision -- against the will of most
Mauritanians -- to establish relations with Israel because we
thought that was the best contribution that we could make at
the time for long term peace in the region. At the Doha
Summit, General Aziz determined that the best contribution
the current government could make was to freeze -- not cut --
relations with Israel." He added that, "Whatever you may
think, we base our policy towards Israel on our own
interests. Our relations were not established to please
America nor will they be cut to retaliate against the U.S.
now or to please Iran, Syria, or anyone else." Charge noted
that Mauritania had chosen the extremist line in relation to
the Palestinian issue -- one that important partners like
Egypt and Saudi Arabia (in addition to the legitimate
representatives of the Palestinian people) reject in favor of
dialogue. The Secretary General stressed that "Mauritania
continues to be committed to a long term relationship with
Israel" and had clearly decided to "freeze" rather than "cut"
ties. Charge noted that "freezing relations" is not part of
the standard diplomatic vocabulary and asked for a
definition. The Secretary General said, "We have closed our
embassy, shipped our furnishings back home, and brought back
our Ambassador and we expect Israel to act in a reciprocal
fashion. We have not, however, changed the legal status of

NOUAKCHOTT 00000167 002 OF 002


our relations with Israel. We still have those relations and
our Ambassador remains the Ambassador to Israel. If and when
the situation between the Israelis and the Palestinians
suggests a durable peace, there is nothing to preclude us
renting a new chancery and sending our Ambassador back."
Charge noted it was unusual that Mauritania would take a
unilateral action and then expect Israel to respond in kind.
The Secretary General only responded, "that is how we view
reciprocity."


4. (C) Charge will be briefing Ambassador Arbel on this
demarche this afternoon. The Secretary General took
particular note of the arguments that a rupture of relations
with Israel would tend to undermine U.S. -- particularly
Congressional -- support for any future Mauritanian
government -- legitimate or otherwise. He also noted the
argument that aligning Mauritania with the
Hamas/Syrian/Iranian hard-line would alienate Mauritania
politically and potentially lead to a hardened European
response to the regime. Our sense is that the timing of the
Mauritanian action is driven by Qaddafi's emerging mediation
initiative on Mauritania. With Tripoli already seen as
biased towards the military regime, the Mauritanians are
likely trying to curry favor with Tripoli hoping Qaddafi, as
AU President, will act contrary to the AU's hard line policy.
Qaddafi is expected to arrive in Mauritania this week
installing his tent-palace in the middle of the national
stadium to initiate talks between Aziz, Abdallahi and Ould
Daddah. The junta may want to be able to tell the Guide
they've kicked out the Israelis before the process begins.
WALSH