Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09NOUAKCHOTT165
2009-03-01 07:56:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Nouakchott
Cable title:  

EDUCATING THE LIBYANS; FNDD OUTLINES FIRST STEPS

Tags:  PREL PGOV MR 
pdf how-to read a cable
O 010756Z MAR 09
FM AMEMBASSY NOUAKCHOTT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8164
INFO ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
ECOWAS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY VIENNA PRIORITY 
USEU BRUSSELS PRIORITY
USMISSION USAU ADDIS ABABA PRIORITY
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 
EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE
C O N F I D E N T I A L NOUAKCHOTT 000165 


SECSTATE FOR AF-BOULWARE; AF/W - HEFLIN/DENNISON; PARIS FOR
KANEDA; USEU FOR FRANCIS; USAU FOR MAYBURY; DOHA FOR
LEBARON; LISBON FOR BALLARD; RABAT FOR JACKSON; DAKAR FOR
MOSBY; MADRID FOR DUNCAN; BERLINE FOR RATHKE; TRIPOLI FOR
STEVENS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/20/2021
TAGS: PREL PGOV MR
SUBJECT: EDUCATING THE LIBYANS; FNDD OUTLINES FIRST STEPS
IN LIBYAN MEDIATION EFFORT

REF: A. A. NOUAKCHOTT 161

B. B. NOUAKCHOTT 159

C. C. NOUAKCHOTT 157


Classified By: CDA Cornelius C. Walsh for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L NOUAKCHOTT 000165


SECSTATE FOR AF-BOULWARE; AF/W - HEFLIN/DENNISON; PARIS FOR
KANEDA; USEU FOR FRANCIS; USAU FOR MAYBURY; DOHA FOR
LEBARON; LISBON FOR BALLARD; RABAT FOR JACKSON; DAKAR FOR
MOSBY; MADRID FOR DUNCAN; BERLINE FOR RATHKE; TRIPOLI FOR
STEVENS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/20/2021
TAGS: PREL PGOV MR
SUBJECT: EDUCATING THE LIBYANS; FNDD OUTLINES FIRST STEPS
IN LIBYAN MEDIATION EFFORT

REF: A. A. NOUAKCHOTT 161

B. B. NOUAKCHOTT 159

C. C. NOUAKCHOTT 157


Classified By: CDA Cornelius C. Walsh for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (U) SUMMARY: National Front for the Defense of Democracy
(FNDD) Director of External Relations, Mohamed Ould Maouloud,
met with Charge, Thursday, February 26, to outline policies
regarding the mediation efforts of African Union President
Qadhafi, relationships within the Mauritanian opposition, and
to thank the US for its continuing support and quick response
to the FNDD's request for a USG statement following the Paris
Contact Group meeting. END SUMMARY


2. (C) The Libyans. As noted in reftels, initial Libyan
efforts to mediate were not successful due to the Libyans
failure to do their homework, as some Mauritanians put it.
However, the second phase of the effort has not gone much
better. The FNDD suspects it is a combination of Libyan
ignorance and a desire to bull their way to an agreement to
AU President Qadhafi's (and perhaps Junta leader Abdel Aziz')
liking. Maouloud outlined three issues that have gotten the
Libyans off to an unfortunate start:

i. Formal reception by AU president Qadhafi of Junta leader
Aziz in Tripoli
ii. Libyan acceptance of the credentials of the Junta's
Ambassador to Tripoli
iii. Libyan attempts to limit the mediation effort to Aziz,
President Abdahllahi, and Rally for Democracy's (RFD),
President Ould Dahdah
iv. Failure by the Libyans to initiate contact with
President Abdahllahi and other parties until after initial
discussions with Junta leader Aziz.


3. (C) Mauritanian Reaction: As bruited in the Junta's
official media, Aziz and colleagues are delighted with the
Libyan effort. As noted by the speed with which RFD
President Ould Dahdah responded to the Libyan invitation to
Tripoli, the RFD obviously sees something in the effort for
ould Dahdah and, concurrently, a means to undercut the
legitimate president. The FNDD, the Presidential camp, and
other bystanders are not as enthused.


4. (C) A Libyan invitation to participate was extended to
President Abdahlahi and President of the National Assembly
and opposition representative, Messaoud Ould Boulkheir.
President Abdahllahi granted Boulkheir authority to speak on
his behalf. Boulkheir explained to the Libyans that the
mediation effort and any further "national dialogue" would
have to go beyond the three players on whom the Libyans were
focused. The FNDD, while strongly supporting the President
and a return to constitutional order, was a coalition of 14
political parties and would have to be represented as an
independent entity. The Parliament, in which the FNDD and
other opposition groups had considerable support should be
represented in its own right. Parties not of the FNDD with
limited or no parliamentary representation should also be
recognized.


5. (C) This resulted in a hurried Libyan invitation to
Maouloud to confer with the Libyans, Wednesday afternoon.
"We'll send a plane this evening." was the Libyan invitation.
Maouloud explained to the Libyans that the FNDD was a
disparate coalition and that he as External Affairs
Commissioner would have to confer with his constituency.


6. (C) Next steps. The FNDD was to have met Thursday
afternoon and evening to outline the platform it would take
in preparing for the discussions with the Libyans. It was
also developing a formal statement outlining its difficulties
with the results of the Paris February 20 Contact Group
meeting (draft copy obtained by USAU Addis and forwarded to
Nouakchott, Paris, and AF) that would be ratified at the same
time. On Friday, the FNDD, other opposition groups, and
parliamentary representatives would meet with President
Abdahllahi in Lemden to develop a generally united platform
for further discussions with the Libyans. Once all have
conferred, Maouloud believed a mixed delegation would be
prepared to travel to Tripoli on Sunday, march 1st.


7. (C) Bottom lines. Maouloud outlined the FNDD's current
posture with the Libyans:

i. No mediatory efforts while President Abdahllahi still
restricted to Lemden while former Prime Minister Wagdhef and
others still i prison, and members of the opposition subject
to constant regulatory harassment by Junta bureaucrats.
ii. Recognition of Libyan mediation efforts only and only if
they are under the auspices of Libyan president Qadhafi's
role as president of the African Union. No CEN-SAD, No
Maghrebian, no Arab aegis. This is an African Union issue
and other groupings or ideologies are not helpful.


8. (C) Even with these issues clearly delineated, Maouloud
noted that the Sunday meetings with the Libyans are simply to
outline the opposition positions, discuss possible modalities
and venues for further discussions, and continue to educate
the Libyan side regarding the dynamics of the Mauritanian
crisis.


9. (C) American Role: Maouloud thanked Charge for quick USG
reaction to FNDD President Abeidna's request for a statement
in the wake of the Paris meeting. The Monday statement had
focused the Europeans once more on targeted sanctions, forced
the HCE to realize that the Paris meeting was not an
unalloyed victory for their camp, and encouraged President
Abdahllahi to press on.


10. (C) COMMENT: The FNDD and other political leaders we
have spoken to, even some supportive of the HCE, view the
Libyan effort with unbounded cynicism. The general feeling
is that Qadhafi wants a solution that preserves Aziz' powers,
if not as head of state, then as eminence grise with the
military's backing. Few believe that the proposed June 6
elections can be free, fair, or transparent, but then, no one
believes that this would be a problem for Qadhafi. The
Libyan difficulties in understanding the various
constituencies and issues swirling about in the Mauritanian
process simply don't bode well for a successful effort.
Sunday's encounters should be interesting. END COMMENT


WALSH