REGIME'S "NATIONAL DIALOGUE ON DEMOCRACY' HARDENS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 NOUAKCHOTT 000016

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/07/2013
TAGS: PREL PGOV MR
SUBJECT: REGIME'S "NATIONAL DIALOGUE ON DEMOCRACY' HARDENS
DIVISIONS

REF: A. 2008 NOUAKCHOTT 740

B. 2008 NOUAKCHOTT 775

C. NOUAKCHOTT 0002

D. NOUAKCHOTT 11

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Dennis Hankins for reasons
1.4 (b and d)


1. (C) Summary -- The two week "National Dialogue on
Democracy" developed more a menu of options than a political
roadmap out of Mauritania's political crisis. Detractors see
what they expected from the process, a charade designed to
legitimize General Aziz' coup. Insiders hope Aziz will not
use the discussion document as a ticket to get himself
elected through elections that would, by definition, be
flawed if held under current political circumstances. Some
Europeans were quick to embrace the Dialogue though others
see little progress on the underlying political dilemma.


2. (SBU) The National Dialogue on Democracy (Etats Generaux
de la Democratie) closed January 6 -- a day later than
previously planned -- in a ceremony in which junta leader
General Aziz committed to abide by the decisions of the
majority. While including seven separate working groups, the
most important points raised in the final declaration
concerned the timing of new elections (with the majority
calling for May 30 presidential elections),amendments to the
constitution to weaken the office of the president, and the
role of the military. By intent, the final declaration did
not attempt to lay out a "roadmap" out of the political
crisis but to describe the issues discussed with some effort
to cite the most frequently heard argument as well as any
strong minority opinions.

A Dialogue Insider
--------------


3. (C) Charge met January 7 with Dialogue Moderator Cheikh
Saad Bouh Camara to see whether the event had panned out as
he had previously described (REFTEL C). Camara offered that
the Dialogue had created a useful document for dialogue but
regretted the event had been marred "by a misunderstanding"
leading to the eventual disassociation of opposition leader
Ahmed Ould Daddah. Camara said Daddah had gotten too upset
"about one word" concerning the recommendations of the
working-group on the constitution as to whether there was a
"majority" or a "minority" view on the need to modify the
constitution prior to new elections. Camara allowed that the
original committee report said "minority" which the
chairperson later tried to change to "majority" claiming a
statistical error. The final report used "majority."


4. (C) While defending the Dialogue's end product, Camara
worried that General Aziz was using it in the wrong way.
Camara boasted, "the final language is very diplomatic -- you
can construct any finding you want, and its opposite, from
the text." For Camara that was the goal -- to spell out the
different views on the various political and constitutional
challenges facing the country for future discussions between
the FNDD and the Regime. He emphasized it was not a real
debate -- the group was too large for anything other than a
series of interventions -- and should not be used as a
decision paper. He noted that many of the most frequently
voiced positions were either impractical or unconstitutional.
He saw the majority view for elections by May 30 as
impossible "if we want free and transparent elections" since
there will not be enough time to put the election machinery
in place. He added that, "Mauritania is not yet able to hold
free and fair elections unless there is international support
and monitoring." He noted also that he personally was
against any change of the constitution prior to new elections
saying such changes needed to be done carefully and
deliberately -- not under a deadline. He thought the changes
wouldn't go through anyhow since Aziz would be unable to
complete either of the two methods for constitutional
revision (a) a referendum, (b) a two-thirds majority of the
combined parliamentary chambers (Camara calculated there are

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not enough votes if Ould Daddah and his RFD members resist).


5. (C) Camara said he saw no way to have credible elections
unless they include Ould Daddah, an FNDD candidate and,
possibly, Col. Vall. If Aziz runs without these significant
opponents (and Camara is still not sure Aziz will run),the
elections will not constitute a real competition between the
main power blocks. Camara saw the various players now
looking at re-assessing alliances. There continues to be an
Aziz -- Ould Daddah dialogue going with the civilian still
looking to be designated the military's next candidate.
There are talks between the FNDD and Vall to see if they can
unite against a common enemy. There are talks between
elements of the FNDD and Ould Daddah for an alliance. And
there are talks between elements of the FNDD (Ould Boulkheir)
and Aziz to find a compromise. Camara's assessment was that
Aziz will not run if he can't get anyone of stature to run
against him -- needing a "real" opponent to have his victory
legitimized. Under the current circumstances, the FNDD
(Abdallahi, Ould Maouloud or Ould Boulkheir) will not run nor
will Ould Daddah or Vall. In the impasse, Aziz will continue
to opt for a longer transition time to try to get a real
opponent -- but not Vall who might beat him. Camara thought
that in the end, perhaps six months out or longer, all the
deadlocked parties will look for a compromise candidate
acceptable to all -- "someone like (Abdallahi's first Prime
Minister) Zein Zeidane but with more experience under his
belt." Camara saw UN SRSG for Somalia Amadou Ould Abdallah
as someone who might fit the bill.

Ahmed Ould Daddah
--------------


6. (C) Charge met with opposition leader and RFD President
Ahmed Ould Daddah January 7 noting things had played out
pretty much the way Ould Daddah had predicted in mid-December
(REFTEL A). Ould Daddah confirmed that his ultimate
disavowal of the Dialogue came from the result he had
expected all along -- a fairly transparent charade to
legitimize the coup and Aziz' efforts for a "democratic coup"
via a new fake election. Ould Daddah said he had left the
door open for a sincere exercise and added he saw some of the
others working with the Dialogue were equally interested in
forging a real solution to the crisis. In the end, Aziz
stacked the deck in his favor and forced changes when the
results weren't what he wanted. As for the "single word"
issue cited in Para. 3, Ould Daddah said getting a "majority
view" that the constitution needed revision prior to the
elections as essential for Aziz' plan to put himself in power
permanently. Ould Daddah noted he agrees that constitutional
reform is needed but not now in the midst of a political
crisis and not with the current corrupted parliament. Ould
Daddah also dismissed the utility of the process saying that,
even if sincere, it was so bloated to exclude any real debate
-- just a "Hyde Park" of interventions with no way of
qualitatively measuring one from another with most coming
from "illiterates from Bassikanou" who couldn't understand
the concepts being discussed.


7. (C) Ould Daddah will not run in elections as being
spelled out by the Dialogue. He saw some room for closer
cooperation with the FNDD "if they can get past this Sidi,
Sidi, Sidi mantra." In that vein, he voiced the same warming
towards the FNDD's Mohamed Ould Maouloud that Ould Maouloud
had voiced for Ould Daddah in REFTEL D. Ould Daddah saw the
FNDD growing frustrated with President Abdallahi and willing
to look at other arrangements that did not involve the
President -- he said he had heard essentially that from Ould
Maouloud, Ould Boulkheir, and even from Abdallahi's
representative abroad Sidi Mohamed Ould Amajare. Ould Daddah
said, "there is a basis for cooperation between those who
want to see the end of over 20 years of military rule,"
adding that "I include the 'parenthesis' of Sidi's time since
he was just a front for the military."


8. (C) Ould Daddah became upset when asked how he saw the
Gaza crisis playing on the domestic political scene. "I'm

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not going to play that card. Yes, Aziz is playing populist
politics on the issue and gaining some support, but this is
something every Mauritanian is united on." Ould Daddah
warned that the U.S. was going to lose years of hard work
over its silence on Gaza. He noted and praised the U.S.
strategy on counter-terrorism in Mauritania that equally
addresses the Al Qaeda threat and the root causes of
extremism, but warned there was little the U.S. could do
internally to stem radicalization in Mauritania is the
Palestinian issue got out of hand. He added, "I'm no fan of
Hamas and I know they provoked the attack, but the response
plays into their hands. They are now the heroes of the
Middle East and nobody is even listening to Abbas."

Role of the Military
--------------


9. (C) One issue of concern raised by Camara, Ould Daddah
and Ould Maouloud was the effort to define a role for the
military in the Dialogue document. Ould Daddah was adamant
that the military can have no special constitutional role.
Camara noted that while the document spoke about the military
as an "institution" as a gesture the military had pushed for,
the text of the declaration emphasized the need for an
apolitical republican army. Ould Maouloud told Charge
January 6 he found the military reference the most worrisome
in the Dialogue document. Ould Maouloud told Charge the
"Kill an Ostrich" story dating back to French colonial times
when the French banned ostrich hunting because of dwindling
populations. A tribe that made its livelihood off ostrich
hunting was up in arms so the village chief went to the
French provincial administrator saying he needed permission
to hunt "just one" ostrich for a religious ceremony. The
Frenchman relented and gave the village chief a permit for
one ostrich. Returning to his village, the village council
berated the chief saying "what can we do with just one
ostrich?" The chief told them, "with this piece of paper, we
can kill all the ostriches -- just one at a time." So Ould
Maouloud worried that any reference to a special status for
the military -- no matter how democratically worried -- will
give them the crack they need for an endless series of coups.

European Reactions
--------------


10. (C) Following the closing of the Dialogue, the
government media was quick to publish comments attributed to
the German Ambassador to Mauritania Eberhard Schanze calling
the Dialogue "a serious discussion that had been very open,
very frank and very serious," and adding, "my impression is
that what took place was not fabricated." Charge checked
with the German Embassy the morning of the 7th finding that
the Ambassador had departed the night before for
consultations with the EU Presidency in Prague that German
will represent in Mauritania through June. The German Charge
Nicole Steckmann (protect) said she had not been present when
the Ambassador spoke to the press but, if accurately quoted,
said what was attributed to her Ambassador, "does not reflect
the position of either Germany or of the European Union."
Steckmann noted that after the closing ceremony, her
Ambassador, the Spanish Ambassador, the French Charge and she
had discussed how to report the process to capitals. Within
the context of the EU negotiations with the regime, Steckmann
noted there had been tangible progress on two points: the
President had been released and there had been some form of
national dialogue that the President had chosen not to
participate in. She noted, however, that the product of the
dialogue was not an exit strategy but a compilation of
opinions that served no real purpose. She also noted that
"the assumption was that Abdallahi's release implies some
return of his functions. Abdallahi doesn't really seem to
have tried since being released, but clearly he is not
exercising any presidential powers."

HANKINS