Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09NOUAKCHOTT155
2009-02-20 15:29:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Nouakchott
Cable title:  

SLIPPERY AS EVER, OULD DAHDAH STILL IN TOUCH WITH

Tags:  PGOV PREL KDEM MR 
pdf how-to read a cable
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 NOUAKCHOTT 000155 

SIPDIS

SECSTATE FOR AF - BOULWARE; AF/W FOR DENNISON/HEFLIN; PARIS
FOR KANEDA; USEU FOR FRANCIS; USAU FOR MAYBURY

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/20/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM MR
SUBJECT: SLIPPERY AS EVER, OULD DAHDAH STILL IN TOUCH WITH
HCE

REF: NOUAKCHOTT 00126

Classified By: Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Cornelius Walsh for rea
sons 1.4 (b) and
(d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 NOUAKCHOTT 000155

SIPDIS

SECSTATE FOR AF - BOULWARE; AF/W FOR DENNISON/HEFLIN; PARIS
FOR KANEDA; USEU FOR FRANCIS; USAU FOR MAYBURY

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/20/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM MR
SUBJECT: SLIPPERY AS EVER, OULD DAHDAH STILL IN TOUCH WITH
HCE

REF: NOUAKCHOTT 00126

Classified By: Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Cornelius Walsh for rea
sons 1.4 (b) and
(d).


1. (C) Summary: RFD President Ahmed Ould Daddah informed
Poloff he asked the National Assembly to postpone a February
19 vote to February 22 on key election-related issues and
threatened an RFD boycott if he were denied. For the regime
sponsored June 6 elections, Ould Dahdah demanded suffrage for
Mauritanian expatriates, greater transparency in the creation
of the National Independent Election Council (CENI). When
informed of his request's refusal, Ould Daddah ordered RFD
members to leave the session. After this setback, he
stressed, now he really would oppose the regime. Dahdah had
a hard time squaring his earlier condemnation of the June 6
process with his party's participation in electoral details
and glossed over the transparency of the RFD gambit to set
the vote for the 22nd. He repeated his ritual denunciation of
Abdahllahi with an ever so slight modification and hinted
that if worse came to worse, he just might have to save the
regime from itself. Nothing concrete except the modulated
nuance regarding the President, but a prima performance by
one of Mauritania's finest political chalmeleons. End
Summary.

--------------
Three Law Projects, One Suspect Strategy
--------------


2. (C) In a February 19 meeting at RFD headquarters, Ahmed
Ould Daddah discussed the RFD strategy for three
election-related issues before the National Assembly. Ould
Daddah explained that the Assembly was scheduled to vote that
afternoon on suffrage for Mauritanians abroad; the creation
of CENI (an independent commission to organize and monitor
elections); and the presidential elections. He stated that
his party had asked the Assembly to postpone the February 19
vote until February 22 and that the RFD intended to boycott
if this were denied. When asked about the reason for this,
he did not elaborate. (Comment: Given the 2/20 Paris
consultative meeting, deferral to the 22nd would allow the
RFD to adjust its position with a better reading of the

regime's strength or weakness. End comment.) Ould Daddah
then stressed that if the Assembly rescheduled, RFD intended
to vote in favor of the Mauritanians abroad and the CENI
projects -- if certain amendments were passed -- but would
reject the presidential election initiative.


3. (C) Ould Daddah was eager to justify his decision to
collaborate in the vote. Since 1992, his party has pressed
for an expatriate suffrage law. Expatriates can't be
threatened as can domestics and there are enough expats to
shift polls. He added that RFD would vote for the CENI only
if the Assembly would accept an RFD amendment calling for
broadly based participation in selecting members. He also
wanted an amendment guaranteeing that CENI would have
autonomy in organizing, managing, and announcing the vote.



4. (C) Poloff pointed out that RFD support of preparative
measures for the June 6 election could be perceived as
support for the elections themselves. Of course not, he
responded, these measures were, by themselves, good for
Mauritania and would ensure future free and transparent
elections. He also reiterated RFD would vote against the
June 6 election plan. He added that "unlike Americans, I do
not see the world in black and white." When asked whether he
thought, given the crisis, this was an appropriate time to
focus on electoral laws, he responded that Aziz had agreed to
allow those laws to be voted by the National Assembly as a
way to lure RFD into accepting the June 6 elections. He
added that allowing the president of the senate to lead the

NOUAKCHOTT 00000155 002 OF 003


transition was a concession by Aziz to him. Comment: Neither
the contradiction nor the understanding that he was still
dickering with the Junta seemed to faze Dahdah. While there's
a certain logic in building an electoral system through which
the RFD might profit if circumstances changed to "force" it
into the polls, Dahdah's earlier condemnations of the June 6
plan hardly seemed to matter. End comment.


5. (C) Ould Daddah then phoned to find out if his request
to reschedule the session had been granted. He looked upset
and told Poloff the answer had been negative and he had asked
his party members to boycott the session. Poloff asked him
about next steps and he responded "I will oppose this
government by all possible means."

--------------
Getting Closer to FNDD
--------------


6. (C) When asked Ould Daddah about a possible compromise
with FNDD, Ould Daddah said he would never accept a military
candidacy or President Abdallahi's return, unless Abdallahi
returned to resign, opening the way for the President of the
Senate to lead the transition. Comment: Dadhdah has been
consistent up to now on one issue: Abdahllahi is not a
legitimate president and therefore has no role in any
settlement. His nod towards a nanosecond's legitimacy for
resignation purposes is, for him, a tectonic shift. This
coupled with Abdahllahi's letter to the Organisation
Internationale de la Francophonie (OIF)which in itself
registered a shift in the Presidential camp's position, may
see a compromise worked out. (see reftel). End comment.


--------------
Open to Dialogue
--------------


7. (C) Poloff solicited his opinion about the declaration
released by Colonel Ely Vall's frontman Mahfoudh Ould Bettah
February 18. The letter, signed by important political
figures, called for the HCE (singling out General Aziz by
name),the FNDD, and the RFD to come to the table and
negotiate. Ould Daddah said he was open to dialogue and he
had a meeting scheduled that afternoon with Cheick Sid'Ahmed
Ould Babamine, chairman of the previous CENI and signatory of
the letter. Nevertheless, he said he felt uneasy as Ely Vall
is corrupt and should not be in politics.


8. (C) Daddah backpedaled and intimated that if the FNDD
refused a compromise in the next few months, he might be open
to negotiations with the military to find a solution without
the FNDD. Poloff asked him if this meant running in
elections organized by the military and he said it did not.
He stated he wanted a transition led by a national consensus
government with the power to replace government officials
named by the military. He would be willing to accept the
military staying on to ensure security. Comment: Daddah may
be thinking that in a few months, if Aziz is unable to
legitimize his government, he will be amenable to
negotiation. Ould Daddah could then become the military's
candidate. End comment.


--------------
Curious About European and US Positions
--------------


9. (C) Ould Daddah asked Poloff if the Americans remained
firm in their position. He also wanted to know if she had
any information about the outcome of the 18 February EU
meetings "to harmonize European policy". He looked irked
when she said she did not. He stated a French source had
told him "they did not see how the EU could do less than the

NOUAKCHOTT 00000155 003 OF 003


AU." Ould Daddah said it would be a big mistake for the
French to accept Aziz's plan as it would not bring stability
to the region. He concurred that a less than strong EU
response would undermine the AU and "tell Africans that
democracy was good for Europeans but not for them." Note:
Ould Daddah is traveling to Paris this weekend to lobby the
Europeans. End note.



8. (C) Comment: RFD's boycott of the National Assembly
vote further highlights the falling out between Aziz and Ould
Daddah. Nevertheless, our eyebrows rise when we realize he
must be in fairly constant contact with the Junta to lobby
back and forth on the elctoral law itself. The ever so
slight shift to accepting an Abdahllahi resignation is his
first hint at any flexibility towards the presidential camp
and comes with his own criticism of the FNDD for its
"loyalty" to the President. Drawing a bead on Dahdah's
position is difficult, but perhaps, just perhaps, he sees a
train moving and doesn't want to be left on the platform.
End comment.
HANKINS