Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09NOUAKCHOTT142
2009-02-18 13:41:00
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Embassy Nouakchott
Cable title:  

MEDIA AND POLITICAL PARTY REACTIONS TO JUNTA LETTER

Tags:  PREL PGOV KPAO KDEM MR 
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UNCLAS NOUAKCHOTT 000142 

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SIPDIS

C O R R E C T E D COPY CAPTION

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PREL PGOV KPAO KDEM MR
SUBJECT: MEDIA AND POLITICAL PARTY REACTIONS TO JUNTA LETTER

REF: NOUAKCHOTT 140


UNCLAS NOUAKCHOTT 000142

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

C O R R E C T E D COPY CAPTION

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PREL PGOV KPAO KDEM MR
SUBJECT: MEDIA AND POLITICAL PARTY REACTIONS TO JUNTA LETTER

REF: NOUAKCHOTT 140



1. (U) Foreign Minister Mohammedou's letter to the AU offering a
transition of the Presidency to the President of the Senate 45 days
before the presidential elections June 6 (Reftel) elicited a sharp
response from coup opponents, while practically all sides assessed
the measure as a last-ditch attempt to avoid EU sanctions. The
following is a sample of the reactions.
for both the FNDD and the Presidential group strongly emphasized
that the letter simply does not meet the basic test of a democratic
transition, i.e., the removal of the military and the government it
installed before any real movement can take place.


3. (U) Junta response: None of the official state-run media has
reported or commented yet on the letter.


4. (U) RFD response: Ahmed Ould Daddah's party wasted no time
releasing a communique on the same day knowledge of the letter
became public. The communique highlighted three main points.

i. First, it described the electoral process described in the letter
as "unilateral," arguing that all the main components of the
upcoming elections are under the control of the High State Council.


ii. Second, it described the resignation of Aziz 45 days before the
election as an "unacceptable, cosmetic maneuver."

iii. Third, it stated that the real solution to the crisis is "free
and transparent elections, far removed from prefabricated schemes
that the country has become all too familiar with."


5. (U) FNDD reaction: Although an official communique from the FNDD
has not been released, a web site closely allied to the FNDD posted
an article blasting Mohammedou's letter, calling it a
"vaudevillesque maneuver where the goal is to get Aziz elected
through a preordained parody". The article went on to note "the
annoyance and feverishness that have taken hold of the Putschist
camp and their henchmen since the implementation of targeted
sanctions imposed by the AU Peace and Security Council."


6. (U) According to the anti-coup newspaper "Le Renovateur" the
proposal confirms General Aziz is "cornered" and is attempting to
give his candidacy a veneer of legitimacy to avoid EU sanctions.
The proposal's only new element would be the General's acceptance of
the constitutional clause allowing the President of the Senate to
lead the country during a transition -- a possibility originally
rejected by the military because it would put a black Mauritanian in
power. For the newspaper, the plan does not guarantee electoral
transparency, as they would be organized by the (AZIZ) government
and the people he put in power, and would benefit his own candidacy.
The only way out of the crisis would be to nominate a transitional
government, dissolve the national assembly, organize early elections
and isolate the military from politics.


7. (U) For the "Nouakchott Info" newspaper, the plan is also a
"measure of last resort" to avoid EU sanctions. The newspaper
highlights RFD president Ould Daddah's dismissal of the plan as
"unilateral," a position echoed by the EU. The newspaper also notes
the plan's release following Libyan mediation efforts, which
according to this source will take the main political actors to
Tripoli to negotiate under Qadhafi's auspices.


8. (U) The anti-coup "L'Authentique Quotidien" newspaper led with
the headline "The concessions of General Ould Abdel Aziz." Stating
that Aziz only offered his proposal "three days before the fateful
meeting in Paris February 20", the author argued that "the European
Union is awaiting responses [of the FNDD and RFD], which will
determine the attitude of the international community with respect
to the crisis... What is certain is that the High State Council
partisans are not very optimistic about the EU meeting in Paris,
especially with a Czech EU presidency judged to be too close to the
American position with respect to the coup d'etat and return of Sidi
Ould Cheikh Abdallahi to power."


9. (SBU) Comment: The plan is regarded with contempt and
suspicion. Many view it as a stratagem to consolidate power and
legitimize the June 6 elections whereas others think it is a
desperate measure to avoid EU sanctions. This is a clever move to
co-opt the Europeans and isolate the USG. More than one
interlocutor has emphasized that this could be the ultimate proof
the General is cornered and willing to negotiate. In either case,
the plan is perceived as a unilateral solution that would allow Aziz
to use the political machine he created to legitimize his candidacy
and his election. For many including the FNCC, the political crisis
consolidate the military's hold, isolate the US, and delegitimize
the African Union. End comment.

WALSH