MAURITANIAN RELATIONS WITH ISRAEL

C O N F I D E N T I A L NOUAKCHOTT 000138


NOFORN

SECSTATE AF - A/DAS BOULWARE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/17/2021
TAGS: PREL USAU PGOV MR IS
SUBJECT: MAURITANIAN RELATIONS WITH ISRAEL

REF: A. STATE 14163

B. NOUAKCHOTT 6

C. NOUAKCHOTT 47

D. NOUAKCHOTT 101

E. NOUAKCHOTT 118

Classified By: CDA Cornelius Walsh, reasons 1.4(b) and (d).


1. (C/NF) Summary: Having watched the evolution of the
Israeli relations issue in the context of the Mauritanian
political crisis, we believe that the junta, particularly
Foreign Minister Mohamed Mahmoud Ould Mohamedou, is deeply
concerned about the repercussions of a formal break in the
Mauritanian-Israeli relationship. Their steps to date, while
detrimental to Israeli interests, have been incremental and
hesitant. However, given the volatile nature of the issue,
American engagement at this very sensitive time may be used
by more radical members of the junta and its constituents,
who have a planning horizon much more limited than that of
the Foreign Minister, as a pretext to sever the relationship
and free Mauritania from what they consider its onerous
restraints. End Summary.


2. (U) Since the advent of the coup d'etat in early August,
Embassy Nouakchott has observed and reported on the junta's
approach towards relations with Israel as well as the
attitudes and statements of other participants in the current
political crisis affecting Mauritania. Inasmuch as Israeli
Ambassador Arbel had not presented his credentials prior to
the coup and that Israel hewed to the western policy of
non-recognition, this kept the issue off the table for some
months. Always a delicate subject, it appeared that both the
junta and its opponents preferred that the issue not enter
their political world.


3. (U) The late December Israeli incursion into Gaza,
however, changed the nature of the discussion. The junta
found itself pressured by its domestic constituency, its
opponents, and fellow Muslim states to cut relations with
Israel as a show of solidarity with Gaza and the Muslim
mainstream. Indeed, it appears that some states offered
recognition and financial support for just such a gesture.
Large and sometimes violent anti-Israeli demonstrations
focused on the Israeli Embassy in Nouakchott further forced
the junta to address the issue. On the domestic front the
junta appeared to be in a competition with its opponents as
to which could be more anti-Israel than the other.


4. (C/NF) Despite these pressures, the junta has proceeded
slowly and very carefully in its measures against the Israeli
presence. It has recalled its Ambassador (Ref B),declared a
freeze in relations (Ref C),almost surreptitiously closed
its Embassy in Tel Aviv and removed its personnel (Ref D),
and finally two weeks ago informally called the Israeli
Ambassador and asked that he take "appropriate measures"
regarding the freeze (Ref E). As of February 16, the Israeli
Ambassador has not been contacted again by the junta's
Ministry of Foreign Affairs.


5. (C/NF) We have sometimes considered the junta's steps to
be an attempt to have its cake and eat it as well, i.e., give
the appearance of distancing itself from Israel while
maintaining a straightened relationship. However, its
hesitancy, its apparent rejection of blandishments from Iran,
Libya and other players, and its rhetorical back and forth
with the opposition lead us to believe that the junta is well
aware of the serious consequences of an actual break in
diplomatic relations. The formal break is indeed a card that
the junta may wish to play at some point. However,
indications until now have been that it will not do so
without a pretext or an action that will allow it to gain an
advantage either from international partners (it already has
anti-sanction support from the Arab League) or against its
domestic opponents.


6. (C/NF) Intervention at this point may be the pretext the
junta desires/needs to make its final break. Using a USG
reminder as the focus of its rupture would burnish the
junta's "eastern" credentials with a number of Muslim states.
Having identified the United States as the most adamant of
its international critics, the junta would also be tempted to
use such an intervention to undermine our democratic
credentials with the Abdallahi administration, the FNDD, and
other parties with whom we have worked throughout the past
six months. There are those, evidenced, in a recent article
in a minor local newspaper "Points Chauds" who choose to see
the sanctions question and the internationalization of the
Mauritanian crisis as (in the words of the paper's headline)
"the Jewish lobby against the Arab pressure group, who will
have the last word?" We would therefore recommend that the
request outlined in Ref A be reconsidered.


7. (C/NF) Comment: In our conversations with the Israeli
Ambassador we sense that the GOI does not realize that the
full spectrum of political opinion in Mauritania, junta,
anti-junta, and opportunistic, is opposed to continuing
relations with Israel. The sole factor that has kept the
junta from a full breach is its understanding that such a
move would make its relations with the United States and the
west that much more difficult. This is understood as well by
the opposition parties which, while goading the junta to take
action, do not make such a break a sine qua non in their own
position papers. In our view, the Israelis could garner
possible good will in the future were they to follow the
Mauritanian lead and depart quietly and unofficially to
return just as quietly when conditions here and in the Middle
East improve. There is, of course, the danger that this
would be another pretext for a formal break but there is also
the possibility that the junta and/or any follow-on
administration would consider such discretion as a positive
factor in the future. End Comment.


HANKINS