LIBYAN DELEGATION ACCOMPLISHES LITTLE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NOUAKCHOTT 000137

SIPDIS

SECSTATE FOR AF/W - HEFLIN/DENNISON; PARIS FOR KANEDA;
ADDIS FOR USAU - MAYBURY

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/16/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL MR
SUBJECT: LIBYAN DELEGATION ACCOMPLISHES LITTLE

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Classified By: Charge d'Affaires a.i. Cornelius C. Walsh for reasons 1.
4 (b) and (d).


1. (SBU) A Libyan delegation led by Ravi Al-Madani, a
special envoy of Muammar Qadhafi, arrived in Mauritania
February 11. The ostensible purpose of the visit was to
encourage all sides to find a consensual solution to the
crisis and spare the country from further international
sanctions and isolation, something Libya has had much
experience with. The delegation met with most of the major
players on the Mauritanian political scene: General Aziz,
President Abdallahi, RFD President Ahmed Ould Daddah,
National Assembly President Messaoud Ould Boulkheir, and
other pro-coup and anti-coup figures. (Note: Local press
reports state that former president, and current Colonel, Ely
Mohamed Vall was in Cairo while the delegation was in
Mauritania. End note.) The delegation was supposed to hold
a final press conference February 14 but did not, returning
to Libya instead with no official announQent made.


2. (U) FNDD and President Abdallahi reactions: The FNDD
released a statement after the Libyan delegation visit.
Beyond the usual expressions of friendship and brotherhood
with Libya, President Abdallahi reiterated that he was open
to dialogue for solving the current crisis, buQnly after
the coup failed and the military returned to their barracks.
"Any discussions held between political parties while under
the reign of the military would legitimize the coup," the
statement finished.


3. (C) President Abdallahi's Chief of Staff: Charge a.i.
met with Abdallahi's Chief of Staff Ahmed Kaber Ould
Hammoudi. Hammoudi noted that the Libyans did not appear to
have done their homework and were unaware of the issues
involved and the positions held by various parties. He also
mentioned that he thought the Libyans were baffled by the
concept of "legitimacy." The foundation of President
Abdahllahi's position is that as an elected head of state
removed by force, he is the legal head of state of the
Islamic Republic, and it rests with the High State Council to
remove itself from office and return the country to a
constitutional process. This reasoning process appeared, to
Hammoudi's view, to be beyond Libyan understanding. While
acceding the President's position, they continually probed
for some "give" in his claim to legitimacy.


4. (C) RFD response: Daddah cut short his own trip around
Africa that he was taking and rushed back to Mauritania to
meet with the Libyans. (Note: The Libyan visit appears to
have taken people completely by surprise. Contacts in both
the RFD and FNDD stated that there was no advance notice
given of the Libyans' arrival. End note.) PolAsst met with
RFD Vice President Dr. Hamedou Baba Kane February 16. Kane
did not provide details of what was said directly between
Daddah and the Libyans. However, Kane did say that the
Libyans arrived with three main points to deliver: share
their own bad experiences of sanctions and embargoes, stress
the necessity of open dialogue, and offer themselves as
mediators to resolve the crisis. Furthermore, Kane said it
was probable that the Libyans would launch a formal
initiative to solve the crisis in the near future, perhaps on
February 20. (Note: This date coincides with the February
20 EU deadline. End note.) PolAsst asked Kane if he was
optimistic about the Libyan proposal's chances, given the
lengthy trail of "initiatives" already put forth by various
actors. Kane paused for several seconds, then offered a
tentative "yes." He said the FNDD may come around to the
Libyan proposal, given the "divisions" he saw beginning to
emerge within the Front, particularly within the APP party.
(Note: APP is an amalgam of Haratine and Nasserist political
currents. The Nasserist wing in the party is rumored to have
pro-Libyan tendencies. Also, the APP is scheduled to take
over the rotating FNDD presidency in March. End note.)


5. (C) Comment: The real reasons for the sudden Libyan

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visit are unclear. Given that most of the participants were
unaware of the visit until the last moment, it does not
appear to have been a well-planned affair. According to some
conspiracy theorists (particularly in the FNDD),the whole
event may have been cooked up by Qadhafi and Aziz to give the
appearance of consultation and dialogue, particularly ahead
of the February 20 EU deadline. However, state-run media did
not cover the visit at all -- presumably Aziz would have
wanted to milk coverage for all it was worth if this were an
attempt to show the international community the regime's
willingness for dialogue. Likewise, Qadhafi may be eager to
notch a diplomatic success as he begins his term as AU
president. Whatever the ulterior motives for the visit were,
it accomplished little aside from vague statements from
participants that they were willing to talk. Given Aziz's
and Abdallahi's entrenched positions though, even this seems
unlikely to happen anytime soon. Kane's lukewarm endorsement
of the Libyans only reinforces an apparent lack of enthusiasm
among the interested parties. LES confirm that many
Mauritanians do not regard the Libyans as trustworthy
mediators, given past history of Libyan "assistance" to
Mauritania that came with many strings attached. End comment.

HANKINS