MAURITANIA: SIX MONTHS AFTER THE COUP

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 NOUAKCHOTT 000128

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/11/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM ECON EAID MR
SUBJECT: MAURITANIA: SIX MONTHS AFTER THE COUP

REF: A. 08 NOUAKCHOTT 777

B. NOUAKCHOTT 31

C. NOUAKCHOTT 93

D. ADDIS ABABA 332

E. 08 NOUAKCHOTT 709

F. 08 NOUAKCHOTT 599

G. 08 NOUAKCHOTT 480

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Dennis Hankins for reasons 1.4 (b) and
(d).


1. (C) Summary: Six months after the coup, the Country
Team, senior LES, and external contacts are virtually
unanimous in their opinion that Mauritania is in the midst of
an unprecedented crisis. Political uncertainty and deadlock
continue and the economy steadily worsens. The economic and
social prospects for the short-term future over the next six
months look grim; however, this adds to the emerging (but not
yet dominant),political trendline against the coup. A
negative European Union decision against the coup would have
a galvanizing effect in building pressure against General
Aziz as would the imposition of our own targeted financial
sanctions. Coordinated diplomatic action is needed to ensure
that the electoral plan announced by the military does not
receive international support and recognition. Mission
believes it appropriate to consider seeking Congressional
waivers to allow us to re-engage on substantially
restructures TSCTP anti-extremism programs as well as new
democratization programs to support Mauritania's tenacious
anti-coup forces. End summary.

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The Current Situation
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2. (C) Political: General Aziz continues to display the
trademarks of an evolving dictator. Arbitrary arrests,
suppression of public demonstrations, political witch hunts
(the arrest of Prime Minister Yahya Ould Ahmed El Waghef on
corruption charges being a prime example),indiscriminate use
of public funds to support the coup and buy off supporters,
and a campaign of tribal score-settling (particularly against
the Idawaali tribe, which was close to President Abdallahi)
have all served to centralize power while generating enemies.
The recent promotion of two new generals has further enabled
Aziz to close ranks at the top echelons of the military and
security services, though discord in the lower ranks may be
on the rise (Ref A). The regime's much-hyped "National
Dialogue on Democracy," to no one's surprise, was largely a
rubber-stamp affair (Ref B),but it did lead to two major
developments. First, the ever-prevaricating Ahmed Ould
Daddah and his RFD party withdrew from the "dialogue" and
took a stronger anti-junta stance (though stopping short of
aligning with the anti-coup FNDD). Second, the "dialogue"
led to an announcement of presidential elections to be held
June 6. However, it seems unlikely that the regime has
enough time or money to organize them into any credible
process. (Note: Given Qatar's continued assistance since
the coup, it may be a potential donor to election funding.
Iran, also, has hinted it may fund elections. End note.)


3. (C) President Abdallahi's thwarted return to Nouakchott
January 22 by the junta (Ref C) was further proof that he is
still restricted, despite the junta's claim that he has been
released "unconditionally." This was, in effect, a political
gift to the President who told Charge February 10 that the
incident substantially strengthened his diplomatic case
abroad. The FNDD appears to have a wait-and-see policy,
preferring to let Aziz dig his own grave. The African Union
imposed targeted sanctions February 6 on members of the High
State Council and their civilian supporters (Ref D).
Meanwhile, the Francophonie Organization, AU, EU, UN, Islamic
Conference, and Arab League are scheduled to hold a
consultative meeting in Paris February 20. These negative
international actions have previous coup-supporters
questioning whether Aziz can "deliver" and have sparked a
spate of discussion on possible counter-coup scenarios.


4. (C) Economic: The economic situation is precarious. The
regime has overspent in an attempt to generate popular

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support (Ref E). This, combined with donor cuts and the
worldwide price drops in iron, copper, and other exports, has
led to a sharp decrease in the state reserves. Likewise, the
fishing industry in Mauritania, a pillar of the economy, is
in dire straits because of appalling decisions by the junta
(Ref F). There are shortages of hard currency, and the
ouguiya has lost value. Prices that the junta had
artificially lowered on fuel, food, and other items shortly
after the coup have begun to creep back up while the supply
of these artificially discounted products has dwindled (since
the regime placed the cost of price cuts on suppliers).
Foreign direct investment has plummeted. Additionally, a
senior LES reports that governmental salaries were not paid
to some employees in at least two ministries in January. The
regime still has the support of wealthy businessmen and
financial backers who may be able to forestall major funding
shortfalls in the near-term. However, the continuing
economic crisis and threat of expanded sanctions are raising
anxieties within the business community, and there are signs
that some financial backers of the junta may be wavering.

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Predictions for the Next Six Months
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5. (C) Political: Assuming there is no counter-coup nor
assassination of Aziz (both regarded as possible, but only
medium probability outcomes),Country Team believes Aziz will
resign from the army, stand as a presidential candidate, and
most likely, win the elections. (Note: Aziz supposedly
declared to his ministers after a meeting February 5 that he
will run, but there has been no official announcement yet.
End note.) The regime will attempt to legitimize the
elections by encouraging additional candidates (who have no
real hope of winning) to run. For example, Ibrahim Sarr,
president of the AJD-MR party and coup supporter, has already
announced that he will run for president. Among the big
players, RFD President Ahmed Ould Daddah has not yet stated
his intentions regarding elections. Opinion at Post is split
-- some say Daddah will run, because this is his last
realistic chance of becoming president, something he
desperately craves. Others say Daddah will not run, because
he knows any election with candidates from the military will
be flawed. APP President and fierce coup opponent Messaoud
Ould Boulkheir will not run, barring a completely unexpected
turnaround by the FNDD. Former President (and current
Colonel) Ely Mohamed Vall remains the wildcard -- he has been
very quiet, though he has not excluded the possibility of
running for president (Ref G). However, many think that he
will not run if the elections are viewed by the international
community as illegitimate, and that he will never run as long
as Aziz stands as a candidate.


6. (C) The repercussions of an Aziz "presidency" would be
far-reaching. Sanctions could drive Aziz to turn his back on
the West and look eastward. Qatar, Iran, Libya, and China
are frequently mentioned as countries that would have few
qualms dealing with an authoritarian regime. Libya and Iran,
in particular, may dangle desperately needed economic
assistance in front of Aziz in return for severing relations
with Israel (and more broadly, for distancing Mauritania from
the West). The junta has already signaled a willingness to
cozy up to Iran, having recently held meetings with President
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, Vice President Mohamed Ridha Rahimiand
Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki. As for Aziz, given his
rumored lack of intelligence and reputed cruelty, many
external contacts and LES state that an Aziz "presidency"
would be worse than President Taya's dictatorship. With some
in the political class now openly warning of a counter-coup
or civil war if Aziz succeeds in clinging to power,
Mauritania's long-term prospects are anything but bright.
Political desperation may open the door even further to
narcotics traffickers who already are reported to have
increased operations transiting Mauritania with the
involvement of certain regime authorities.


7. (C) Economic: The economic situation will continue to
deteriorate. With foreign assistance cut off and foreign
direct investment sharply reduced, the junta's budgetary
problems will increase. If the regime continues to have

NOUAKCHOTT 00000128 003 OF 004


problems paying civil servants' salaries, popular discontent
will spread, perhaps leading to increased repression by Aziz
in a bid to maintain order. The junta may try to forestall
this by raiding SNIM's coffers and other government holdings,
but that would only provide a temporary respite. Likewise,
if the public becomes aware of the full scope of the regime's
budgetary problems, the situation may become very volatile.
Country Team believes that with current government spending
levels, and barring a fresh infusion of outside financial
assistance, the regime will run out of money sometime within
the next six months. This will spark significant public
discontent and may spark a major urban food crisis as there
will be no hard currency available to purchase food and other
essential imports.

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What to do?
--------------


8. (C) In light of the current situation in Mauritania,
Country Team recommends the following courses of action:

-- Make it widely known that elections as currently proposed
by the junta are not acceptable to the international
community and work with partners (EU, AU, UN, Arab League) to
ensure no support is given to this fatally flawed process..
The junta hopes that elections will solve everything: create
a clean slate, and make everything good with the
international community. The regime, political class, and
public need to be made aware that this is not the democratic
transition of 2005-2007 all over again.

-- Highlighting the regime's budgetary woes may be another
way to apply pressure. Appealing to the patriotic national
interests of the regime's financial backers (i.e., "do what's
good for Mauritania") would probably have little effect.
However, appealing to their personal economic interests may
convince junta supporters that continued support for the
regime is not in their own best interests. Particularly if
they face personal financial, travel, and trade sanctions.

-- Expand targeted sanctions. Focused sanctions on the
regime and its supporters (both civilian and military) should
be applied as soon as possible. These sanctions may have
enough psychological effect push Aziz's supporters past the
tipping point and force his ouster. The AU has done its part
by imposing sanctions and transferring Mauritania's dossier
to the UN for deliberation. For sanctions to be maximally
effective however, the Europeans must follow the AU's lead.
Sanctions on the part of the USG, while having little
practical effect due to the limited economic ties between the
two countries, carry significant psychological and political
effect. Effective sanctions on the part of the AU and EU
would have much greater bite -- hitting the junta where it
hurts.

-- Re-engage where needed: While Mauritania passes through
this most difficult of political times, it is also set by a
real and increasing terrorist and radical threat. We should
continue to engage in information exchange and provide
practical support to the regime when it can have an immediate
effect against credible and actionable threats.
Anti-extremism remains the larger long term security threat
and we should would recommend Washington consider seeking
Congressional waivers to allow USAID and State PD to
re-engage in TSCTP anti-extremism activities that would work
with civil society and local communities rather than with
central-government authorities. In the same vein, we would
seek funding and waivers for democratization funding that
would allow us to provide practical assistance to political
parties, local governments, media and civil society entities
that continue to struggle against the military regime.

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CHARGE COMMENT
--------------


9. (C) Six months ago, we assumed the coup would be resolved
by now -- either the putsch would have fizzled or it would
have undisputed control that might have forced a "pragmatic"

NOUAKCHOTT 00000128 004 OF 004


acceptance on our part. Neither has happened. The General
has yet to legitimize his position in the face of concerted
international condemnation and dogged internal resistance.
Having a viable democratic alternative to the regime requires
a continuation of much of our same policies to date. The six
months since the coup have been like tracking the stock
market with some weeks seeming to show encouraging signs
followed by sudden dips. Our senior staff and many
Mauritanian contacts (pro-coup, anti-coup, and indifferent)
are signaling major discomfort within the regime and giving
30 to 40% odds that Aziz will not be around in six months.
Mauritanians speak of three ouster scenarios; (a) a typical
"palace coup" wherein Aziz's closest military, political,
financial and tribal supporters will show him the door for
exile abroad; (b) a "good" counter-coup led by the likes of
General Ghazwani that will force Aziz out with the risk of
limited and contained violence; and, (c) a "bad" counter-coup
led by the likes of General Hady that would involve bloodshed
and establish a straight-forward military dictatorship.
Nobody sees the likelihood that Aziz will step down if not
coerced. FNDD types cite the odds of a "bad" counter-coup as
remote but show a willingness to run the risk of a "good"
counter-coup even if it involves a bit of bloodshed. We, of
course, should be working towards steering events towards
Option A for an arrangement that does not involve arms.
While we are not there yet, we need to be prepared for
Mauritania's tipping point when things will happen quickly.
We are by far the best placed external actor to influence the
President and the FNDD if a truly democratic opportunity
presents itself whereas we have very limited influence on the
regime (that remains the domain of the French).


10. (C) Despite all the talk of possible counter-coups, the
60 - 70% odds remain on more of the same. Nothing in Aziz'
performance to date offers hope his regime might evolve into
something good. While our European brethren often fall back
on the argument that we have to be "pragmatic" and look at
stability over elusive democracy, an Aziz government over a
five year or longer period would almost certainly result in
increased narcotics penetration, greater corruption,
increased hunger, worsening human rights, greater
radicalization and a population more open to terrorist
advances.
HANKINS