MAURITANIA: NEEDS ASSESSMENT FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT

UNCLAS NOUAKCHOTT 000127


DEPARTMENT FOR AF/RSA CHRISTOPHER POMMERER, INL/AAE AARON
ALTON, AND DS/T/ATA TONY GONZALEZ

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV SOCI KCRM ASEC XW XY XI
SUBJECT: MAURITANIA: NEEDS ASSESSMENT FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT
AND JUDICIAL TRAINING

REF: STATE 05448



1. (SBU) Post Coup Caveats: This is a response to REFTEL
request for information. Our response reflects activities we
believe would be useful if political conditions -- i.e. the
return of democratic governance -- will allow. In the
Post-Coup environment, our engagement must be very limited
and limited to narrowly focused CT efforts with immediate
impact and/or essential Mauritanian participation in regional
CT efforts (i.e. situations where the lack of Mauritanian
participation would negate the effectiveness of the regional
initiative).


2. (U) Internal and Regional Challenges: The primary
challenge to regional security is the continued presence of
Al Qaida in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) forces,
within Mauritania itself. Mauritania's border with Mali, an
acknowledged safehaven for AQIM, is extremely porous. The
border's remoteness and size, approximately 1,000 miles in
length, has historically allowed AQIM forces to travel into
Mauritania, conduct operations, and retreat into the relative
safety of Mali, all before an appropriate response from
Mauritanian security forces can be assembled.


3. (U) While Mauritania does have its share of drug-related
arrests involving large shipments of narcotics, Mauritania
itself has no indigenous crop of illicit drugs. However, the
nation, specifically its eastern coastline, serves as a
significant trade route for drug shipments transiting between
Europe and greater West Africa. The deficiencies of
Mauritanian border security programs and agencies must be
addressed by foreign assistance, for there to be any
measurable gains in this area.


4. (U) Non-Military Capabilities: Mauritania's
non-military security agencies all suffer from the same three
issues. Each agency is understaffed, given the current
workload, undertrained and very poorly equipped. The majority
of police officers show no understanding of basic arrest or
interview techniques. The Douanes, a customs force under
Ministry of Finance, is critically understaffed and highly
prone to solicit bribes. The Gendarmerie Nationale, perhaps
the most professional security force within the country, is
composed of only around 1500 personnel. When one considers
that Gendarme fill the role of a coast guard, border patrol,
and provide law enforcement for Mauritania's vast, rural
areas, their shortage of manpower becomes apparent. That
being said, Mauritanian security forces have shown an ability
to apply the most basic principles of investigation, when
confronted with urgent issues, such as the presence of known
terrorists in major cities. In the past year dozens of
terrorism-related arrests have been conducted by members of
the Gendarmerie. Additionally, the instructors of prior
training courses provided to security forces have all noted
the near-universal appreciation and enthusiasm for such
classes from their students. The most common issues faced by
security forces are:

-- A shortage of vehicles: This is particularly apparent in
the Gendarmerie's modest fleet of light pickups, used for
border and rural security patrols. Although Gendarme vehicles
are typically well-maintained, in comparison with the other
security services, the small numbers make frequent patrols of
outlying areas a significant challenge. Border security
assets display a complete lack of sophisticated electronic
monitoring systems, such as seismic sensors, or surveillance
aircraft. This makes the mounted patrolling of border zones
of critical importance.

-- Lack of easily-acquired force multipliers, such as night
vision scopes, radios, and GPS units: Police officers are
rarely seen to carry radios, and there is currently no
national radio system for official use. Currently, separate
non-military and military forces maintain their own networks
with widely varying manufacturers and models of equipment.

-- Low standards of professionalism: Apparent, to some
extent, in all of the non-military security services, this
lack of professionalism has several root causes. The
Mauritanian populace often regard members of uniformed
services with a mix of disdain and dismissiveness. Rank and
file police officers are frequently ignored when attempting
to enforce more common laws, such as traffic regulations.
Their ready willingness to accept, and even solicit, bribes
contributes heavily to this impression. However, it is
apparent that the low pay inherent in these jobs, as well as
the frustration stemming from being given a difficult job to
do, with none of the tools to do it properly, significantly
erodes the esprit de corps of new members of the security
services, and all but eliminates the professionalism of many
veteran members.



5. (U) Specific Training Requirements

-- Police: Mauritanian police officers universally need
basic training in investigative process, evidence handling,
arrest techniques, defensive techniques, and customer service.

-- National Guard: The National Guard requires significant
training in basic marksmanship, as well as physical security
features, to assist in their role as a peacetime
infrastructure protection force. National Guard officers
require instruction in the areas critical to managing a
facility security program, such as establishing access
control policies, site surveys, developing emergency response
procedures and managing and conducting response drills.

-- Gendarmerie: Gendarmes require training in effective
border patrol techniques, such as grid searches and mounted
tracking, as well as advanced field interview techniques. Due
to their role as a front-line counter-terrorism force,
tactical marksmanship skills and off-road emergency response
driving are also a high priority

-- BASEP (Presidential Security Battalion): As the events
of the August 6th Coup prove, BASEP is effectively a pawn of
the military junta. Any democratically-elected leader
following this period will have an immediate need for a
reliable, adaptable, non-military protection unit. This unit
will vary in size and require training in a full array of
executive protection skills; site advances, protective
formation, motorcade operations, etc.


6. (U) Host Country Willingness to Accept Assistance:
Although Post currently maintains a policy of limited, direct
engagement with host country, we still enjoy excellent
relations with security forces. The military junta has made
it clear that it welcomes United States assistance in these
areas, as has deposed President Abdallahi. Past assistance,
provided prior to the August 6th Coup, showed an excellent
response from both senior level members of security forces,
as well as rank and file officers.


7. (U) Other Efforts by International Partners: Although
Post has not partnered with foreign governments in the past,
when providing this sort of assistance, several other nations
have provided training and equipment. France, notably, has
fully re-engaged Mauritania with regard to counter-terrorism
assistance within the past month.


8. (U) Regional Training Centers: Currently, their are no
regional training centers, operated either by the United
States or a foreign government, within Mauritania. However,
in the past, Mauritanian security officers were frequently
the recipients of such training in neighboring countries, as
well as the United States. Post has identified several
existing facilities, such as the National Police Academy
(ENP),that could, with adequate support, be built into such
a center, serving all Mauritanian, non-military security
services, as well as those of other nations.


9. (U) Embassy Contacts: Events set in motion by the
military junta following the August 6th Coup have seen almost
all of American Embassy Nouakchott's higher level contacts
reassigned to less operational roles in the nation's security
services. Although Post still enjoys excellent relations with
host country security forces, any new initiatives, put
forward while the military junta retains power, would have to
be very carefully tailored to the political realities of
post-coup Mauritania.


HANKINS