IN LEMDEN, ABDALLAHI SEES THE TIDE TURNING

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 NOUAKCHOTT 000126

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/11/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM MR
SUBJECT: IN LEMDEN, ABDALLAHI SEES THE TIDE TURNING

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Dennis Hankins for reasons 1.4 (b) and
(d).


1. Summary: President Abdallahi is more determined than
ever to oppose the coup and sees political and economic
trends going in his favor. He has been approached by Aziz'
own Ouled Bisbaa tribe business leaders about resigning but
rejects any negotiations with the military and hopes to
return to power, but not necessarily to organize early
elections. He does not think the coup was a tribal affair
but believes it has now turned into one because the Ouled
Bisbaa are determined to tighten their grip through General
Aziz or, possibly, through Colonel Vall. The president is
convinced Ahmed Ould Daddah will side with the military if
Aziz decides not to run for President. From his exile in
Lemden, the president is coordinating FNDD outreach to the EU
in preparation for the February 21 deadline, and the UN
Security Council. He is worried about the upcoming Libyan
presidency of the Security Council and wants the US to raise
awareness about Mauritania among Security Council members.
End summary.

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Ouled Bisbaa Visitors: The Truth
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2. (C) In a meeting February 10 with Charge d'Affaires and
PolOff in Lemden, President Abdallahi denied rumors that
Mohamed Ould Bouamatou and Azizi El Mamay -- powerful Ouled
Bisbaa businessmen and members of his wife's family -- were
visiting to negotiate a solution to the crisis. Instead, the
president said, they were probing his willingness to step
down "for his country's sake." President Abdallahi knows
General Aziz was aware of the visits but is not certain
whether their initiative was personal or part of a concerted
plan. The president was appalled by their boldness and
declared he will do everything in his power to thwart the
coup. The president spoke primarily of the visit of junta
financier Mohamed Hmayenne Bouamatou who had essentially
beaten around the bush until 3:00 in the morning without
putting something concrete on the table from either himself
or on Aziz' behalf aside from vague references about how all
could be resolved if Abdallahi resigned. Abdallahi told
Bouamatou, "you (the tribe) launched a coup against me,
locked me away for months and denigrated my reputation. It
seems far fetched to expect me to stand down to help you."
Bouamatou responded, "I would react the same way if I were
you, but I'm not you."

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The Coup: Not a Tribal Affair
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3. (C) Charge asked whether the coup was motivated by Ouled
Bisbaa tribal interests as some in the FNDD feel Aziz is
actually working on behalf of Aziz or at least as part of a
tag-team where whoever has the better position gets to run
the country. President Abdallahi insisted the coup was not
tribal. He stressed the coup happened because Aziz and the
parliamentary majority realized he was not "the man they
needed," as he refused to encourage clientelism and remained
open to all political actors.


4. (C) For President Abdallahi, tribal allegiances started
playing after the coup. Before the coup, General Aziz
mobilized his cousins to co-opt elected officials and spread
rumors against Abdallahi's wife, but full-fledged Ouled
Bisbaa involvement came later, when the tribe closed ranks
around and strengthened Aziz. To this end, Ouled Bisbaa
targeted Ould Taya's Smasside group and the Idaballi.
Rivalries between them existed before but have been
exacerbated by the coup. Comment: Political LES believe
that even though the coup was not a tribal affair, it has now
become one and current tensions could devolve into actual
conflict. Other tribes feel threatened and displaced by
Ouled Bisbaa who are reported to have frequent meetings of
tribal leaders to determine how to protect/advance their
interests. A counter-coup, particularly one that would
physically harm Aziz, could spark a tribal war. End comment.


NOUAKCHOTT 00000126 002 OF 004



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Ouled Bisbaa's Struggle for Unity
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5. (C) President Abdallahi underlined that the rift between
General Aziz and his cousin Colonel Ely Vall has existed
since 2006. The tribe needs to contain it as divisions
threaten Ouled Bisbaa political and financial influence. The
President stated it would be impossible for both to run for
President as that would divide the tribe. If General Aziz
realized he had no political future, he would abstain from
running and would either support Vall or keep quiet, said
President Abdallahi. Nevertheless, according to tribal
logic, it would be impossible for the General to support
anyone else or to openly oppose his cousin.


6. (C) The president thinks Ely Vall is more respected by
the international community than by Mauritanians.
Nevertheless, he could emerge as a solution because he knows
the country well, is respected by the international community
and has resources. Abdallahi said Vall won't run if the
elections are organized by the military. Charge told the
president that Vall overstates the extent of his
international support -- while Vall's shepherding of the
transition process was appreciated, that did not mean he was
seen as an ideal president given his history of corruption
and rumored narcotics ties.


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Ahmed Ould Daddah
--------------


7. (C) In the President's view, unlike Vall, Ahmed Ould
Daddah will run for president in elections organized by the
military if General Aziz decides not to run. Ould Daddah's
problem with President Abdallahi is personal and stems from
Abdallahi's 2007 presidential victory. After the election,
said the president, Ould Daddah's sole intent was to
destabilize Abdallahi's government. As opposed to some FNDD
leaders who see some possibility of rapprochement between the
president and Ould Daddah, Abdallahi did not appear to offer
any hope the two would be able to work together.

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What Abdallahi Wants
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8. (C) President Abdallahi stated that the political class
must force the military to pull back for him to return. The
president heavily qualified the language in his recent
political plan suggesting he would call for early
presidential and legislative elections upon his return to
power. For him, early elections are not a given. He would
only accept early elections if Mauritanians request them
after the military's departure with the base assumption that,
without military manipulation, there is no political crisis
requiring new elections. Abdallahi's position contrasts
somewhat with that of other FNDD leaders who view his return
as a bridge to constitutional order and a short transition to
new elections. Even though support for President Abdallahi
has increased slightly following the military's refusal to
let him enter Nouakchott, most of that support is for him as
the INSTITUTION of the elected president and not for him
personally. Many believe the president's return,
resignation, and early elections are necessary to end the
crisis.


9. (C) President Abdallahi supports sanctions. He believes
targeted sanctions against the military and pro-coup
civilians will erode Aziz's support. He sees the African
Union decision as highly important since the regime thought
they would be able to avoid a negative AU decision. In a
society where many Mauritanians will simply follow power,
Abdallahi sees Aziz' defeat in Addis as undermining the
confidence of those around him that he can deliver the goods.
A negative decision by the European Union would be even more
effective since European sanctions would have more bite than
African or American measures. Abdallahi also reviewed his

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understanding of the increasingly desperate financial
situation that will likely turn public opinion strongly away
from Aziz in coming months. Charge asked whether the
president was worried that Arab states like Libya and Qatar
as well as Iran might fill the gap in exchange for a rupture
of relations with Israel. Concerning Iran, Abdallahi noted
that in a meeting he had held with Ahmedinajad, the Iranian
leader had pushed for stronger bilateral relations but had
not once raised the issue of Mauritanian relations with
Israel. He said, "I don't know about the Iranian practice in
regards to paying for what they want," but discounted the
idea Iran would come in with significant money. As for
Libya, he confirmed that the Leader always raises the
relationship with Israel coupled with offers of money but
discounted the Libyan and all bluster and not much substance.
He assumed Tripoli might advance some money if Aziz cuts
ties, but not enough to offset the cost of losing western
support. Abdallahi was deeply disappointed with the Emir of
Qatar who he had previously seen as a strong supporter of
Mauritanian democracy. Following the divisive Doha Summit of
Gaza, Abdallahi said he had seen increased support for his
position from the Arab League's Amr Musa and recognized the
possible utility of bolstering contacts with Cairo and Riyadh
to toughen up the Arab position on the coup.


10. (C) When asked by Charge whether he sees mediation as a
solution to the crisis, Abdallahi responded he is the
rightful president and will not negotiate with the military
unless to set the terms of their departure. Abdallahi
accepted the Charge's suggestion that if the political
situation reaches a tipping point leading to Aziz' ouster,
fast and effective mediation might be needed to steer the
outcome in the right direction. He confirmed that neither he
nor Aziz are looking for a mediator right now. Comment:
Requests for US mediation by both pro-coup and anti-coup
supporters have increased. Many believe the current blockage
is dangerous and some would like to see the US, viewed as a
disinterested, credible actor, bring opposing parties to the
negotiating table. Another possible mediator would, of
course, be France.

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Abdallahi Requests US Help with EU and UN
--------------


11. (C) The President asked Charge to help the FNDD engage
with EU and Security Council members. The FNDD has increased
contacts with the Czech Republic in preparation for the
February 21 EU deadline. An FNDD emissary went to Morocco,
met with the Czech Ambassador and had the opportunity to let
the Czech talk directly to President Abdallahi. The FNDD
European representative will hold discussions with the Czech
Foreign Minister on February 18. The group feels the US
could help by maintaining pressure on Spain, France and
Germany. Comment: FNDD rotating president Ould Abeidna said
he has been picking up positive signs from the Czech
presidency. He noted the Czechs indicated displeasure with
continued French input on the issue after their presidency
had concluded. End comment.


12. (C) The President expressed concern about the upcoming
Libyan Security Council presidency. He believes the Libyan's
are inconsistent and unpredictable and is worried that many
countries in the Security Council do not understand the
Mauritanian context. Charge suggested that it would be a
good strategy to ask African members like Burkina Faso and
Uganda to organize an informal Security Council briefing when
his representatives go to New York as members like China and
Russia could react negatively at US involvement. Abdallahi
said he was confident Uganda and Burkina Faso would be
supportive. He hoped that the Security Council would discuss
Mauritania in February under the Japanese presidency than in
March when Libya will be in the chair since anything
involving Tripoli is always hard to predict.

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Comment
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13. (C) This was the Charge's third trip to Lemden (previous

NOUAKCHOTT 00000126 004 OF 004


visits on November 13 and December 9) and saw President
Abdallahi perhaps more confident than ever before. He
appeared in good health and did not suffer from the somewhat
detached nostalgia noted in the December visit. Like a
tug-of-war, he sees the flag moving towards his side although
with no illusions he is running away with a victory. There
is no significant change in his position. Indeed, he has
pulled away from what seemed a concession of accepting early
elections should he return. For a government in external
exile, the little village of Lemden shows signs of new
construction. Each visit sees Abdallahi's staff growing.
The first meeting in November was with Abdallahi alone. In
December, he had gained a Chief of Staff. On this trip he
had a Diplomatic Advisor and Spokesperson. He still receives
visitors in the equivalent of a two-room school house, but
the operation is becoming more professionally staffed.
HANKINS