Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09NOUAKCHOTT118
2009-02-09 18:06:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Nouakchott
Cable title:
MAURITANIAN JUNTA PRESSURES ISRAELI AMBASSADOR TO
how-toVZCZCXRO6558 PP RUEHPA RUEHROV DE RUEHNK #0118/01 0401806 ZNY CCCCC ZZH P 091806Z FEB 09 FM AMEMBASSY NOUAKCHOTT TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8102 INFO RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV PRIORITY 0277 RUEHJM/AMCONSUL JERUSALEM PRIORITY 0064 RUEHXK/ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE RUEHZK/ECOWAS COLLECTIVE RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 0436 RUEHMD/AMEMBASSY MADRID 1978 RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 0780 RUEHPG/AMEMBASSY PRAGUE 0053 RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0885 RUEHDS/USMISSION USAU ADDIS ABABA
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NOUAKCHOTT 000118
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/09/2021
TAGS: PGOV PREL IS MR
SUBJECT: MAURITANIAN JUNTA PRESSURES ISRAELI AMBASSADOR TO
LEAVE
REF: A. NOUAKCHOTT 108
B. NOUAKCHOTT 101
C. NOUAKCHOTT 78
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Dennis Hankins for reasons 1.4 (b) and
(d)
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NOUAKCHOTT 000118
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/09/2021
TAGS: PGOV PREL IS MR
SUBJECT: MAURITANIAN JUNTA PRESSURES ISRAELI AMBASSADOR TO
LEAVE
REF: A. NOUAKCHOTT 108
B. NOUAKCHOTT 101
C. NOUAKCHOTT 78
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Dennis Hankins for reasons 1.4 (b) and
(d)
1. (C) Summary: Mauritanian Junta Foreign Minister has
called Israeli Ambassador and strongly suggested it is time
for the Ambassador to leave. After consultations with the
Israeli MFA, the Israeli Ambassador has informed us that if
further pressure applied, he will indeed depart but he "won't
go quietly, nor will we give them this on a platter."
Israeli Ambassador indicated that MFA has been in touch with
Israeli Embassy in Washington. We can only surmise the
Regime is (a) playing more populist politics, (B0 trying to
take further action to secure Arab or Iranian financial
support, and/or (c) signaling the political cost to the U.S.
and Europe if the Europeans follow the AU lead with a tough
stance on February 20. A public and acrimonious departure
will make future return difficult if not impossible. End
Summary.
2. (C) Israeli Ambassador Arbel informed Embassy that he had
been called February 8 by Junta Foreign Minister Mohamedou
and asked what response the Israel planned to the Mauritanian
letter informing the Embassy of the Mauritanian decision to
quote freeze end quote relations and requesting the Embassy
take appropriate measures (REFTEL C). What, the "foreign
minister" asked, measures have the Israelis taken?
Ambassador Arbel replied that since there were no specific
instructions, he had taken a low profile and believed this
was best path to follow.
2. (C) Mohamedou asked if the Israelis were aware of actions
taken by Mauritanian embassy in Tel Aviv (see ref B.).
Ambassador replied only from websites. Mohamedou indicated
that a similar departure from Nouakchott might be
appropriate. Ambassador Arbel, who has not presented his
credentials to the Junta, delayed the "Minister" by citing a
need to consult with his superiors.
3.(C) After consultations with Jerusalem, Ambassador Arbel
indicated to us that Israelis would depart if further
pressure is applied. But, as cited above, not quietly. He
indicated that the Israeli Foreign Ministry would be in touch
with the Department through its Embassy in Washington. Arbel
has not spoken as yet to Mauritanians.
4. (C) Comment The Junta has suffered a major defeat in the
announcement of African Union sanctions last Thursday and the
probable announcement on February 20 of EU sanctions and
likely discussion of the issue at the UN. It needs every
cheap victory it can get and the departure of the Israeli
Ambassador from Nouakchott without a definitive break in
relations is about as cheap as it gets. It is also possible
the Regime, which is increasingly strapped for money, is
being pressured by Arab states or Iran to do more than the
symbolic "freezing" of relations to get funding. Finally,
the Regime, which always considers the continued Mauritanian
relationship with Israel as a dominant U.S. interest in
Mauritania, is likely signally that further sanctions will
come at a political cost.
5. (C) The Israeli Ambassador is understandably unhappy that
this discussion should be brought up even as a real cease
fire in Gaza might be possible and after being the mouse in
the "Foreign Minster's" drawn out cat and mouse game
regarding Israeli relations. His rhetoric may reflect his
frustration (he arrived shortly before the coup and has not
even presented his credentials) and isolation. Charge told
Arbel that it is understandable Israel may want to make a
vocal departure if he is forced to leave; however, actions
that cause a definitive cut will probably be irreversible
since any future democratic government would likely consider
it political suicide to re-establish relations early on.
Mirroring the Mauritanian's relatively quiet withdrawal of
personnel without severing ties leaves the door open for an
equally quiet return
6. (C) The U.S. has little to no leverage with the Junta and
its "Foreign Minister," on this issue There is little we can
NOUAKCHOTT 00000118 002 OF 002
do in increased condemnation of the regime to make them alter
their path and any enticement to soften their position would
severely undermine our pro-democratic credentials.
HANKINS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/09/2021
TAGS: PGOV PREL IS MR
SUBJECT: MAURITANIAN JUNTA PRESSURES ISRAELI AMBASSADOR TO
LEAVE
REF: A. NOUAKCHOTT 108
B. NOUAKCHOTT 101
C. NOUAKCHOTT 78
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Dennis Hankins for reasons 1.4 (b) and
(d)
1. (C) Summary: Mauritanian Junta Foreign Minister has
called Israeli Ambassador and strongly suggested it is time
for the Ambassador to leave. After consultations with the
Israeli MFA, the Israeli Ambassador has informed us that if
further pressure applied, he will indeed depart but he "won't
go quietly, nor will we give them this on a platter."
Israeli Ambassador indicated that MFA has been in touch with
Israeli Embassy in Washington. We can only surmise the
Regime is (a) playing more populist politics, (B0 trying to
take further action to secure Arab or Iranian financial
support, and/or (c) signaling the political cost to the U.S.
and Europe if the Europeans follow the AU lead with a tough
stance on February 20. A public and acrimonious departure
will make future return difficult if not impossible. End
Summary.
2. (C) Israeli Ambassador Arbel informed Embassy that he had
been called February 8 by Junta Foreign Minister Mohamedou
and asked what response the Israel planned to the Mauritanian
letter informing the Embassy of the Mauritanian decision to
quote freeze end quote relations and requesting the Embassy
take appropriate measures (REFTEL C). What, the "foreign
minister" asked, measures have the Israelis taken?
Ambassador Arbel replied that since there were no specific
instructions, he had taken a low profile and believed this
was best path to follow.
2. (C) Mohamedou asked if the Israelis were aware of actions
taken by Mauritanian embassy in Tel Aviv (see ref B.).
Ambassador replied only from websites. Mohamedou indicated
that a similar departure from Nouakchott might be
appropriate. Ambassador Arbel, who has not presented his
credentials to the Junta, delayed the "Minister" by citing a
need to consult with his superiors.
3.(C) After consultations with Jerusalem, Ambassador Arbel
indicated to us that Israelis would depart if further
pressure is applied. But, as cited above, not quietly. He
indicated that the Israeli Foreign Ministry would be in touch
with the Department through its Embassy in Washington. Arbel
has not spoken as yet to Mauritanians.
4. (C) Comment The Junta has suffered a major defeat in the
announcement of African Union sanctions last Thursday and the
probable announcement on February 20 of EU sanctions and
likely discussion of the issue at the UN. It needs every
cheap victory it can get and the departure of the Israeli
Ambassador from Nouakchott without a definitive break in
relations is about as cheap as it gets. It is also possible
the Regime, which is increasingly strapped for money, is
being pressured by Arab states or Iran to do more than the
symbolic "freezing" of relations to get funding. Finally,
the Regime, which always considers the continued Mauritanian
relationship with Israel as a dominant U.S. interest in
Mauritania, is likely signally that further sanctions will
come at a political cost.
5. (C) The Israeli Ambassador is understandably unhappy that
this discussion should be brought up even as a real cease
fire in Gaza might be possible and after being the mouse in
the "Foreign Minster's" drawn out cat and mouse game
regarding Israeli relations. His rhetoric may reflect his
frustration (he arrived shortly before the coup and has not
even presented his credentials) and isolation. Charge told
Arbel that it is understandable Israel may want to make a
vocal departure if he is forced to leave; however, actions
that cause a definitive cut will probably be irreversible
since any future democratic government would likely consider
it political suicide to re-establish relations early on.
Mirroring the Mauritanian's relatively quiet withdrawal of
personnel without severing ties leaves the door open for an
equally quiet return
6. (C) The U.S. has little to no leverage with the Junta and
its "Foreign Minister," on this issue There is little we can
NOUAKCHOTT 00000118 002 OF 002
do in increased condemnation of the regime to make them alter
their path and any enticement to soften their position would
severely undermine our pro-democratic credentials.
HANKINS