Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09NOUAKCHOTT111
2009-02-08 13:26:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Nouakchott
Cable title:  

TAWASSOUL, APP, AND SAWAB POLITICAL PARTIES OFFER

Tags:  PGOV PREL KDEM MR 
pdf how-to read a cable
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PP RUEHPA RUEHTRO
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ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 081326Z FEB 09
FM AMEMBASSY NOUAKCHOTT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8090
INFO RUEHZK/ECOWAS COLLECTIVE
RUCNMGH/MAGHREB COLLECTIVE
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 0430
RUEHMD/AMEMBASSY MADRID 1972
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 0771
RUEHDO/AMEMBASSY DOHA 0370
RUEHRL/AMEMBASSY BERLIN 0450
RHMFISS/HQ USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE
RHMFISS/COMSOCEUR VAIHINGEN GE
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS
RUEHDS/USMISSION USAU ADDIS ABABA
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 0493
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0876
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 NOUAKCHOTT 000111 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/04/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM MR
SUBJECT: TAWASSOUL, APP, AND SAWAB POLITICAL PARTIES OFFER
THEIR VIEWS

REF: A. 08 NOUAKCHOTT 722

B. NOUAKCHOTT 28

C. 08 NOUAKCHOTT 744

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Dennis Hankins for reasons 1.4 (b) and
(d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 NOUAKCHOTT 000111

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/04/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM MR
SUBJECT: TAWASSOUL, APP, AND SAWAB POLITICAL PARTIES OFFER
THEIR VIEWS

REF: A. 08 NOUAKCHOTT 722

B. NOUAKCHOTT 28

C. 08 NOUAKCHOTT 744

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Dennis Hankins for reasons 1.4 (b) and
(d).


1. (C) Summary: Two anti-coup parties and one pro-coup
party gave their reactions to recent events. From the
anti-coup Tawassoul and APP parties, the main themes were
categorical rejection of the "National Dialogue on Democracy"
and upcoming presidential elections, concern about civil war,
and the need for a unified international community and
targeted sanctions. From the pro-coup Sawab party, the main
themes were the errors of President Abdallahi and the need
for a mediator to find a way out of the crisis. End summary.

--------------
Tawassoul: Keeping the Faith
--------------


2. (C) PolAsst met Tawassoul party members in charge of
external relations Dr. Amar Ould Mohamed Najem and Mohamed
Lemine Ould Mohamed Moussa at party headquarters February 1.
Since Embassy's last meeting with the moderate Islamist party
(Ref A),the "National Dialogue on Democracy" took place, a
date was set for presidential elections, and anti-Israel
protests rocked Nouakchott.


3. (C) Regarding the "National Dialogue on Democracy," Najem
characterized it as a "farce." It wasn't really a
consultation, he argued; the proof being that RFD, the only
participating political party with any credibility, withdrew
from the proceedings. Najem and Moussa also discounted the
presidential elections scheduled for June 6, saying "we
reject them completely." Moussa said General Aziz is worse
than President Taya, because while Taya was repressive, he
was at least intelligent. Aziz is repressive, but also lacks
intelligence, Moussa said. Unprompted, Najem and Moussa
mentioned eventual civil war as a possibility if Aziz
persisted in clinging to power.


4. (C) The discussion turned to the recent anti-Israel
protests and the Minister of Interior's threat to bring
formal charges against political leaders who organized the
marches (Ref B),a move widely interpreted as a threat
against Tawassoul. Najem said, "We are not concerned." When
asked about the possibility of the regime banning the

Tawassoul party altogether, Najem and Moussa still were not
troubled. They had endured torture and imprisonment under
Taya, they said -- "we don't fear the authorities." PolAsst
posed a hypothetical scenario: What if the junta offered to
sever relations with Israel in exchange for the FNDD and
Tawassoul supporting the regime? "Never," Najem stated.
"Democracy is first."

--------------
APP: Targeted Sanctions are the Key
--------------


5. (C) PolAsst met Vice President Oumar Ould Yali, Secretary
General Ladisi Traore, Vice Secretary General Mohamed Vall
Ould Malmudy, and Executive Office member Ahmed Abdallahi at
APP party headquarters February 1. APP, the party of
National Assembly President Messaoud Ould Boulkheir, is
strongly anti-coup.


6. (C) Yali thanked the USG for its firm commitment to the
anti-coup cause in Mauritania, noting that some other
countries, particularly European, did not appear to show the
same enthusiasm for restoring democracy. The heads of state
of some countries say one thing, while their ambassadors in
Mauritania say something different, Yali noted. Comment:
Although Yali did not name any names, he was almost certainly
referring to France and Germany, both prime examples of the
inconsistent statements between the head of state and
respective ambassador. End comment.


7. (C) Yali maintained that there had been many efforts

NOUAKCHOTT 00000111 002 OF 003


(citing Boulkheir's proposal) to solve the "unprecedented
impasse in our history," but the junta remained obstinate in
face of all of this. Mentioning recent attempts by pro-coup
parliamentarians to depose Boulkheir (Ref C),Yali said this
would be a disaster. Boulkheir's dismissal would marginalize
the Haratines, and provide the spark for ethnic violence.
Stating that the junta "has created a mess of things," Yali
expressed a deep concern that civil war could break out and
lead to a situation reminiscent of Somalia.


8. (C) Yali echoed the sentiments of others in the FNDD,
calling for targeted sanctions against the junta and its
supporters. "This is the key," he said. If Mohamed Hmayenne
Bouamatou and other financial backers of the junta are hit
where their interests lie, support for Aziz will crumble, the
reasoning goes.

--------------
Sawab: Can't We All Just Get Along?
--------------


9. (C) PolAsst met Sawab Vice President Dr. Mohamed El
Moctar Ould Melil at party headquarters February 2. Sawab
("The Right Way" in Arabic) is an Arab nationalist and
Baathist party. Baathism enjoyed widespread influence in the
mid to late 1980's under Taya, but its influence has waned
greatly since then. Nevertheless, Sawab remains active among
the Arab elite. The party has adopted a pro-coup stance,
though not an extreme one.


10. (C) Frequently digressing into long-winded Arab
nationalist diatribes, Melil's position boiled down to a need
to "solidify the rules of democracy" and find a mediator who
could lead Mauritania out of its present crisis. There are
two camps in the political scene diametrically opposed to
each other, Melil stated, preventing any hope of arriving at
a "consensus solution." Melil was dismissive of President
Abdallahi, asserting that "he wasn't able to govern a
democracy," turned his back on his own supporters, and was a
major cause of the present crisis.


11. (C) PolAsst asked about the recent initiative put forth
by the Bedil ("Alternative" in Arabic) party. (Note: Bedil
invited 16 political parties to a meeting January 28 with the
objective of "opening dialogue" to find a solution to the
crisis. Sawab participated in the meeting. End note.)
Melil stated that his party attended because there must be
"another option" to end the crisis, and emphasized again the
need for a mediator. As for the mechanics of the initiative,
Bedil had only invited political parties that met certain
criteria, Melil said. For example, the parties had to be
represented in Parliament, or have received at least 1% of
the vote in the last elections, and so on. These criteria
narrowed the field down to 16 political parties, and it was
these parties that Bedil invited to its meeting. When
PolAsst noted that all of the attending parties were in the
pro-coup camp, Melil said that the RFD turned down the
invitation because it was "preoccupied with its own internal
problems" and was waiting to arrive at a unified position.
The FNDD declined, he said, because invitations were sent to
individual parties -- they wanted an invitation sent to the
FNDD as a whole. Comment: The FNDD was probably wary of
possible attempts by coup supporters to create divisions in
its ranks. Bedil's efforts to take the lead in resolving the
crisis are likely to remain unproductive if they cannot
secure the participation of anti-coup forces. End comment.

--------------
Comment
--------------


12. (C) Tawassoul and APP show no signs of yielding from
their firm anti-coup position, and remain committed to
defeating the junta. Their readiness to raise the
possibility of civil war is a new development; previous
discussions assumed a peaceful resolution to the crisis.
Members of both APP and Tawassoul now seem to regard a
violent outcome as increasingly likely. As for the pro-coup
Sawab party, beyond the usual criticisms of Abdallahi, their

NOUAKCHOTT 00000111 003 OF 003


call for a mediator to resolve the crisis is interesting. It
may signal a softening of pro-coup sentiment among some
members of the political class as they hedge their bets in
light of the turbulent political scene. Likewise, the
realization that the threat of sanctions is real may have
focused people's attention and sparked their desire to find a
way out of the crisis as soon as possible.
HANKINS