REFINING THE FNDD POLITICAL STRATEGY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NOUAKCHOTT 000011

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/06/2013
TAGS: PREL PGOV MR
SUBJECT: REFINING THE FNDD POLITICAL STRATEGY

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Dennis Hankins for Reasons 1.4 (b and
d)


1. (C) Summary: The FNDD will hold back until February or
March to launch a political counter-offensive believing
General Aziz will see himself further isolated both
internationally and domestically. The "National Dialogue on
Democracy" brought nothing substantive to the negotiation
table and was manipulated but did succeed in creating a final
breach between the military and opposition leader Ahmed Ould
Daddah -- who may now work more closely with the FNDD if not
directly with President Abdallahi. The FNDD believes
President Abdallahi can be more useful for the cause outside
of Mauritania than inside. End Summary


2. (C) The Gaza Effect: Charge met January 6 with President
Abdallahi's effective Foreign Minister and FNDD leader
Mohamed Ould Maouloud to discuss current FNDD political
strategy. Ould Maouloud noted that the Gaza crisis had had a
direct impact on the Front. Plans for a highly public return
of President Abdallahi from Lemden on December 31 had been
canceled because national attention was diverted on Gaza and
since a celebration of the President's return would be the
wrong message with the country in protest over Gaza.
Maouloud offered that General Aziz had gained from the crisis
in Gaza by being able to condemn the Israelis to strong
public acclaim. Maouloud noted the junta had made an early
miscalculation by organizing early protests against the
Israelis only to find them getting out of hand as returning
university students took over and escalated the level of
violence. The decision to recall the Mauritanian Ambassador
for consultations had appeased the crowd. Maouloud (who does
not support the relationship) did not believe Aziz would move
quickly to severe relations outright but hold that as a
future bargaining tool -- either to entice political support
at the right moment or to get money out of Libya.


3. (C) Let things stew some more: Maouloud assured the
Charge that the FNDD has a political strategy to get
President Abdallahi back in power but said it was not useful
to make a political counter-offensive until Aziz had been
weakened. The anticipated decision of the African Union in
early February and of the European Union in late January --
as well as the possible referral of Mauritania to the
Security Council -- will further isolate General Aziz. "It
doesn't matter how effective the sanctions are, the mere fact
of international sanctions will have a political and
psychological effect" that Maouloud believes will convince
Aziz' supporters that he will never be able to overcome
international opposition and; therefore, not be able to
deliver anything for his supporters. As that effect sets in,
Maouloud said the FNDD will be ready to launch a political
counter-offensive (although, by way of detail, he offered
only getting some political party defections to the FNDD).


4. (C) The National Dialogue Plays in Our Favor: Maouloud
said the National Dialogue on Democracy had played out as
expected and would bolster the FNDD more than Aziz. He saw
the structure of the Dialogue stacked by the regime by
hand-picked "representatives" from the interior and abroad
who "repeated whatever they were told." The skewed
membership had upset all political parties who had seen
themselves pushed aside. Maouloud alleged that the Dialogue
itself was openly manipulated. By example, he noted that the
first reading of the committee report looking at
constitutional issues had correctly noted that the majority
of the delegates had recommended that no changes be made to
the constitution until a new president is elected and there
is greater political calm. On the first reading of the
report, the Vice President of the Senate Mohamed ElHacen Ould
Elhaj had interjected that the REAL consensus was that
changes had to be done now that would support Aziz' campaign.
ElHacen crowded the room with his supporters forcing the
conclusion to be changed. For Maouloud, the Dialogue showed
Aziz for what he is and will alienate those who might have
been hoping for some option between Aziz and Abdallahi.


5. (C) We can work with Ould Daddah now: Maouloud saw the

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best result of the Dialogue being Ahmed Ould Daddah's new
(and hopefully permanent) rupture with the military.
Maouloud said he had met several times with Ould Daddah prior
to the Dialogue with Ould Daddah making clear he was willing
to test the General's good faith. Ould Daddah said he would
go along with the Dialogue if the military agreed not to
present themselves in early presidential elections but
condemn the Dialogue without that commitment. In the end,
Ould Daddah told Maouloud that Aziz had said unequivocally
that he would run for President leading Ould Daddah to
denounce the process. Maouloud noted that President
Abdallahi "has something personal" against Ould Daddah and
that the dislike seemed mutual. That said, he saw Ould
Daddah as "a common enemy against the military" that he
thought the FNDD would now be able to work with. He expected
that Ould Daddah's RFD party would come apart in coming weeks
but added "we just need him, not his party members."
Maouloud did not believe Ould Daddah would present himself
for the elections being organized by the junta which would
leave Aziz as the only real candidate. The lack of and real
opposition will, Maouloud believes, force the international
community to dismiss the elections as a farce leaving Aziz no
better off after the elections than before.


6. (C) The President Is More Useful Outside Of Mauritania:
Maouloud said the FNDD had proposed to President Abdallahi
that he leave Mauritania for the next several months and is
awaiting his decision. Maouloud noted that under the current
circumstances "every day he stays in Lemden or, later, in
Nouakchott just underlines that he is not in power and makes
him irrelevant." The FNDD believes that outside of
Mauritania, Abdallahi can "act presidential" by meeting with
heads of state and bolstering his image and international
support. Maouloud also added that having Abdallahi back in
Nouakchott will pose insurmountable security issues since the
only security available are forces provided by the regime.
HANKINS