TARGETED SANCTIONS: THE MOST EFFECTIVE WEAPON

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 NOUAKCHOTT 000108

SIPDIS

SECSTATE FOR AF/W - BOULWARE/HEFLIN; PARIS FOR KANEDA; USAU
FOR MAYBURY

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/03/2019
TAGS: KDEM PGOV PREL MR
SUBJECT: TARGETED SANCTIONS: THE MOST EFFECTIVE WEAPON

REF: NOUAKCHOTT 73

Classified By: Classified by Charge d'Affaires Cornelius Walsh for reas
ons 1.4 (b and d)


1. (C) National Front for the Defense of Democracy director,
Mohammed Ould Maouloud, tells us the very thought of targeted
sanctions is taking a toll on the Junta. Anxiety is growing
among businessmen and Junta financiers. As the February 5
AU/PSC and the February 20 EU/AU consultative meetings near,
tensions have risen and faith in Aziz has dropped. As
reported reftel, senior Junta financier, Mohamed Ould
Bouamatou, visited President Abdahllahi on a reconnaissance
mission. The FNDD has received similar visits. The FNDD
believes Aziz supporters will defect if targeted sanctions
are applied. They realize the state is nearly broke, major
investments stalled, donors are pulling back, and the regime
has made appalling economic decisions. Maouloud believes
that the Aziz tribal "mafia", the Ouled Bisbaa, may force
Aziz to defer to Colonel Vall to keep their quarter century
hold on the national economy. Targeted sanctions,
particularly from the EU, frighten them. Keep pressuring
them is the FNDD message. On the political side, the FNDD
reaffirmed its support for the constitutional return of
President Abdallahi. After that, all is negotiable. The FNDD
has not abandoned hope of finding common ground with RFD
leader Ahmed Ould Daddah to transition the country into
civilian dominated elections. End Summary.

--------------
Nobody Will Take a Hit for Aziz
--------------


2. (C) In a February 3 meeting at UFP headquaters, FNDD
leader Ould Maouloud and former Abdahllahi Minister of the
Economy Abderrahmane Ould Hama Vezaz unexpectedly focused on
Mauritania's deteriorating economy, the role of the tribal
Ouled Bisbaa "mafia" in supporting the Junta (and before
that, transition leader Vall, and two decade strongman Taya)
and their worries as money dries up and targeted sanctions by
the AU, EU, and possibly, the UN move closer. According to
Ould Maouloud, Aziz has asked supporters to downplay his
potential candidacy in the Junta's planned June elections to
allay Western and domestic concerns about his remaining in
power. Moreover, influential pro-coup Ouled Bisbaa
businessmen Mohamed Ould Bouamatou and Azizi el Mamay have
contacted President Abdallahi and the FNDD to express their
anxieties about sanctions and probe for some give in the
Presidential and/or FNDD positions.


3. (C) Maouloud discounts European diplomats who have
cautioned him on sanctions. For him and the FNDD, targeted
sanctions and the threat thereof have had and will continue
to have serious psychological, symbolic, and political
impact. Given the opportunistic nature of Mauritanian
politics, Aziz will be progressively isolated if he fails to
establish legitimacy and credibility with the West and the
AU. In his view, Aziz's supporters themselves will "restrain"
the general if sanctions are imposed. The Bouamatou visit to
Abdallahi and the Senate Vice President Mohcen El Hajj's
visit to imprisoned former Prime Minister Waghef were made
against a backdrop of tribal concern that Aziz was
endangering not only their decades long access to the state
trough but the trough itself. If Aziz can't deliver, and the
elite finds its access to travel, trade, and financial
resources cut or limited, something will have to be done.

--------------
The Ouled Bisbaa Mafia
--------------


NOUAKCHOTT 00000108 002 OF 003



4. (C) Ould Maouloud and Ould Hama Vezaz think the coup was
fueled by Ouled Bisbaa's greed. The Ouled Bisbaa has amassed
considerable economic/political influence due to support to
Ould Taya, their role in the 2005 coup d'etat and military
transition, and their influence on recent events through
Aziz. Ould Maouloud and Ould Hama Vezaz outlined Ouled
Bisbaa density in the current administration. Comment:
Indeed, Aziz has peopled the government with cousins and
clients. Post will report on winners and losers in septel.
End Comment.


5. (C) Former Economy Minister Ould Hama Vezaz enumerated
various corruption schemes devised by the Ouled Bisbaa to
monopolize state resources and scoffed at the junta's clumsy
fiscal/monetary policies. He also noted that the
transparency of the regime's anti-corruption campaign,
targeted as it is at coup opponents, is engendering an
atmosphere of fear and contempt.

--------------
Vall and Aziz: One and the Same
--------------


6. (C) Ould Maouloud mentioned a recent Ouled Bisbaa meeting
in which the coterie discussed Aziz's replacement by
Colonel Ely Mohamed Vall. They would hope to use Vall to
keep their grip on power and the money. Vall, who has
Western support and is viewed as the "father of democracy,"
would make a viable presidential candidate. Ould Maouloud,
himself a former presidential candidate, warned "make no
mistakes! Aziz and Vall are one and the same, they serve the
same mafia."


7. (C) Ould Maouloud believes the rivalry between General
Aziz and his cousin Vall is real. General Aziz and Vall are
competing to lead their tribe. According to Ould Maouloud,
Vall has stayed aloof to prosper from Aziz's clumsiness and
maintain an unsullied reputation.

--------------
Toward an End State
--------------


8. (C) Ould Maouloud:

- Reaffirmed the FNDD's absolute dedication to a
constitutionally viable resolution to the impasse with no
role whatsoever for the military. Once the legality of the
elected government is confirmed and the Junta deposed,
everything else is negotiable. (Comment: There's fuzziness
here. Abdallahi is the symbol and personification of the
democratic movement. His return to office is paramount to a
final solution. However, there are constitutional variations
that would/could limit his time and actions once returned to
office. End Comment.)

- Confirmed that RFD leader Ahmed Ould Daddah and the FNDD
are negotiating. They are in agreement that the military
have no role in any political settlement and no role in the
planned elections, particularly not in the current regime-
sponsored voter census and registration program.

- Confirmed that the estrangement between president Abdallahi
and RFD leader Ould Daddah is a real and significant obstacle
to a constitutional settlement but it might be worked out.
(Comment: In an earlier meeting with Ould Daddah, he told CDA
and PolOff that Abdallahi should have no role whatsoever
inasmuch he was not the legal president due to his 2007
pre-election support from the military. There is a chasm to
be negotiated here. End Comment.)


NOUAKCHOTT 00000108 003 OF 003


- Projected post-Addis Ababa FNDD outreach to all political
actors excluding the military.

- Stated that both parties (FNDD and RFD) agree on sanctions.
Indeed, sanctions would frighten many prominent RFD members
who have been co-opted with positions and financial access
back to the democratic fold. Furthermore, both parties
believe that if the AU applies sanctions, the EU and the
international community will follow.

--------------
The United States
--------------


9. (C) As we left, former Minister Vezaz thanked the Embassy
once again for its support and noted the recent letter from
President Obama to President Abdallahi. In the end, he said,
what we are doing here, with your help, transcends our
concerns in Mauritania. What is Maritania? Three million
people and limited economy? If we were to disappear
tomorrow, it'd be hardly noticeable. What we are doing for
Africa with your help (he emphasized) is much larger than us
or our issues here. He seems a rare straightforward person
and perhaps meant this as sincerely as he said it.

WALSH