CYPRUS: TURKISH CYPRIOT LEADER TALAT: "THE SIDES

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NICOSIA 000681

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR EUR/SE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/28/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV UNFICYP TR GR CY
SUBJECT: CYPRUS: TURKISH CYPRIOT LEADER TALAT: "THE SIDES
CANNOT FINALIZE DEAL WITHOUT INTERNATIONAL INVOLVEMENT"

REF: A. NICOSIA 678

B. ALLISON-FITZPATRICK OCTOBER 16 E-MAIL

C. URBANCIC-KAIDANOW OCTOBER 21 E-MAIL

Classified By: Amb. Frank Urbancic for reasons 1.4(b) and 1.4(d)


1. (C) Summary: "The sides cannot finalize a deal without
international involvement," Turkish Cypriot (T/C) leader
Mehmet Ali Talat warned the Ambassador during an October 21
lunch. Although he admitted that progress was possible, Talat
lamented what he dubbed the "acquiescence" of the
international community to the Greek Cypriot (G/C) notion of
a "Cypriot Solution." He wanted upgraded UN involvement to
prevent what he termed G/C "violations" of established UN
parameters and get the sides to "yes." Talat urged the USG to
"encourage" the UN to increase its footprint and lobbied for
the appointment of a US Special Envoy for Cyprus. He said
the rhetoric of G/C leader Demetris Christofias "fluctuated
between good and bad." He said the leaders planned a joint
media strategy to counter increasingly hostile anti-solution
voices on both sides (Reftel A). Regarding the talks
themselves, Talat said the sides were still making
constructive proposals, but that, at present, the "give and
take" phase was still "remote." For his part, the Ambassador
said that the USG had looked long and hard at the possible
appointment of an envoy, but had to consider the possibility
that such a step might do more harm than good by triggering a
G/C backlash and fueling hard-line opposition. He also said
he was in regular contact with UNSYG Special Adviser Downer
and would pass on Talat's desire for a more robust UN role.
End Summary

"The sides cannot finalize a deal without international
involvement"


2. (C) In an oft-heard refrain, Talat complained that,
although progress was possible, "the sides cannot finalize a
deal without international involvement." He said that the
international community had uncritically adopted the G/C
mantra of a "Cypriot Solution", i.e. minimal outside
involvement. He said that a purely "Cypriot Solution" as
envisioned by the Greek Cypriots was "nonsense" and would, in
the end, result in failure.


3. (C) In fact, he charged, the present G/C position on
property and bi-zonality violated the "established UN
framework" and would stymie on-going property talks unless
Greek Cypriots walked back their demand that the original
property owner had the right of first refusal (Note: G/Cs
owned a majority of property in the north pre-1974, i.e in
the area that would form a future T/C constituent state. End
Note) This position, Talat hinted, would lead to majority G/C
property ownership in the future T/C constituent state--a
clear redline for him. To strengthen his point, Talat pointed
to 1992 UNSCR 750 that defined bi-zonality as majority
population/property ownership in the titular constituent
state of a given community. Christofias, he claimed, accepted
the principle of majority population only, but rejected
majority property ownership as evident in his position on
property. (Note: A UN Good Offices' staffer told us on
October 28 that the UN's goal is to get the sides to focus on
creating solutions to the property issue, not debating past
issues over which the sides vehemently disagree. End Note)


4. (C) Talat urged the USG to use its own good offices to
encourage the UN, which until now had behaved "timidly," to
play a more "salient" role and call out the G/Cs on their
"violation" of bi-zonality. Talat also urged the appointment
of a Special US Envoy for Cyprus without clearly defining
what he expected such an individual to do, aside from
"encouraging" the G/Cs. The Ambassador noted that the USG had
considered the appointment of an envoy, but had to weigh the
possibility that it might trigger a G/C backlash and harm the
common goal of achieving a solution. The Ambassador added
that the Embassy enjoyed regular and good contact with the UN
Good Offices Mission and would raise Talat's concerns with
UNSYG SA Alexander Downer.

"Difficult to understand Christofias' repeating controversial
topics"


5. (C) Talat voiced consternation over what he said were
Christofias' often unhelpful press statements, though Talat
admitted that sometimes Christofias' rhetoric was "good." He
said that is was "difficult to understand Christofias'
repeatedly raising controversial topics", such as his
insistence on the post-solution continuation of the RoC and

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the need to put pressure on Turkey. Talat said he avoided
raising hot-button issues in public, like "virgin birth."
Unfortunately, however, this sensitivity was not
reciprocated. Talat said that Christofias had even voiced
public support for Talat against his probable challenger in
2010 "presidential elections", hard-liner Dr. Dervish Eroglu.
Such a tack, he said, was sure to "backfire" given
deep-seated Turkish Cypriot suspicion. Talat shared with the
Ambassador a conspiracy theory in circulation in the north,
with which he did not agree but dubbed "logical." According
to the theory, Christofias is secretly working to undermine
Talat and secure Eroglu's election on the assumption that
Eroglu's hard-line will allow Christofias a blameless exit
strategy. (Note We have heard this sentiment voiced with
conviction by two of Talat's high-ranking supporters and
advisers. End Note). To counter this, Talat said that he
would propose a "common media strategy" to Christofias, but
did not go into further detail.

"Christofias frightened by criticism"


6. (C) Talat said Christofias was "frightened by criticism,"
especially from his coalition partners EDEK and DIKO. He
added that Christofias still believed that Turkey "would
surrender" in the face of EU pressure as advocated by his
partners. Talat hoped, however, that the October 19-20 visit
of Greek Prime Minister George Papandreou might have a
positive effect on Christofias since "Greece was back in the
game" after the defeat of New Democracy, which he felt was
more willing to follow Nicosia's lead (Note: Talat's
Republican Turkish Party (CTP) has excellent relations with
PASOK, which helped CTP obtain observer status in the
Socialist International. End Note). The Ambassador noted that
former RoC President George Vassiliou told him in a recent
meeting that Papandreou had delivered a strong pro-solution
message to Christofias.

"Give and Take Phase still remote"


7. (C) Talat said that the sides were still "making
proposals" and trying to take each other's concerns into
consideration. That said, he warned that the "give and take
phase" was still remote. He said that property and
governance, the present focus of the on-going second round,
were different issues and did not lend themselves to
trade-offs; that would come later when they started to tackle
issues such as territory, which could be coupled with
property.


8. (C) Talat said that they had, for the time being, put the
various proposals on electing the executive made during the
second round "on the shelf." The final G/C proposal (Ref
B),which envisioned weighted, single-ticket cross-voting,
was "rejected in principle" by the T/Cs, but not
"categorically." He said that the G/C proposal met the
requirements of "political equality," but fell short on
"bi-communality" since it allowed Greek Cypriots to have a
say in whom the T/Cs elected. He said that nationalism would
grow on the T/C side post-solution since the Turkish Cypriots
would, at least short-term, suffer property and territorial
displacement. Right-wing parties would then manipulate this
unease to increase their votes. If Greek Cypriots voting in
Turkish Cypriot elections stymied this will by allying with
left-wing T/C parties, he argued, there would be an ugly
backlash.





URBANCIC