CYPRUS: TURKISH CYPRIOT LEADER UPBEAT AFTER START

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 NICOSIA 000595

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR EUR/SE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/16/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV UNFICYP TR CY
SUBJECT: CYPRUS: TURKISH CYPRIOT LEADER UPBEAT AFTER START
OF SECOND ROUND OF UN-BROKERED PEACE TALKS

REF: A. NICOSIA 577

B. PANICO-NETOS SEPTEMBER 3 E-MAIL

C. NICOSIA 576

D. NICOSIA 561

Classified By: Ambassador Frank C. Urbancic for reasons 1.4(b) and 1.4(
d)


1. (C) Summary: In a September 11 meeting with the
Ambassador, Turkish Cypriot (T/C) leader Mehmet Ali Talat
said that the September 10 meeting launching the second round
of UN-brokered talks went "extraordinarily well." He was
nonplussed by Greek Cypriot (G/C) leader Demetris
Christofias' postponement of the original September 3
kick-off date (Ref C) and described his G/C counterpart as
"totally constructive." On electing the federal executive
(the subject matter of the Sept 10 meeting),Talat noted that
the Turkish Cypriots had "walked back" the Annan Plan by
accepting a President/Vice President indirect election model.
He dismissed the G/C bicommunal, single ticket direct
election scheme as "impossible" given that rightist parties
would be unable to find bicommunal partners. He was
heartened by Christofias' apparent willingness to discuss
expediting the talks--a "first" according to him.
Nevertheless, Talat lobbied for increased U.S. and UN
involvement and warned "no serious steps" were possible given
the present "timidity" of the international community. He
said the risk of his ouster by an anti-solution candidate in
April 2010 was serious and would derail the entire process.
He is traveling to the United States for the UN General
Assembly and hopes for meetings with both the Secretary and
UNSYG Ban Ki-Moon. The Ambassador told Talat that the U.S.
government would continue to support his negotiating efforts
and urged him to think of ways that Ankara could broadcast
its pro-solution policy in a language understandable to the
Greek Cypriots, possibly through a small, but symbolic
gesture. End Summary.

-------------- --------------
Start of Second Round: "Went Extraordinarily Well"
-------------- --------------


2. (C) Talat was upbeat after the start of the second round
of UN-brokered negotiations on September 10, after
Christofias canceled the original September 3 meeting in
protest over the Limnitis/Yesilirmak crossing "debacle" (Ref
D). Talat commented that they had lost a day "without any
reason," then praised the September 10 meeting as having gone
"extraordinarily well." He said he had been expecting the
worst, but instead found Christofias to be "very
understanding" as the two worked on how to elect the federal
executive, one of the main goals of the second reading, along
with devising a property regime.

-------------- --------------
T/Cs Abandon Annan Plan Position for a Presidential System
-------------- --------------


3. (C) Talat was energized about the T/C governance proposal
presented September 10, which he said both overcame Turkish
sensitivities and represented a significant departure from
the previous T/C position that had been similar to provisions
in the Annan Plan. (Note: According to our contacts, Talat
reportedly previewed the proposal on September 1 to Turkish
FM Davutoglu, who had no major objections(Ref B). End Note.)
With this proposal, Talat said, the T/Cs dropped their first
round proposal of a weak Swiss-style "Presidential Council"
in favor of two rotating "members of the presidency."
According to the new T/C proposal, the two would be chosen
from and by the communally elected Senate (equally divided
between Greek and Turkish Cypriots) on a single, bicommunal
ticket. The winning ticket would have to get 50 percent from
both communities in the first two rounds, or 40 percent from
both on the third and final vote. Failing that, a
transitional government would be formed and new senate
elections would be called within a year. Talat said he was
"100 percent" sure the plan would work since it addressed
both T/C needs (communal voting) and G/C concerns (a strong
executive),while allowing right-wing candidates to build
coalitions in the small, collegial senate. He said
Christofias had told him that he would "consider" the new
idea, without commenting on its merits.

--------------
G/C Executive Proposal: "A Real Threat"
--------------


NICOSIA 00000595 002 OF 003



4. (C) Talat dismissed a G/C proposal of weighted direct
voting (60:40) on a bicommunal ticket as "a real threat." He
said that G/Cs had merely sweetened the pot over their
first-round proposal, which had been the same arrangement but
weighted 70:30. He further claimed the scheme would
marginalize those on the right in both communities, who would
be hard pressed to find compatible, bicommunal partners.
"Rightists are the majority in the north," Talat complained,
"but Christofias told me 'to get rid of them.'" Talat worried
that the results also might not be legitimate in T/C eyes,
since the executive could possibly be elected with only
minimal support from the T/C community. He added that the
National Unity Party (UBP),the "ruling" party in the north
that has even rejected Talat's proposal, would never accept
the G/C idea.
--------------
Speeding Up the Process
--------------


5. (C) Talat said he was encouraged by Christofias' agreeing
to discuss expediting the negotiations at their next meeting
on September 17. He dubbed this "a first" for Christofias,
who had hitherto rejected increasing the pace or intensity of
the process. Talat said that he, personally, was open to a
number of modalities, including conducting longer meetings
(now about 2.5 to 3 hours) or more focused ones (e.g.,
Christofias-Talat tete-a-tete, followed by a session to read
out their position papers). Talat, who is acutely aware of
the passing of time, was hopeful a compromise could be struck
to speed things up. (Note: After the September 17 meeting,
UN SRSG Taye-Brook Zerihoun announced publicly that the
leaders had decided to defer the October 2 meeting, but would
meet October 7 and 8 and also October 14 and 15; he added
that the leaders had decided to maintain an accelerated pace.
End note.)

-------------- --------------
No "Serious Steps" Possible without the Intl Community
-------------- --------------


6. (C) In a familiar refrain, Talat said that the USG and the
UN were still "a bit reluctant" to engage on the Cyprus
problem. He lauded the activism of Swedish FM Carl Bildt and
said that the international community needed to cast off its
"timidity." Otherwise, he warned, no "serious steps" would
be achieved. For example, he advocated a joint meeting in New
York with President Christofias under the aegis of the UNSYG
and said that he had already informed UNSYG SA Downer of this
desire. (Note: Downer told us that he was against a joint
meeting during UNGA given strong G/C antipathy. End Note.)
Talat said he is planning a U.S. visit during UNGA (9/19-22
in Washington and 9/23-24 in New York) and inquired about the
possibility of a meeting with the Secretary. He said that he
already had a confirmed meeting with British FM David
Miliband and a likely one with FM Bildt.

--------------
Risk of Defeat in April 2010 Elections "Real"
--------------


7. (C) Talat said his reelection in April 2010 "Presidential
elections" was far from assured, adding that the elections
posed a "real threat." He warned Christofias, he said, that
it would be "impossible" to negotiate with his likely
electoral opponent, "TRNC PM" Dervish Eroglu, a hard-liner
who does not speak English. (Comment: We largely agree with
both assessments. End Comment)

-------------- ---
Talat at a Loss on Possible Gestures from Ankara
-------------- ---


8. (C) Talat was unable to respond to the Ambassador's
question about small gestures Ankara might make to ease G/C
suspicions and foster good will. He could not think of any
symbolic action and said it was impossible for any Turkish
government to implement the Additional Ankara Protocol
without the Greek Cypriots lifting T/C isolation. The return
of Varosha to G/C administration, he added, was part of the
comprehensive solution. Consequently, Talat said that he had
told Christofias to cease pressuring Turkey. This appeal, he
said, was met by silence from Christofias.


9. (C) Comment: Talat's governance proposal represents the
most serious negotiation toward common ground since talks
began a year ago. Talat's precarious domestic position was
put in dramatic relief when his proposal to the G/Cs was

NICOSIA 00000595 003 OF 003


quickly pounced on by his own right-wing "government" and
nationalists, who together control about 55-60% of the vote
in the north. They charged Talat with "selling out" Turkish
Cypriot "sovereignty," forcing him to invoke Ankara to dampen
criticism. We expect such attacks to increase in volume and
intensity as the process moves forward (in tandem with the
anti-solution chorus in the south),making Talat's position
all the more difficult and Ankara's vocal support for his
efforts more important. End Comment.




URBANCIC