CYPRUS: CHRISTOFIAS DISAPPOINTED IN TALAT'S

C O N F I D E N T I A L NICOSIA 000050

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/SE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/21/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL UNFICYP CY TU
SUBJECT: CYPRUS: CHRISTOFIAS DISAPPOINTED IN TALAT'S
"UNREASONABLE" POSITIONS

REF: A. NICOSIA 49

B. NICOSIA 48

C. NICOSIA 47

D. NICOSIA 46

E. NICOSIA 36

F. NICOSIA 28

Classified By: Ambassador Frank C. Urbancic, Reasons 1.4 (b),(d)


1. (C) SUMMARY: President Demetris Christofias, while
acknowledging Turkish Cypriot leader Mehmet Ali Talat's
desire to reach a Cyprus settlement, worries that the model
Talat prefers is confederal, not federal. Still, Christofias
remains ready to engage in a genuine give-and-take discussion
with his T/C interlocutor.


2. (C) SUMMARY CONTINUED: In an hour-long meeting on
January 14 with visiting EUR DAS Matthew Bryza, Christofias
lamented that "comrade" Talat had changed over their years of
acquaintance. "Perhaps he had to kiss the hand of the
establishment," he quipped, an oft-repeated G/C allegation
that the T/C leader operated under the Turkish "Deep State's"
marching orders. Talat's negotiating positions on governance
seemed unreasonable, designed to emasculate the federal
government and buttress the powers of the constituent state
-- in other words, to create a confederation, if not in name.
Christofias claimed his side's proposals, in contrast,
benefited all Cypriots, not just Greek ones. Negotiations
soon would move to property, where Greek Cypriots would seek
maximum freedom of choice for displaced property owners; the
President predicted a tough fight, since T/Cs preferred
compensation arrangements to protect strict bi-zonality. On
CBMs, Christofias alluded to progress toward opening the
Limnitis Buffer Zone crossing, but claimed that Turkish
Cypriot demands to move fuel through Limnitis to the T/C
military enclave of Kokkina/Erenkoy remained a non-starter.


3. (C) SUMMARY CONTINUED: Bryza observed that progress had
occurred on Cyprus since his last visit in 2006 and
congratulated Christofias for his courage in inking the May
23 joint statement and canceling the Nikiforos military
exercise. He agreed that risk-averse and rigid members of
the Turkish elite were in no hurry to reach a settlement that
would satisfy G/Cs, but highlighted positive steps Ankara had
taken on Cyprus and surmised the hard-liners were on the
defensive. Talat seemingly had room to maneuver in all areas
but security and guarantees, Bryza assessed. He offered to
convey to Ankara Christofias's allusion that G/Cs sought not
to bury the 2004 Annan Plan but to build on it. The G/C
leader politely declined, however. "While the Annan Plan has
useful elements, it can never be the basis of a solution."
END SUMMARY.

--------------
Change...For the Better
--------------


4. (C) Responding to Christofias's remark that Georgia had
recklessly provoked war with Russia, Bryza noted that
Russia's constant provocations had set a trap that Georgian
President Saakashvili regrettably stepped into. Moscow's
recognition of the breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South
Ossetia had opened a Pandora's box in the separatist-peppered
region.


5. (C) Moving to the Cyprus question, Bryza observed that,
in contrast to July 2006, when he last had visited, the mood
among the negotiators seemed brighter. Rather than endless
battles over legalisms and process, the leaders were engaged
in face-to-face substantive talks and appeared willing to
engage in a genuine give-and-take. He congratulated the
President for the latter's courageous acts of co-signing the
May 23 statement (which stipulated a partnership between
Greek and Turkish Cypriots),canceling the Nikiforos military
exercise, and agreeing to the September 3 start of
full-fledged negotiations. The United States fully supported
the leaders' efforts to reach a settlement based on a
bi-zonal, bi-communal federation, and would utilize its good
offices to help get there.


6. (C) Christofias, who had traveled to Moscow in November,
claimed the Russians had had no intention to recognize the
breakaway areas until Saakashvili "offered them a gift."
Moscow leaders had promised that no policy shift on Cyprus
was envisioned, however. He appreciated Bryza's assurances
that Washington supported the territorial integrity of
sovereign states and its clarification that peoples'
self-determination could only be exercised within the

territory of an existing state.

--------------
Going Still Slow, However
--------------


7. (C) Progress in the pre-negotiation period (March-July
2008) had not proven satisfactory, Christofias assessed.
Nonetheless, he had decided to green-light the move to
full-fledged negotiations believing that the long history of
cooperation between the two "comrades" and their shared
desire to reunify the island could overcome the sides'
substantive differences. The decision was correct, but the
results from four month's discussions on governance were
disappointing. "In my recent statements," the President
explained, referring to comments distributed on the
presentation of credentials of a number of foreign
ambassadors, "I didn't mean to say there was zero progress,
but rather little progress."


8. (C) He attributed the slowdown to Talat and the T/C side,
as expected. "I had expected Mehmet Ali to be more
reasonable. Perhaps, though, he has had to kiss the hand of
the (Turkish) establishment," the President theorized,
claiming that Talat's positions before coming into power were
more moderate. In no way could Greek Cypriots ever accept UN
mediation or arbitration, for example, which Talat insisted
was the only manner to bridge substantive gaps. Further,
Talat's demands for ever-increasing numbers of competencies
to be assigned to the constituent states showed that he
viewed the federal government as an enemy, a vehicle for G/C
domination. "Our positions are serious and reasonable,
however, and benefit all Cypriots, not just Greek Cypriots."
He referred to their proposal for G/C and T/C co-presidents,
to be elected on a common ticket. "Even though we make up 80
percent of the population and they only 20 percent, the
future leaders will serve on a 4-year/2-year rotation, which
is a major concession on our part." Talat's pitch for a
7-member presidential council comprised of four G/Cs and
three T/Cs, on the other hand, was not functional and "worse
than the Annan Plan."


9. (C) As further proof of Talat's newfound confederal ways,
the President raised the T/C demand for a greater role for
the constituent states in the conduct of foreign relations.
"There will be three diplomatic services, with no hierarchy
among them. No federation operates similarly," he
complained. And approving such a demand amounted to
political suicide. T/C allegations that G/Cs deliberately
were stalling the talks, or that the discussions were not
sufficiently intensive, were groundless propaganda,
Christofias added. He and the G/C team would not go into
negotiations unprepared, though. He reasoned that the best
method of speeding the process lay in the Turkish Cypriots
abandoning their extreme positions. Christofias stressed he
was ready for a genuine give-and-take negotiation, and called
on Talat to follow suit.



10. (C) Negotiators would begin discussing property on
January 28. Christofias delineated the traditional G/C
position: that refugees should enjoy full freedom to choose
between property restitution, compensation, and exchange.
Turkish Cypriot positions aimed to restrict the return of
G/Cs to their land in the north, to preserve a clear T/C
majority there in population and land ownership. "This is
not beneficial to them," the President asserted. "Wouldn't
it be better to have wealthier G/C residents there, paying
taxes? And wouldn't their economy benefit from more Greek
Cypriot businessmen, who are better than their T/C
counterparts?"

--------------
Some Movement on Limnitis
--------------


11. (C) Christofias turned next to confidence-building
measures, foremost among them additional BZ crossings.
"Despite the misgivings of many Greek Cypriots, I gave the OK
to open Ledra Street," the President noted. The arrangement
entailed each side's forces drawing back from the crossing
route, shoring up and rehabilitating the abutting structures,
and opening the Limnitis crossing in far-west Cyprus as quid
pro quo. None had occurred, at political cost to the
President and harming the negotiating environment. He
alluded to progress in UN-brokered talks on Limnitis,
however, claiming the sticking point a T/C desire to use the
crossing to move fuel overland to the T/C pocket at Kokkina.

"Food and humanitarian supplies we can accept, but fuel,
never." (Note: UN contacts on January 22 reported that
Limnitis talks had stalled over this issue.)


12. (C) The President wished Bryza good luck in his travels
to Turkey, specifically in his meeting with MFA Cyprus hand
Ertugrul Apakan. "I've never met Apakan, but I hear he's
very hard-line and influential," Christofias remarked. He
hoped that PM Tayyip Erdogan and President Abdullah Gul, whom
he had engaged briefly at UNGA in September, eventually would
prevail in their battles with the Army and "Deep State."
Echoing conspiracy theory that is treated as fact in the
Greek Cypriot community, the President argued that Erdogan
had inked a deal with the military, winning his political
survival but ceding to the generals significant influence on
Turkey's Cyprus Policy and EU-mandated reforms. "While they
told me they'd given Talat negotiating room and supported a
federal settlement, their public statements, and those of the
Turkish NSC, bespeak confederation."

--------------
Hard Lines, Yes, But Flexibility, Too
--------------


13. (C) Bryza repeated that the U.S. sought reunification of
Cyprus into a bi-zonal, bi-communal federation, and would
criticize strongly any attempt to destroy federal structures.
On Turkey, he agreed that MFA Cyprus hands like Apakan and
Haydar Berk were rigid and risk-averse. Yet, they were also
showing a readiness to negotiate in good faith. Moreover,
Turkey had taken positive steps on Cyprus before. He
recounted how former TGS chief Hilmi Ozkok had confided that
Turkey would benefit by removing its troops from Cyprus and
losing the need to subsidize Turkish Cypriots. Successor
Yasar Buyukanit harbored traditional hard-line views, but
current TGS commander Ilker Basbug seemed more conciliatory
and progressive. Talat seemingly had room to maneuver on all
issues except security and guarantees and a residual troop
presence on the island, neither of which Bryza believed
Turkey had any intention of relinquishing, at least at this
time.


14. (C) Of greater concern was the declining interest in EU
accession amongst both the Turkish elite and the
rank-and-file citizenry. "EU accession is not the priority
it once was," Bryza opined. On the settlement talks and how
Turkey might improve the climate, he explained how the USG
was urging the GoT to soften its rhetoric. Foreign Minister
Ali Babacan had agreed with Bryza last March, for example, to
refrain from referencing the unpopular and
quasi-unmentionable (in the G/C community) Annan Plan. "But
from my understanding, your aim is not to bury the Annan
Plan, but to build on it?" Bryza questioned. He inquired
whether he could pass that message during his meetings in
Ankara.

--------------
Continued Heartburn Over That Darn Plan
--------------


15. (C) Christofias disagreed that Turkey was showing any
flexibility on Cyprus; as proof, he raised Talat's continuing
demands for what appeared to him a confederal government
model. As to the Annan Plan, the 2004 UN work contained
positive elements, the President acknowledged, many of which
would find their way into any settlement plan. Annan's
division of federal and state competences was one, its
stipulation the island should have a single sovereignty
another. But the Plan could never become the basis for the
settlement discussions, owing to Greek Cypriots' overwhelming
rejection of it and its continuing unpopularity. Christofias
asked that Bryza not pass that message while in Ankara.


16. (U) DAS Bryza has cleared this message.
Urbancic