Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09NICOSIA49
2009-01-26 12:17:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Nicosia
Cable title:  

CYPRUS: ARCHBISHOP DECRIES TURKISH INTRANSIGENCE

Tags:  PGOV PREL UNFICYP CY TU 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXYZ0001
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHNC #0049/01 0261217
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 261217Z JAN 09
FM AMEMBASSY NICOSIA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 9531
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 1327
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS
C O N F I D E N T I A L NICOSIA 000049 

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/SE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/18/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL UNFICYP CY TU
SUBJECT: CYPRUS: ARCHBISHOP DECRIES TURKISH INTRANSIGENCE
IN TALKS

REF: A. NICOSIA 48

B. NICOSIA 47

C. NICOSIA 46

D. NICOSIA 36

E. NICOSIA 28

Classified By: Ambassador Frank C. Urbancic, Reasons 1.4 (b),(d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L NICOSIA 000049

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/SE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/18/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL UNFICYP CY TU
SUBJECT: CYPRUS: ARCHBISHOP DECRIES TURKISH INTRANSIGENCE
IN TALKS

REF: A. NICOSIA 48

B. NICOSIA 47

C. NICOSIA 46

D. NICOSIA 36

E. NICOSIA 28

Classified By: Ambassador Frank C. Urbancic, Reasons 1.4 (b),(d)


1. (C) SUMMARY: Continued intransigence from mainland
Turkish leaders has slowed the Cyprus negotiations, argues
hard-line Archbishop Chrysostomos II. In a January 14 dinner
with visiting EUR Deputy Assistant Secretary Matthew Bryza,
Chrysostomos described current Greek Cypriot imperatives for
any settlement plan: an immediate removal of all Turkish
troops and an end to Ankara's intervention rights on the
island; deportation of all mainland "settlers" except those
married to Turkish Cypriots; and no "virgin birth" ) the
unified Cyprus republic must be a transformation of the
existing Republic of Cyprus, not a new entity formed by the
merger of the RoC and "TRNC." Britain continued to exert
negative influence in island politics, the Primate accused,
and as such should have no role in the negotiations. END
SUMMARY.

--------------
More a Political than a Religious Figure
--------------


2. (C) The concluding call of his whirlwind 36-hour stay,
DAS Bryza on January 14 dined with controversial Church of
Cyprus Archbishop Chrysostomos II. The primate launched
straight into CyProb politics as he poured 23 year-old Chivas
Regal as an aperitif ("most foreigners don,t like our
stronger Zivania brandy," he quipped.) "I'm not a politician
and I lack their political vocabularly...so I will speak only
the truth," Chrystomos avowed. While leaders Demetris
Christofias and Mehmet Ali Talat had tallied some progress in
secondary issues, the sides remained far apart on core
matters like federal versus state competencies and the nature
of the central government. He was not optimistic the pace
would pick up soon.


3. (C) Ethnic Greeks had inhabited the island for 3,300
years and survived countless waves of invaders bent on
eradicating their culture, Chrysostomos boasted. The first
wave of Turkish-origin inhabitants had landed only 450 years
ago, and their numbers were small. "Most Turkish Cypriots
are actually Islamicized Greeks," he argued, alleging as

proof that the two communities suffered equivalent rates of
thalassemia, an anemia-like disease not seen amongst the
Anatolian newcomers. During most of their years on Cyprus,
G/Cs and T/Cs got along well, attending each others'
religious, cultural, and social events.

--------------
Breaking up our Happy Family
--------------


4. (C) Turkish Cypriot nationalists like Rauf Denktash had
ruined the happy coexistence in their drive to make the T/C
minority a separate community, the Archbishop contended. And
the 1974 Turkish "invasion and occupation" made good their
separatist dreams. Great demographic alterations had
followed, with half the indigenous T/C population emigrating
and their places taken by Turkish "settlers" and occupation
troops, their numbers now 300,000 and 45,000, respectively.


5. (C) The numbers explained why T/C leader was not his own
man, and why his positions in the negotiations were actually
Turkey's. Chrysostomos could not understand why Ankara
needed a presence on the island. "I understand geopolitics,"
he continued, "but in this age of supersonic bombers and
cruise missiles, they don,t need an occupation force on
Cyprus." Settlement talks could never prosper as long as the
Turkish troops remained.

--------------
How Can We Get a Deal?
--------------


6. (C) Greek Cypriots had clear red lines for the
negotiations and no G/C politician, regardless of popularity,
dared cross them. Security was reddest of all: the Turkish
military must withdraw from the island, with Turkey,s
guarantor status and interventionist rights abolished. As to
settlers, only those mainlanders married to Turkish Cypriots
could remain on the island after a deal ) "for humanitarian
reasons," the not-always-altruistic Chrysostomos explained.

Last, the reunified Cyprus must be the existing Republic of
Cyprus transformed into a federal entity. "We can never
accept 'virgin birth' -- a fusing of the RoC and the illegal
'Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus.'" Were Turkey to
accept these parameters, the Archbishop thought a final
settlement possible.


7. (C) He concluded with disparaging remarks toward the
British, Cyprus's former colonial masters, who were not to be
trusted. "For their own reasons, the British fostered
divide-and-conquer tactics that pitted Turkish Cypriots
against Greek Cypriots. Now they want a loose federation or
confederation that is bound to fail eventually. All to
protect their bases," the Archbishop insisted. For this and
other reasons, the settlement talks must remain
Cypriot-driven, free of foreign impositions.
--------------
Ankara's Views, From Our Perspective
--------------


8. (C) Turkey was not a monolithic entity bent on Cypriot
domination, Bryza clarified. True, there were hard-liners
both within the Turkish General Staff and the Foreign
Ministry who continued to see great geopolitical value in
holding the island, a la former Turkish PM Ecevit. Yet there
were plenty of progressive voices too, he noted. The Turkish
military under General Ozkok had supported the Annan Plan and
had marginalized Denktash in the run-up to the April 2004
referendum, for example. Successor General Buyukanit tread
familiar hard lines, but current TGS commander Basbug seemed
more moderate. Further, the continuing Ergenekon scandal had
the military on the defensive, Bryza reasoned.


9. (C) Bryza doubted the TGS would call the plays on the
Governance, Property, or EU/Economy settlement chapters.
Turkish interlocutors had told him Talat had plenty of room
to negotiate, and he had seen nothing so far to refute their
assertion. Undoubtedly, the Turks would become serious
players once the talks turned to security, however, owing to
the troop presence and their status as guarantors under the
1960 treaties.


10. (U) DAS Bryza has cleared this message.

Urbancic