CYPRUS: OPPOSITION LEADER CRITICIZES CHRISTOFIAS,

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NICOSIA 000047

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/SE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/18/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL UNFICYP CY TU
SUBJECT: CYPRUS: OPPOSITION LEADER CRITICIZES CHRISTOFIAS,
TALAT

REF: A. NICOSIA 28

B. NICOSIA 36

C. NICOSIA 46

Classified By: Ambassador Frank C. Urbancic, Reasons 1.4 (b),(d)


1. (C) SUMMARY: The continued demonization of the 2004
Annan Plan had precluded greater progress in the Cyprus
settlement talks, opposition DISY leader Nikos Anastassiades
told visiting EUR DAS Matthew Bryza on January 14. G/Cs'
determination to keep the compromise Plan off the table had
resulted in Turkish Cypriots tabling extreme positions, with
his side obliged to oppose them and criticize T/C
intransigence. President Demetris Christofias was
mishandling the negotiations, Anastassiades argued, playing
to the hard-liners and not acknowledging the support and
contributions of DISY. While criticizing his own
compatriots, the opposition leader also took shots at Turkey
and T/C leader Mehmet Ali Talat, questioning the former's
commitment to a solution and the latter's desire for
confederation over federation. Finally, Anastassiades
requested greater international community involvement than
Chistofias seems prepared to countenance, especially in the
talks' crucial give-and-take phase. END SUMMARY.

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Never at a Loss for Words
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2. (C) Anastassiades rearranged his January 14 schedule to
accommodate a brief January 14 meeting with visiting EUR
Deputy Assistant Secretary Matthew Bryza, which focused
solely on progress in the Cyprus settlement talks. The
irascible DISY (G/C opposition) leader voiced great pessimism
over the course of the negotiations. Two factors lay
primarily to blame, one of the Greek Cypriots' own making.
The continued demonization of the Annan Plan, both by
hard-line disciples of the recently-deceased former President
Tassos Papadopoulos and by Christofias himself, had closed
off useful avenues of negotiation, Anastassiades asserted.
It was obvious that in rubbishing the compromise Plan, the
G/Cs would invite harder-line opening positions by the
Turkish Cypriots.


3. (C) In announcing recently that four months' negotiations
had delivered little or no substantive progress, Christofias
was playing to the nationalist crowd, Anastassiades thought,
which was a big mistake. Such tactics not only questioned
the performance of the UN and the bona fides of Turkish
Cypriots, they actually were preparing the G/C side for
failure of the talks. The DISY leader did not doubt
Christofias's deeply-held commitment to reaching a deal, but
he did question his tactical smarts. As proof, he pointed to
the administration's flat-out refusal to reference the Annan
Plan in a comparison of G/C, T/C, and Annan Plan positions on
Governance, an assessment that DISY was demanding.
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Blasting Both Sides of the Green Line
--------------

4. (C) Mehmet Ali Talat too deserved blame, of course. The
DISY leader, who regularly engaged Talat, claimed the T/C
leader's positions on Governance looked more confederal than
federal. Meriting special criticism were the T/C demands for
numerical equality within the executive, and constituent
state treaty-making powers that far exceeded the
"traditional" areas of commerce, sports/culture, and
education. Christofias and G/Cs had no option but to oppose
all.

5. (C) Greek Cypriots by nature question Talat's negotiating
autonomy, and the more-serious-than-most Anastassiades was no
exception. Via his reading of Turkish media and his contacts
with Turkish Cypriots, he doubted the T/C leader actually
enjoyed much negotiating room. Had the Turkish Army given PM
Erdogan space on Cyprus? he inquired of Bryza. And how would
the Turks react to the calling of early "parliamentary"
elections in the north? Anastassiades saw an opposition UBP
victory greatly injurious to the process.
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He Seems to Have Some Room
--------------

6. (C) Bryza responded with his impressions of his visit so
far. Comparing this trip to the island to his last in July
2006, the atmospherics were far better, and he held out hope
for significant progress in the future talks. While Turkish
Cypriot positions clearly differed from G/Cs' on the details,
he saw no indication the T/Cs were pursuing anything other
than a bizonal, bicommunal federation. Mainland
interlocutors had assured Bryza that Talat was free to

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negotiate Governance and other chapters as he saw fit, and
Bryza had seen nothing so far to put their assurances in
doubt. Greek Cypriots recently had put forward a seemingly
creative, mutually-agreeable proposal on judicial and
legislative deadlock breaking mechanisms, and as proof of
T/Cs' commitment, he hoped they would give it serious
consideration.

7. (C) Bryza expected the Turks to become more involved once
the negotiations moved to Security and Guarantees, owing both
to their troop presence on the island and their status as
guarantor powers under the 1960 founding treaties. As to
greater involvement by the U.S. and/or broader international
community, that would depend on the expression of interest of
the two leaders. The U.S. stood ready to use its good
offices to further the process in any way, Bryza clarified.

8. (U) DAS Bryza has cleared this cable.
Urbancic