CYPRUS: LOCAL BRITS LAUD CHANGE IN TONE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NICOSIA 000046

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/SE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/18/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL UNFICYP CY UK TU
SUBJECT: CYPRUS: LOCAL BRITS LAUD CHANGE IN TONE

REF: A. NICOSIA 28

B. NICOSIA 36

Classified By: Ambassador Frank C. Urbancic, Reasons 1.4 (b),(d)


1. (C) SUMMARY: In moving from earlier debates on procedure
to real substantive give-and-take, the Cypriot leaders had
progressed far, UK High Commissioner Peter Millett and
visiting EUR Deputy Assistant Secretary Matthew Bryza agreed
on January 14. Mehmet Ali Talat and Demetris Christofias's
long friendship, as well as the relative paucity of
detail-mad lawyers amongst their top-level advisers, also
boded well for negotiating success. Britain intended to
support the process from the sidelines much like the U.S.,
but was not averse to weighing in on substance if it felt
that one side or the other's positions were extreme, Millett
revealed. Her Majesty's Government did not intend to name a
Cyprus envoy, however. Cyprus was playing a dangerous game
on Turkey's EU accession path, the British diplomat reckoned,
hoping to apply maximum pressure on Ankara in the months
before the December Council review. Continuing on
Brussels-related matters, Millett believed the Commission
must take a more active role in the Cyprus settlement
discussions. END SUMMARY.

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Going Great Guns, Compared to 2006
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2. (C) Millet had met with Bryza during the latter's last
visit to Cyprus in July 2006. The two men agreed that
advances made in the intervening 30 months were palpable.
"In 2006, we couldn't get past process," Millett explained.
Then-G/C leader Tassos Papadopoulos was doing his best
impersonation of Rauf Denktash, the long-time "TRNC
president" famed for his stubbornness. Both were now
departed from the Cypriot political scene, a positive
development. Leaders Talat and Christofias enjoyed similar
ideologies and a reasonably warm personal relationship,
Millett noted. They realized a settlement plan must be
sellable on both sides, meaning that total victory for one
was not desirable. And their teams, at least at the highest
levels, were free of legal whizzes like Papadopoulos and
Denktash, always ready to kill promising proposals on
nit-picky grounds.


3. (C) Not all was rosy in the talks, Millett appraised; the
pace, for example, was glacial, and the UN was proposing
measures to speed it up. He was unsure whether Christofias
and Iacovou would accept a modified framework, mainly because
G/C domestic politics favored a go-slow approach.
Christofias understood the electoral calendar in northern
Cyprus worked against a settlement, however, and that only
Talat, amongst T/C leaders, could deliver a deal acceptable
to Greek Cypriots.

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Britain's Thoughts on Going Forward
--------------


4. (C) Millett turned next to HMG's tactics in supporting
the talks, taking note of Bryza's remark that Washington
likely would not name a Cyprus Special Envoy in this phase of
talks. The Hellenic lobby in Britain for months had been
pushing the government to nominate its own envoy, but now had
stood down. They likely had been satisfied by UK Europe
Minister Caroline Flint's statement that a Cyprus settlement
was amongst her three highest priorities.


5. (C) On-island, Millett believed the international
community might best support the talks with careful
cheerleading. The leaders must become more comfortable with
each other, he added, and must realize the internationals
have great expectations of them to actually reach a deal.
Britain would not remain quiet and neutral regarding
substantive elements of the negotiation, however. Millett
pointed to two specific proposals which looked unworkable --
the T/Cs' demand that the constituent states enjoy broad
treaty-making powers, and the G/C position that the president
and vice-president be elected on a common ticket. On these
and similarly controversial matters, the British would not
hesitate in making their opinions known to UN Special Adviser
Alexander Downer and the rest of the UNFICYP team.

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Brussels on My Mind
--------------


6. (C) Millett worried that Turkish Cypriot leadership

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lacked fundamental knowledge of how Brussels functioned.
Their limited understanding resulted in demands in the
negotiations inconsistent with the European Union Acquis,
such as permanent derogations on settlement and capital
flows. He believed the European Commission must become more
involved in the process, "politically, technically, and
financially." The UK was working hard to get a Commission
official seconded to Downer's team.


7. (C) Christofias, too, seemingly was misplaying his hand
in Brussels. By casting virtual vetoes over additional
Acquis chapter openings and continuing to bad-mouth Ankara's
CyProb intransigence, the President was attempting to apply
ever-greater pressure on Turkey in the run-up to the European
Council's December accession assessment. "That's a very
dangerous game," Millett ventured.


8. (U) DAS Bryza has cleared this message.
Urbancic