Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09NICOSIA457
2009-07-13 09:47:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Nicosia
Cable title:  

CYPRUS: UNFICYP CHIEF CALLS LAST QUARTER 2009

Tags:  PGOV PREL UNFICYP TR CY 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXYZ0003
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHNC #0457/01 1940947
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 130947Z JUL 09 ZFF4
FM AMEMBASSY NICOSIA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 9995
INFO RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 1490
C O N F I D E N T I A L NICOSIA 000457 

SIPDIS

EUR/SE, IO/UNP

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/02/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL UNFICYP TR CY
SUBJECT: CYPRUS: UNFICYP CHIEF CALLS LAST QUARTER 2009
"MOST CRITICAL" TO PROCESS

REF: A. NICOSIA 402

B. JUNE 12 PANICO-FITZPATRICK E-MAIL

C. NICOSIA 438

Classified By: Ambassador Frank C. Urbancic for reasons 1.4b and 1.4d

C O N F I D E N T I A L NICOSIA 000457

SIPDIS

EUR/SE, IO/UNP

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/02/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL UNFICYP TR CY
SUBJECT: CYPRUS: UNFICYP CHIEF CALLS LAST QUARTER 2009
"MOST CRITICAL" TO PROCESS

REF: A. NICOSIA 402

B. JUNE 12 PANICO-FITZPATRICK E-MAIL

C. NICOSIA 438

Classified By: Ambassador Frank C. Urbancic for reasons 1.4b and 1.4d


1. (C) Summary: "We could reach irreversibility if the
parties can identify areas of give and take in the last three
months of the year," UNSG Special Representative Taye
Zerihoun told Deputy Assistant Secretary Matthew Bryza on
June 29. Zerihoun, who noted tangible improvement in
atmospherics, said that the sides had to focus on territory,
property, and security/guarantees during the second reading
(preferably in September) in order to engage in the
horse-trading that hopefully might start in 4th quarter 2009,
"the key months" according to him. Zerihoun said that both
leaders clearly wanted to strike a deal, but, in a personal
aside, noted that each still had to arrive at a definition of
what exactly a deal entailed. In a clear contradiction of the
position of UNSG Special Adviser Alexander Downer, Zerihoun
welcomed a US Special Envoy provided the appointment came
during the "give and take" phase, did not spook the Greek
Cypriots (G/C),and played a role complementary to the UN,
such as a conduit for "brainstorming" and providing
"experts." He welcomed both the agreement to open the
Limnitis/Yesilirmak crossing point, as well as the USG
financial contribution necessary for the full operation of
the crossing. Regarding Turkey, Zerihoun said he had no doubt
that Ankara had every reason and incentive to solve the
problem but, at times, "still thinks like an empire." For his
part, DAS Bryza applauded the work of UNFICYP and the Good
Offices Mission, and said that the US wanted to help the
process with the possible appointment of an envoy, not get in
the way or compete with the UN. He also said that the US
consistently used its own good offices with all the parties,
including Ankara, to push the compromise and flexibility
needed to reach a mutually-acceptable solution.

-------------- --------------
Zerihoun: 4th Quarter 2009 "Most Critical Moment"
-------------- --------------


2. (C) UNSG SR Taye Zerihoun dubbed the last three months of

2009 "the most critical phase" when the sides, he hoped,
would be able to enter the crucial "give and take" stage: the
actual negotiation requiring compromise and sacrifice among
the various chapters. To get there, however, both leaders
needed, in the yet to commence second reading, to identify
clear areas of "trade off" in three crucial areas: territory;
property; security. These chapters, he hinted, could be
bargained against other competencies. Timewise, the leaders
would need to build on the present improved climate and
quickly wrap up the first reading of security/guarantees, set
to begin July 9 and the last of the six chapters, before the
summer doldrums of August. Zerihoun said that the second
reading possibly could take place in September, though he
hoped, in the meantime, that the sides--possibly at the level
of the Leaders' representatives George Iacovou and Ozdil
Nami--could take another quick look at property, security,
and guarantees before then. (Note: In the June 30 meeting
with DAS Bryza, President Demetris Christofias mentioned a
"third reading." We have not heard that before from anyone.
End Note)


3. (C) Zerihoun then gave a tour d'horizon of the six
negotiating chapters (five of which had already been taken
up). He noted that the progress had been uneven.

--Governance: Lots of work completed, with decent convergence
on the legislature and judiciary. Main sticking point is the
executive (power sharing and the origin of legitimacy for the
post-solution state)

--Property: "Nowhere" in his words. Derailed by the European
Court of Justice ruling on the Orams Case and the passions
and tensions around it.

--EU Matters: Discussed at length with many areas of
convergence as well as some non-convergence;

--Economy: Similar to the EU Chapter in terms of agreement
and disagreement;

--Territory: Low expectations in the first reading, though
nevertheless difficult. G/Cs tried to extract as many details
as possible despite the mutual agreement not to exchange
maps. "The Greek Cypriots presented a map without a map," he
joked. T/Cs don't want to solve one (G/C) problem, the return

of IDPs, and create another (T/C) problem: the inability to
house those who must relocate.

--Security/Guarantees: Hope is to finish first reading as
quickly as possible once the first reading commences on July

9. Need to reexamine Annan Plan format to determine whether
present "2 UN" format is applicable given that the chapter
deals with the guarantor powers as well. Need to determine
when guarantors need to engage.


4. (C) Zerihoun said that the talks might enter a phase of
"irreversibility" during the "give and take" phase if the
sides could identify areas of "trade off", especially dealing
with property, territory, and security/guarantees. He was
quick to point out, however, that was not the case at
present. (Note: After the July 2 Leaders' Meeting, Zerihoun
announced the following mutually-agreed calendar of future
meetings through Oct. 2: July 9,17,23,30; August 6; September
3,10,17; October 2. The meetings will be interrupted by the
sacrosanct August vacation period and UNGA, though Iacovou
and Nami will reportedly continue to work. End Note)

-------------- --------------
"Christofias and Talat see each other as best partners,
but..."
-------------- --------------


5. (C) In response to DAS Bryza's question about the linked
political fates of Christofias and Talat (a favorite line of
SA Downer),Zerihoun responded that it was a "tough"
question, noting that, at the very least, their political
agendas were intertwined. He added, however, that Christofias
and Talat saw each other as the best partner with whom to
strike a deal and that the possible election of a hard-line
T/C leader in April 2010, namely "TRNC PM" and National Unity
Party (UBP) leader Dervish Eroglu, certainly would complicate
the negotiations. He also had no doubt in their sincere
desire for peace. That said, Zerihoun noted, albeit as a
personal observation, that it seemed as if neither man had
"sorted out" exactly what a solution meant as the sum of its
parts. The Greek Cypriots, he said, were obsessed by a
perceived T/C plot to come together only then to pull apart,
this time with recognition. For their part, the T/Cs had a
"limited capability" to think broadly about political
equality and were obsessed with their numerical status as a
community and the need to translate that, in certain areas,
into numerical equality.

--------------
Appointing an Envoy: "Matter of Timing"
--------------


6. (C) Zerihoun clearly was more receptive to the possible
appointment of a US Special Envoy for Cyprus than, per REF A,
UNSG SA Downer, in response to DAS Bryza's question regarding
the efficacy of such an appointment in the context of
"Cypriot-driven" solution. Drawing on his past UN
experience, especially in Mozambique, Zerihoun thought that
the appointment of an envoy would be "very useful" and would
help draw world attention to the on-going process and serve
as a source of expert advice and ideas.


7. (C) He warned, however, that such an appointment should
come no earlier than after the first reading or, better yet,
during the "give and take" period, in order to prevent the
sides from blaming an envoy for their own intransigence. He
also said that a "representative" group of envoys from
interested countries would be beneficial so as to present a
"united front" (provided of course the envoys agreed on basic
principles) and not to spook the Greek Cypriots, whom he said
otherwise were "allergic" to the idea. He was quick to point
out, however, that the G/Cs sought closer contact with the
US. DAS Bryza said that any US Envoy would work to complement
the UN's efforts and supported the idea of an envoy as a
"brainstorming center." He added, to which Zerihoun agreed,
that, regarding the appointment of an envoy, it was probably
best to wait and see if September brought the all-important
"give and take" period. Ambassador Urbancic added that the US
recognized it should not "surprise" the UN if it did decide
to go forward with appointment of an envoy.

--------------
"G/Cs called Turkish Army Bluff on Limnitis"
--------------


8. (C) In response to the Ambassador's question, Zerihoun
said that the sides were able to agree, after 15 months of
haggling, to open the Limnitis/Yesilirmak crossing point

because it had become--unfortunately--"too big to be left
unresolved." He said that the G/Cs had "made the necessary
compromises" and had "called the bluff" (without going into
detail) of the Turkish Army. He welcomed DAS Bryza's
announcement that the USG was willing to help out financially
to upgrade the existing road necessary to open the
checkpoint, and said that the T/C side of the road should be
completed first, before the portion in the buffer zone (Note:
The G/C side up to buffer zone is intact, but an additional 2
km in the buffer zone and 4 km on the T/C side need to be
repaired. End Note) Zerihoun noted that the Turkish Cypriots
would accept G/C funds if they were "laundered" first through
UNDP. He also said that ambulances could presently use the
crossing in the event of an emergency.

--------------
"No Doubt Turkey has every reason to solve..."
--------------


9. (C) In response to DAS Bryza's question regarding the
blowback to Turkey's EU Accession Bid from a possible setback
or stalemate in the process and, consequently, the wisdom of
revisiting an initiative like the Finnish 2006 EU Presidency
deal on Varosha/Famagusta, Zerihoun avo)DeQ !dQb!@t`*BsEb(QQQb1d Lg0d tQ`0bQd(TUb+dq`*d Aa0b1Q (` gn rE`3Nfd+ bEQ
#MfQd2Tc0h2D&H!sAh tQ`0pQe BcA #l!Ar(h @e(h!TeQ )D Qf1LdQ
beb1dcEd n"`Qf ht""@cQl)daTe !Ld b#M`%b!TeQ 3HtH" D`QQQQpPg#dsQ& H!a d!D$h#TeQd2Q Q`!d Q`! GPe!j Aq0b!LtQ *DeQd tMQ
gEd NvEb d E $`#T 4h!T 4h!H Qd2D Q 3DrAt!f!Aa(l9d!b3QQQh)@gQd!ltf!daMf d`Af D1PcQh*RAf!@dQn# TUb+dqQ (d Ha$ "MQQ
Lu d T`Qd @fIa2@ Ha "Ev!b9r!`3Lf`*D Qf#dfTa2d"t) 3Md0dQQQQHQBG@ "DtQ 1nfMb0dbAd!l1Q !d Tad3"Qd)Ldd(hbIc l!Ie `*QQd)PaQd"aQd cQe3 sQa0 bUt0n"Q"d#pQd3B Qt#aPb D`E Q.QQ!(QQQ@Q *LtQd(fb dpQd0LaQ 0D#Ef4 3Ta0d)Dfpb @qD1@cIc( EU QhaEfQQQLe!o0HaQn2EEd)dfB!faQ 2dcAb h"E Qh!eQh3TeQb! gQ "DwMQQ
3Ta0d3 )n T`! )@dQf aQ "daLg `aPt)bqLa0l9uQh!LpQd(Q DAQQQQB2HrA (n0Ddd @tf(HdQ
0heDQF Qg1l f/d Ig(n2D 4h!pb3HbLdQQQPa3j Mf `*AQj!@a@2Ntc+L%In dcEd "pPa)n UrQb#Q$h0wd(dQ
!@pQf!b`t(d Is1d!s) !P Qn0tM (hfDe2 cP h3TrQb0 from the
on-going UN-brokered peace process.

This cable has been cleared by DAS Bryza.
Urbancic