CYPRUS: TALAT DENIES "CONFEDERALIST" ALLEGATIONS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 NICOSIA 000036

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (DELETED REFERENCE)

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/SE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/19/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL UNFICYP CY TU
SUBJECT: CYPRUS: TALAT DENIES "CONFEDERALIST" ALLEGATIONS

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Classified By: Ambassador Frank C. Urbancic, Reasons 1.4 (b),(d)


1. (C) SUMMARY: A cautious but constructive Turkish Cypriot
leader, Mehmet Ali Talat, assured visiting EUR DAS Matthew
Bryza on January 14 that T/Cs remained committed to
reunification of Cyprus into a bi-zonal, bi-communal
federation, despite Greek Cypriot fears the T/Cs were
shifting to favor a confederation. Talat explained that the
distinction between federalism and confederalism lies in the
structure of the state and its international personality, not
the number and types of competencies assigned to the
constituent states. Pushing for more competencies for a T/C
state did not make Talat a confederalist, as G/C critics
alleged. The T/C leader assured that his side was committed
to reaching a deal, while its positions on key issues, such
as the election and composition of the federal executive,
took into concern Greek Cypriot interests. Talat believed
that he and Christofias could make great progress on their
own but could never bridge all remaining gaps without UN
mediation or arbitration; the appointment of special envoys
from the U.S. and other countries might help. He
acknowledged that a CTP loss in April "parliamentary"
elections in the north could constrict his ability to
negotiate. END SUMMARY.

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Bizonal, Bicommunal Federation Still Our Aim
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2. (C) Joined by chief negotiator Ozdil Nami, "TRNC
President" and Turkish Cypriot leader Mehmet Ali Talat
welcomed visiting Deputy Assistant Secretary Matt Bryza for a
one-hour discussion of Cyprus Problem politics. The call
came hours after Bryza saw Christofias (Septel),and two days
after the RoC President had alleged publicly that four
months' discussions on Governance had engendered little
substantive progress. In response to Bryza's observation
that Christofias seemed eager to engage in give-and-take
discussions, Talat guessed that his counterpart aimed to
placate hard-line coalition partners EDEK and DIKO with the
message, although how that might help Christofias was
anyone's guess. Both the President and his AKEL party
historically were prone to flip-flopping, Talat charged. As
proof, he pointed to Christofias's back-tracking after the
G/C nationalists had protested the May 23 agreement that
stipulated a reunited Cyprus would comprise a partnership of
two constituent states. This latest "no progress" allegation
looked like similar waffling.


3. (C) Talat rebutted G/C charges that he aimed to ignore
thirty years of UN resolutions calling for a federal Cyprus,
and instead pursue a loose union of Greek- and Turkish
Cypriot states. Demanding greater competencies for the
constituent units did not signify the end product would be
confederal. "The distinction is found in the structure of
the state and its international personality," he asserted. A
unified island would feature a single international
personality, for example. Unlike confederacies, which Talat
claimed had only a unified economy and national defense, the
new island would enjoy stronger and more numerous federal
structures. Were Greek Cypriots to agree to more political
representation for T/Cs -- "not in the civil service, but
only at the highest ranks" -- Turkish Cypriots would agree to
cede more competencies to the federal government. G/Cs had
made concessions recently on representation in the
legislative and judicial branches, but not on the executive,
he added.

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We Cannot Live With This
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4. (C) Greek Cypriots historically demand a strong, stable
federal government, and Talat claimed that key Turkish
Cypriot proposals on Governance supported this aim. The T/C
executive model -- a presidential council of four Greek
Cypriots and three Turkish Cypriots, elected on a joint
ticket by majorities of both T/C and G/C federal senators --
would ensure the leadership enjoyed both sides' broad-based
political support before taking office, he asserted. In
contrast, the Greek Cypriot proposal, which envisioned direct
election of a Greek Cypriot president and Turkish Cypriot
vice president on a common ticket with the incumbents
switching positions periodically, looked disenfranchising and
unstable. Because the G/C community dwarfed the T/C
community in size, it effectively would determine the winners
of both slots, he contended. Further, while pro-solution

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parties like his CTP and AKEL might succeed in forging a
pre-election pact and campaiging in the other community,
Talat could never imagine nationalist forces like UBP or DIKO
ever doing the same, resulting in the effective
disenfranchisement of these parties. Bi-communal coalitions
were easier to forge after, not before, popular elections.


5. (C) Bryza observed that Christofias worried the T/Cs'
call for more competencies to devolve to the constituent
states reflected a T/C shift toward a confederation rather
than a federation. Talat responded by criticizing
Christofias's CyProb competence, claiming "he is simply not
that knowledgable of past settlement efforts." He pointed to
the G/C side's insistence that residual powers belonged to
the federal government. "All UN efforts back to the the
Ghali Set of Ideas (1992) stipulated that these powers
belonged to the states (e.g. powers not explicitly assigned
to the federal government). Why else have we been
negotiating for weeks the competencies of the federal
government?" Talat questioned. Similarly, past UN plans
allowed for the constituent states to ensure their "citizens"
maintained clear majorities in both population and land
ownership, a concept which Christofias was now opposing.
Talat also refuted the allegation that the the reunified
state must be a metamorphosis of the existing RoC into a
federal entity, claiming that the UN resolutions took no
position.

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Talks Not All Bad, But Need Some Work
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6. (C) Christofias's election in February 2009 had brought a
new sense of purpose to the bi-communal talks, and the T/C
leader did not doubt his counterpart's commitment to reaching
a settlement. "I worry more about his coalition 'allies,'"
Talat revealed. DISY and its pro-solution leader Nikos
Anastassiades could provide Christofias political cover to
negotiate, but the President was allowing his "ideological
antagonism" toward the right-wing party to prevail over
pragmatic need.


7. (C) He and Christofias had reached convergence in various
areas and would continue to ink successes as the talks
progressed to other chapters. The pace did not satisfy,
however. Nor could the sides ever close the remaining gaps
in order to allow a plan to go to referenda without external
help. "Here, the UN must play a greater role, either through
arbitration or mediation," Talat reckoned. The international
community might also assist by assigning envoys to the
process. He hoped the Obama administration would take that
step.


8. (C) Coming "parliamentary" elections (April 19) could
affect the direction of settlement talks and limit his
maneuvering room, Talat admitted. A victory by the
pro-solution CTP was therefore essential. Should nationalist
UBP prevail, the "government" could tie his hands, or at
least make negotiations a far harder proposition. Talat had
said the same to Christofias, and he thought the G/C leader
understood his predicament. The U.S. and international
community might electorally aid the CTP -- and thereby, the
solution effort -- by praising progress tallied so far in the
talks. Further efforts to reduce Turkish Cypriot isolation
could prove even more beneficial to pro-solution forces, he
concluded.

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Bryza Responds
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9. (C) Bryza concurred that the pace of negotiations could
be quicker, noting that every day that passed without a
solution raised the risk of failure to reunify the island.
The U.S. was continually searching for EU partners to make
that point to Greek Cypriots. He worried the G/Cs might
overestimate Ankara's willingness to concede in Cyprus talks
to smoothe its accession path. Still, during his talks in
Nicosia, he had seen a far more constructive Greek Cypriot
stance in comparison to that of 2006, when hard-line former
President Tassos Papadopoulos called the shots. Christofias
and chief negotiator George Iacovou seemed willing to deal in
a give-and-take negotiation and had pitched some creative
ideas, such as those on deadlock-breaking mechanisms in the
legislature and judiciary. He hoped Talat would give them
full consideration and respond in kind. (Comment:
Immediately prior to the Talat meeting, T/C negotiator Ozdil
Nami handed Bryza a copy of the coming-into-being of the
federative state, dubbing it a constructive response to the

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G/Cs' constructive proposal earlier in the week on
deadlock-breaking mechanisms. A quick review indicated that
it was indeed a constructive T/C proposal.)


10. (C) As usual, the USG stood willing to use its good
offices to further the process, Bryza assured. A U.S.
special envoy might eventually serve to "even the playing
field" between the internationally-recognized RoC and the
Turkish Cypriot side, for example. The appointment was not
off the table, but was not being contemplated at the moment.
Once the negotiators had completed the first pass through the
settlement chapters and shifted from laying out their
positions to horse-trading, the question of an envoy deserved
another look.


11. (U) DAS Bryza has cleared this message.
Urbancic