CYPRUS: TURKISH "AMBASSADOR" ON LIMNITIS,

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 NICOSIA 000344

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR EUR/SE, IO/UNP

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/23/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV UNFICYP TU CY
SUBJECT: CYPRUS: TURKISH "AMBASSADOR" ON LIMNITIS,
VAROSHA, ERCAN, AND UNFICYP

REF: A. MACRIS-EUR/SE MAY 22 E-MAIL

B. NICOSIA 333

C. NICOSIA 327

D. NICOSIA 300

Classified By: Ambassador Frank C. Urbancic for reasons 1.4(b) and 1.4(
d)


1. (C) At a May 22 working lunch with the Ambassador, Sakir
Fakili, the Turkish "Ambassador" to the "TRNC," did not
respond substantively to the Ambassador's call for a
compromise to allow the eventual opening of the
Limnitis/Yesilirmak crossing point in northwest Cyprus.
Fakili instead voiced full support for the May 21 demand of
Turkish Cypriot (T/C) leader Mehmet Ali Talat to include
large-scale T/C troop movements (albeit in civilian clothes)
as part of "free passage" to the T/C enclave of Kokkina. The
requirement that troops could also use Limnitis was
long-standing and the UN had long been aware, he said. On
the Cyprus issue in general, Fakili called for iron-clad
bizonality and only grudgingly accepted that members of the
two communities might live side-by-side in the same
constituent state. He pressed the Ambassador on the need for
a "Plan B" (read, an upgrading of the status of the "TRNC")
if the present UN-brokered process were to collapse. Fakili
also sought the withdrawal of UNFICYP or, barring that, an
overhaul of its mandate. Domestically, he waxed favorably
about the nationalist, solution-skeptical National Unity
Party (UBP) "government" and pointedly noted that Turkey
would not "play the role of the IMF" to the notoriously
profligate Turkish Cypriots. Fakili redirected a request for
Embassy consular access to the walled-off city of Varosha to
inspect abandoned AmCit properties, claiming that T/Cs were
responsible for that decision and the city, not Turkey.
Responding to the Ambassador's query over a now-stalled
proposal to allow communication between T/C and G/C air
traffic controllers to prevent in-air collisions, Fakili's
economic adviser said a formal "letter of agreement" between
the sides would be required. End Summary.

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Crossing of Troops Still a Red Line
--------------


2. (C) Fakili, accompanied by First Counselor Bekir Usyal
and Second Counselor Levent Eler, discussed with the
Ambassador recent efforts to reach a compromise on opening
the Limnitis/Yesilirmak crossing point, a stalled
confidence-building measure (CBM) and lately the source of
great discord between the sides. The Ambassador said that he
had been surprised by Talat on May 20 insisting on the need
to transport small amounts of fuel to Kokkina, especially
after the Greek Cypriots apparently had agreed to most of a
UN-devised bargain that involved the G/Cs supplying
electricity to the pocket in lieu of fuel, allowing the
passage of commodities (save fuel and lethal items),and
permitting the transit of the relatives of T/C soldiers
(regardless of whether or not they would otherwise be
considered RoC citizens).


3. (C) Fakili claimed that the G/C offer on electricity had
not been "confirmed," a line Talat himself had used with the
Ambassador (Ref B). He then said that the Turkish Cypriots'
latest position on Limnitis -- to allow the movement of large
numbers of T/C soldiers in civilian dress to Kokkina -- was
actually long-standing, despite UN Special Adviser Alexander
Downer and the Greek Cypriots' surprise when Talat tabled it
at the contentious May 21 leaders' meeting (Ref B). Fakili
insisted that "free passage" meant just that, and only
ammunition, armaments and large amounts of fuel were
excluded. Adviser Eler claimed the proposal hailed from
October 2007. Fakili argued that there was "no difference
between troop rotation (the concept that had led RoC
President Demetris Christofias to blow up at Talat on May 21)
and soldiers crossing in civilian dress." The Ambassador
urged Fakili to have Talat transmit to Downer his exact
proposal regarding the movement of troops to Kokkina.

--------------
"No mixing" of Turkish and Greek Cypriots
--------------


4. (C) Fakili told the Ambassador that it was difficult to be
"overly optimistic" about the overall negotiations,
especially given the turbulence over Limnitis/Yesilirmak, but
he was pleased with the efforts of Talat. On bizonality, a
key T/C demand, he thought there would be "no residential

NICOSIA 00000344 002.3 OF 003


mixing" of Turkish and Greek Cypriots post-solution. He
quickly clarified his comments, however, stating that there
would be "ceilings" that limited G/C settlement in a future
T/C constituent state. (Note: Our pro-solution T/C
contacts, both in Talat's office and the "TRNC MFA", claim
that Turkey wants as ethnically pure a T/C constituent state
as possible, even if this means giving up more territory in
return.)

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Demand for a "Plan B"
--------------


5. (C) Fakili emphasized the need for a "Plan B" (read, an
upgrading of "TRNC's" status) in case the G/Cs rejected a new
peace plan, as they had done in 2004. He complained about
"unfilled promises made to the Turkish Cypriots" during the
Annan period, and noted that constant G/C demands for the
abolishment of Turkey's guarantor rights meant that those
rights needed to be enumerated clearly in any new plan.
Regarding the possibility of a second G/C NO vote, the
Ambassador reckoned that, if a plan were to reach a
referendum, it would be supported by the political leadership
on both sides, unlike 2004.

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"No need for UNFICYP"
--------------


6. (C) The Ambassador asked Fakili for the Turkish side's
general impressions of the UN presence on Cyprus. "There is
no need for UNFICYP," he assessed flatly, stating it was the
Turkish military in 1974 that had brought relative security
to the island. He was displeased by recent complaints that
Turkish forces increasingly were limiting UNFICYP movement
and access in the north, and bothered by the criticism his
side had received in the Secretary General's most recent
report (May) to the Security Council. Fakili leveled a
number of minor grievances toward the UN contingent: use of
official vehicles by UNFICYP personnel in civilian clothes
for unofficial purposes (Note: long a UN practice, a
considered well within the mandate),the continued UN
transport of humanitarian goods to "wealthy" G/C and Maronite
enclaved villages, and its "slanted" reporting of buffer zone
violations. His real criticism was directed at UNSCR 186
(1964),which had recognized the Republic of Cyprus -- by
that point bereft of Turkish Cypriot representation -- as the
"legitimate" government on the island. UNFICYP needed to
operate on the principle of the sides' "political equality"
on Cyprus, he continued, suggesting that UNSCR 186 might have
to be "amended" to reflect this reality. Fakili claimed that
UNFICYP forces were at best "guests" in the north, since they
had no status of forces agreement with the Turks. The
Ambassador replied that, if Fakili wanted, he would pass on
to UNFICYP any issues the Turks might have with their
operation, in an effort to resolve problems speedily.

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"Eroglu Cooperating"
--------------


7. (C) Fakili said that new UBP "Prime Minister" Dervish
Eroglu was "cooperating" and was fully aware of Turkey's
continuing strong support for Talat in the ongoing peace
process. He praised the make-up of the new "government,"
including the presence of businessmen as "Ministers" of
Finance and Public Works, claiming that the markets had
positively responded to their appointment (Note: While
our more candid UBP contacts complain that the present
"government" consists exclusively of party loyalists, not
technocrats or experts, we believe they are at least as
qualified as the poor-performing "ministers" in the previous
CTP "government." Ersin Tatar, the "Minister" of Finance, is
wanted in the UK for his alleged link to the "Polly Peck"
scandal, however.)


8. (C) After economic expert Bekir Usyal had said the Turkish
Cypriots needed to control expenditures and reform the
bloated public sector, Fakili sharply clarified that Turkey
would not "act like the IMF" by setting conditions for its
aid to the "TRNC." (Note: if true, the "no conditionality"
pledge represents a change in policy. The previous,
not-AKP-friendly Republic Turkish Party (CTP)-led
"government" was forced to call early elections after Turkey
closed the money spigot in the absence of implementation of
significant "public sector" cuts and other fiscal reform.)


NICOSIA 00000344 003 OF 003


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Claims T/Cs control Access to Varosha
--------------


9. (C) The Ambassador urged Fakili to approve Embassy
consular access, blocked by Turkey since 2005, to a number of
abandoned, AmCit-owned properties in the fenced off city of
Varosha. Fakili claimed unconvincingly that Turkish Cypriots
controlled access to Varosha, and said that we should appeal
directly to Talat, since the T/C Security Forces, under
General Recep, were responsible for ingress and egress.
(Note: General Recep is a Turkish general. Under the "TRNC
Constitution, he and all T/C police and military forces
report to the Turkish General Staff, not Talat. Sympathetic
Turkish Cypriots in the "MFA" have told us they have
absolutely no control over Varosha, and that decisions over
access rest with the TGS. The zone is plastered with
standard red Turkish militar "KEEP OUT" signs as seen across
the Turkish mainland.) The Ambassador responded that we
would continue to pursue the issue. He warned that our
inability to inspect AmCit properties in Varosha might draw
negative attention from Members of the U.S. Congress who were
increasingly visiting Cyprus, especially if they had
property-owning constituents.

-------------- --------------
Need Letter of Agreement to fix air traffic control problem
-------------- --------------


10. (C) In response to the Ambassador's question regarding
the fate of a scheme to allow direct communication between
Ercan and Larnaca air traffic control via EuroControl in
Brussels and Ankara, Uysal said there would be no problem if
the G/Cs agreed to "direct contact" with Ercan (a G/C
red-line that had been obviated by the scheme's proposed
technical routing through Brussels and Ankara.) Moreover, he
added that letters of agreement between Ankara, Ercan, and
Larnaca would have to be signed in Brussels with EuroControl
to get the project off the ground -- seemingly another
non-starter for the Greek Cypriot side. Fakili noted that
Turkey had fully financed a "Smart Project" at Ercan that,
when completed in the near future, would not only be more
advanced than the G/C air traffic control system, but would
also serve as an emergency back-up for all of Turkish air
traffic control. (Note: Turkish sensitivities on control of
air space post-solution have already been felt during the
present negotiations. A contact in Talat's office told us
that T/C demands for two flight control regions (FIRs) had in
fact come from Ankara and were non-negotiable.)
Urbancic