Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09NICOSIA342
2009-05-26 13:31:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Nicosia
Cable title:  

CYPRUS: COMPROMISE POSSIBLE ON LIMNITIS

Tags:  PREL PGOV UNFICYP CY TU 
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RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHNC #0342/01 1461331
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 261331Z MAY 09
FM AMEMBASSY NICOSIA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 9889
INFO RUEHTH/AMEMBASSY ATHENS 0018
RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA 5472
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 1459
C O N F I D E N T I A L NICOSIA 000342 

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/SE, IO/UNP

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/24/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV UNFICYP CY TU
SUBJECT: CYPRUS: COMPROMISE POSSIBLE ON LIMNITIS

REF: A. NICOSIA 333

B. NICOSIA 327

Classified By: Ambassador Frank C. Urbancic, Reasons 1.4 (b),(d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L NICOSIA 000342

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/SE, IO/UNP

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/24/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV UNFICYP CY TU
SUBJECT: CYPRUS: COMPROMISE POSSIBLE ON LIMNITIS

REF: A. NICOSIA 333

B. NICOSIA 327

Classified By: Ambassador Frank C. Urbancic, Reasons 1.4 (b),(d)


1. (C) SUMMARY: UN Special Adviser Alexander Downer on May
25 secured buy-in from Greek and Turkish Cypriot negotiators
George Iacovou and Ozdil Nami on a compromise plan to allow
the Limnitis/Yesilirmak Buffer Zone crossing to open.
Iacovou and Nami must now "sell" the plan to Demetris
Christofias and Mehmet Ali Talat, with Downer hoping to
announce the measure after the leaders' May 28 meeting.
Constructive ambiguity dominates the four-point agreement,
aiming to bridge the sides' opposing positions on use of
Limnitis by Turkish Cypriot military and their family
members. For it to work, Talat and Christofias must
coordinate their messages to respective media and
hard-liners. END SUMMARY.


2. (C) Downer on Memorial Day (May 25) urgently sought a
meeting with the Ambassador and UK High Commissioner Peter
Millett. He told the envoys that Iacovou and Nami, meeting
(with their teams) that morning ostensibly to discuss
economic issues, instead had peeled off to tackle Limnitis, a
contentious confidence-building measure which a week ago had
caused public acrimony between the leaders (reftels). Downer
opened the Iacovou-Nami meeting with an admonition: the
sides' positions were divergent and well-known, and unless
one or both reconsidered, the matter had reached a dead-end
that would damage perceptions that a wider Cyprus settlement
could be reached. He suggested they move on to substantive
issues.


3. (C) Instead, Iacovou and Nami began to discuss the
crossing -- though only after the always-pendantic G/C
negotiator lectured 30 minutes on the genesis of the Limnitis
impasse. Downer believed that Talat may have felt pressure
to act not from the Turkish Army, but rather from T/C
municipal leaders in the Limnitis area who contend that the
crossing would economically revitalize their region.
Regardless of the reasons, Nami engaged seriously in 90
minutes of give-and-take, after which the sides agreed on an
ad referndum four-point agreement to present to their
respective leaders. According to the compromise (verbatim,

and please protect),

-- Limnitis crossing will be opened under normal rules.

-- The G/Cs will connect the enclave of Kokkina to the Cyprus
Electrical Authority grid.

-- A bus will be authorized to travel several times a week
from the T/C checkpoint at Limnitis to the Kokkina enclave
and back at predetermined times. The bus will be under the
exclusive jurisdiction of UNFICYP from the T/C checkpoint to
the enclave at Kokkina and back.

-- UNFICYP will inspect and supervise the transport of
foodstuffs and other civilian supplies from Limnitis to
Kokkina.


4. (C) Downer acknowledged that the framework agreement
depended on constructive ambiguity. Passing line-by-line
through the text, he interpreted "Limnitis crossing will be
opened under normal rules" to mean all Turkish Cypriots,
including T/C military in civilian clothes and their
"settler" family members, could transit. Point 2 was
straightforward and technically feasible and should be
accepted by both sides. Point 3 had received significant
attention from Iacovou and Nami, primarily over who would
enjoy ridership privileges and how they might be accounted;
Nami was adamant, for example, that the "TRNC" could not
discriminate between its T/C- and mainland Turkish-origin
"citizens." With Downer's mediation, they eventually agreed
not to stipulate formally any ridership criteria and to
perform a simple passenger count (to ensure the same number
disembarked who embarked). Point 4 had been attached to meet
G/C concerns that shipment of agricultural products and
foodstuffs through Limnitis to Kokkina not range far from EU
Green Line Regulation norms in force at the other crossings.


5. (C) Turning to the source of the latest Limnitis hiccup
-- Talat's position that Turkish Cypriots be allowed to
transport small quantities of vehicle fuel to Kokkina even
after the electrical hook-up is complete -- Downer winked
that the Turkish Cypriot vehicles using the crossing might
carry "a jerry can or two of gas... for the tractor of the
shepherd still living in Kokkina." He thought Christofias
likely could accept the ambiguity of the agreement, but was
less sure of Talat's reactions. The ball was now with Nami
and Iacovou to convince their leaders to accept it; Downer
hoped Christofias and Talat would announce the measure after
their upcoming meeting on May 28. UKHC Millett mentioned
that Foreign Secretary David Miliband would be arriving in
Ankara shortly for consultations and asked Downer if his boss
should raise the compromise. The UN envoy responded
positively but suggested an indirect approach, saying only
that Limnitis was delaying progress on key substantive issues
and the parties should make great efforts to resolve it.



6. (C) Comment: Downer emphasized rightly that this deal is
tentative at best and asked that we ensure that details
remain strictly within U.S. and UK channels. Successfully
bridging the sides' divergent positions on Limnitis requires
both to accept a broadly-written, ambiguous compromise text,
and even with Downer's interpretation, this represents real
compromise by both sides. In the UN envoy's short briefing,
however, he did not give the impression that he or his staff
had considered fully the reactions to the deal of the media
and hard-line camps in both the G/C and T/C communities. For
example, Greek Cypriot nationalists last week protested
loudly against Talat's latest "demands" that fuel and
"Turkish settlers" be allowed to cross Limnitis to Kokkina.
When they ping Christofias again, will the
not-always-courageous President deploy his constructively
ambiguous points, or will he counter that he would never
accept such demands -- likely spurring an equally firm
response from Talat and possibly scuttling the deal? Serious
efforts by the Good Offices mission to convince G/Cs and T/Cs
to coordinate their responses will be imperative. The
Embassy will work with Downer and his team toward that end.
Urbancic