CYPRUS: TALAT IN FOUL MOOD ON LIMNITIS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 NICOSIA 000333

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/SE, IO/UNP

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/19/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV UNFICYP CY TU
SUBJECT: CYPRUS: TALAT IN FOUL MOOD ON LIMNITIS

REF: A. NICOSIA 327

B. NICOSIA 306

Classified By: Ambassador Frank C. Urbancic, Reasons 1.4 (b),(d)


1. (C) SUMMARY: Turkish Cypriot leader Mehmet Ali Talat
continues to demand the right to transport vehicle fuel to
the T/C military enclave in Kokkina as quid pro quo for the
opening of a Buffer Zone (BZ) crossing at Limnitis. During a
May 20 meeting with the Ambassador, Talat explained he could
not domestically sell a "concession" like opening Limnitis --
which in his view benefited only Greek Cypriots living in
isolated Pyrgos village -- without obtaining something in
return; the UN-brokered compromise which entailed G/Cs
providing electricity to Kokkina was insufficient. He
criticized G/C leader Demetris Christofias for publicizing
elements of the UN plan, which had made further fine-tuning
problematic on both sides of the Green Line. News regarding
other CBMs was better: hindrance-free ambulance crossings
should begin soon, the communities were already staffing a
communications cell to share information on criminal
activity, and cultural heritage experts were engaging on a
bicommunal work plan. He and Christofias would meet on May
21 in one of the final meetings on economic matters;
convergences existed, but significant gaps remained. Talat
still clung to hopes that the first and second reads of all
core negotiating topics would complete by summer's end,
allowing give-and-take to begin in September. One day after
this meeting, however, Talat and Christofias's tete-a-tete on
Limnitis ended disastrously, leaving the UN and the
international community brainstorming ways of keeping the
process on track. END SUMMARY.

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Ambassador Makes Urgent Pitch on Crossing
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2. (C) After obtaining a telephonic readout from UN Special
Adviser Alexander Downer on his May 18-20 visits to Ankara
and Athens, the Ambassador on May 20 requested an urgent
meeting with the Turkish Cypriot leader, primarily to discuss
progress on opening Limnitis. The two immediately began a
discussion of the Limnitis crossing -- lately the source of
discord between the leaders and a worsening negotiating
environment between the sides. The Ambassador recounted his
very first substantive engagement with Talat, which focused
on Limnitis; Talat had explained that the crossing would only
benefit Greek Cypriots living near Pyrgos, and to open it and
not receive a black eye in the process, he needed payback.
The UN-brokered compromise that involved the G/Cs providing
electricity to Kokkina, drastically reducing the frequency
and cost of shipping fuel to the enclave, seemed just the
political cover that Talat needed, the Ambassador thought.
On the other hand, delaying the deal by demanding a minimal
quantity of vehicle fuel (which Talat estimated at 50 gallons
per week) seemed counter-productive. Since some form of
seaborne resupply would continue regardless, mainly for arms
and ammunition, the fuel could be transported on those
vessels and easily stored at Kokkina, obviating the need for
the unacceptable-to-G/Cs ground shipment.


3. (C) The Ambassador also highlighted the positive role on
Limnitis being played by certain elements of the Church. The
Bishop of Kykkos and his allies had been preaching calm to
the aggravated residents of Pyrgos, for example who were
threatening actions to close other BZ crossings if their
demands on Limnitis went unmet. Continued T/C refusal to
establish the crossing risked marginalizaling the
pro-solution Kykkos on the Holy Synod, further buttressing
rejectionist hard-liners like Archbishop Chrysostomos. The
Ambassador emphasized that reaching agreement on Limnitis
would show decision makers in Washington and the broader
international community -- many of whom question the sides'
political will -- that the Cypriot leaders were capable of
compromise on politically difficult matters. Last, a deal
would truly constitute a confidence-building step between the
sides, sorely needed at this time. He urged Talat to find a
way to get to "yes" on Limnitis.

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Unsure What Future Will Bring
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4. (C) Talat expressed disappointment that Christofias had
leaked news of the Limnitis compromise and was now publicly
rejecting fuel delivery for Kokkina. Such announcements not
only boxed in Christofias, but himself as well -- "how can I
walk back my demand now?" he reasoned. Talat was unsure what
results the May 21 leaders meeting would bring on the

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crossing question. Both he and Christofias would be talking
to villagers on opposite sides of the crossing route in
coming days; Talat dismissed strong signs of support from the
T/C mukhtar (village elder),saying he only cared about a
repaved road that came as an eventual by-product to the
crossing's opening.


5. (C) Perceiving a need to clarify the genesis of the
Limnitis issue, the Turkish Cypriot leader walked through
recent developments. He rebutted a point voiced often by
Greek Cypriot negotiator George Iacovou: that T/Cs had
agreed unconditionally to open Limnitis in exchange for a G/C
green-light to open Ledra Street. Rather, Turkish Cypriots
needed payback for Limnitis, either unfettered access to
Kokkina or a new road into the bi-communal village of Pyla.
They had decided on Kokkina after uncovering a reference by a
former UNSYG that the Pyla road would confer military
advantage to Turkish Cypriots and thus should be opposed
under UNFICYP's mandate.


6. (C) Talat next recounted the T/Cs' original demands to
open the Limnitis crossing. All T/C relatives, not just
those whom the G/Cs considered "real" Turkish Cypriots,
needed access to Kokkina. Additionally, his side sought the
right to transport through the crossing all commodities save
armaments and munitions. He never thought the Greek Cypriots
would draw the line on fuel, which he had told Christofias he
needed because of G/C efforts between 1963 and 1974 to
"starve out" the Kokkina enclave by interrupting electrical
supplies. During the negotiations, Christofias surprisingly
had conceded on the "settlers" point but refused to budge on
gas; after the UN tabled the electrical hook-up compromise,
the G/C leader responded that he needed additional time to
consider it.


7. (C) Domestic political concerns were making it difficult
to negotiate on Limnitis, Talat assessed. Families of T/C
conscripts were demanding immediate access to Kokkina.
Hard-liners were insisting on "no concessions to G/Cs" and
would equate a retreat on overland fuel shipments to a major
defeat. And the military would see little utility in the
electrical arrangement if it still had to send fuel by sea to
the enclave. In a nutshell, the compromise as prepared was
not acceptable to the Turkish Cypriot side.


8. (C) Concluding the call, Talat dismissed the argument
that Limnitis represented a valuable CBM that would improve
prospects for progress on core CyProb subjects. "Look, we
opened Ledra Street. Did it help?" he argued, convinced the
answer was "no." Increased focus on CBMs would actually
perpetuate the status quo by making the current arrangement
more comfortable, "normalizing the non-solution conditions."


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More Progress on Other CBMs, Though
--------------


9. (C) Talat brightened on discussing positive movement in
other confidence-building measures. A bicommunal advisory
board tackling cultural heritage preservation was meeting
regularly and prioritizing possible projects, and the
heritage working group formed during last summer's
preparatory phase of negotiations remained active and
motivated. On environmental issues, a handful of
disagreements -- "but none that serious" -- were temporarily
halting progress, but Talat appeared optimistic they would be
overcome soon. Perhaps most promising, law enforcement
experts from both communities were staffing a crime/criminal
matters cell and sharing information. The only hiccup so far
was a Greek Cypriot demand for Sundays off for souvla and
backyard barbecues, Talat chuckled.

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G/Cs' Allegedly Slowing Progress on Economy
--------------


10. (C) He and Christofias would again discuss economic
matters on May 21, Talat noted. The issue was complex, the
working papers thick, and the staffwork to prepare the
leaders for meaningful talks voluminous. Convergence existed
between the sides' positions, but so did dissonance. Talat
was troubled by Greek Cypriot attempts to assign full
responsibility to the federal government for economic
relations with the EU and other international bodies, even on
matters of constituent state competence; the technical teams
were attempting to develop a compromise.


11. (C) Echoing a complaint voiced earlier by chief T/C

NICOSIA 00000333 003 OF 003


negotiator Ozdil Nami, Talat criticized Greek Cypriot
under-preparedness for the economic discussion. "They are
disorganized," he argued, and had moved from positions they
earlier had tabled during the preparatory phase of
negotiations (Note: G/Cs make the same accusations toward
Turkish Cypriots. UN participants in the economics-related
meetings confirm the T/Cs have been able to use G/Cs' lack of
coordination to shift the agenda.) Talat claimed the sides
had agreed last summer to assign development policy to the
constituent states. Now, however, Greek Cypriots sought to
make it a federal competency. "Perhaps Christofias is
motivated by his love for Soviet-style 5-year plans," the T/C
leader laughed. Concluding the meeting, Talat repeated his
hope that the first read of the core negotiating topics and a
second, gaps-bridging phase would be completed by summer's
end, allowing the leaders to begin horsetrading in September.

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Limnitis Hits the Fan
--------------


12. (C) Greek Cypriot television interrupted regular
programming at 1245 hrs local May 21, less than three hours
after the leaders meeting commenced, to cut to the
Presidential Palace . There, an upset Christofias voiced
great disappointment with Talat, "who was tabling new demands
for Limnitis's opening every time we meet." (Note: Downer
subsequently confirmed to the Ambassador that Talat had
insisted that T/C military units be permitted to use the
crossing for troop rotation.) Follow-on reports from Pyrgos
showed the G/C mukhtar and village leaders promising more
dynamic measures, such as the closing of the main BZ crossing
at Astromeritis, to publicize their plight.


13. (C) Downer telephoned the Ambassador at 1300 hrs with
news the Christofias-Talat tete-a-tete had been disastrous.
The Greek Cypriot leader had emerged from the leaders' room
silent, Downer recounted, but became enraged almost
immediately over the private Limnitis discussion.
Christofias calmed slightly, but no substantive discussions
on the economy chapter took place and the larger meeting
broke early. UN staff did manage to schedule another leaders
meeting in one week, but all involved worried that the recent
dust-up could prove serious. At 1600 hrs, the Ambassador and
UK High Commissioner Peter Millett engaged Downer for a
more-detailed readout of the day's events meeting and an
urgent brainstorming session aiming to avoid a slow-down in
the talks (septel).
Urbancic